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Abstract 
Issues and problems associated with the seriousness of tax non-compliance have 
increased dramatically over the years due to the widening tax gaps experienced by 
governments worldwide as a result of sophisticated transactions. To add to the severity of the 
situation are the concerns surrounding the difficulties associated with our abilities in defining 
what is meant by tax compliance, non-compliance and their relevant sub-categories. This 
study reviews both the international existing literature and New Zealand case law to examine 
how the concepts have (or have not) been defined over the years within particular studies and 
case law. The results are presented in the form of a critical literature review where the 
definitions (or descriptions) for the concepts are organized into tables, in order to compare 
how the definitions have (or have not) been ‗improved‘ over the years. Lastly, this study 
discusses the implications regarding whether ‗universal‘ definitions can or should be 
developed and attributed to each of the concepts in order to clear the murkiness between our 
understanding of the various concepts of tax compliance, non-compliance, and their sub-
categories.  
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Topic 
Debate regarding tax compliance and non-compliance is a never-ending matter. This 
is largely due to governments relying to a significant degree on the collection of taxes from 
taxpayers to achieve their goals and objectives. With the ‗actual‘ tax liability of taxpayers 
usually somewhat different from what taxpayers actually declare and pay, governments are 
unwillingly experiencing a widened tax gap (Reckers et al., 1994; James and Alley, 1999; 
Richardson and Sawyer, 2001; and Manly et al., 2005 ).  
A decade or so ago, the level of annual unpaid taxes in New Zealand remained at a 
fairly low percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP), estimated at around 2 to 4 percent 
(Tan, 1998). However, the level of unpaid taxes more recently has increased to approximately 
10 to 12 percent of GDP (Business NZ, 2004) as taxpayers are becoming more ‗actively‘ 
involved in non-compliant activities. Although some commentators (for example: see 
McBarnet, 2003 and Picciotto, 2007) hold the view that the level of compliance can be 
improved through the adoption of policies and regulations by either the use of clear language 
or the application of ―precise or specific rules rather than more abstract general principles‖ 
(Picciotto, 2007, p. 12), it is not as easily seen in practice as in theory without practical 
problems.  
Across the Tasman, Australia‘s Government is equally committed to adopting a series 
of policies and regulations to increase the compliance rate from its taxpayers. Since the early 
1970s, taxpayers have become more involved in ―taking advantage of many structural 
loopholes in the taxation laws to minimise tax‖ (Xynas, 2010, p. 1). In 1985, the amount of 
revenue losses as a result of tax avoidance and evasion schemes has been estimated to be 
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around $3 billion
1
 per year (Xynas, 2010). Because of the significant amount of taxes that are 
uncollectable, the Australian Government has allocated an annual budget of around $1 billion 
(Australian Taxation Office, 2011) to combat this deteriorating situation. But regardless of 
the initiatives implemented by the Government, it is impractical to assume that the (voluntary) 
compliance rate will ever be at 100 percent, as some taxpayers are risk-seeking where they 
challenge the tax laws and loopholes to minimize their true tax liabilities.  
From the figures released on the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
website (IRS, 2006), the gross tax gap in the United States in 2001 is estimated to be around 
$US345 billion (IRS, 2006),  and represents a non-compliance rate of around 16 percent (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, 2009).
2
 This is a significant increase from the estimated figure of 
around US$170 billion in 1993 (Hasseldine and Li, 1999). A significant proportion of the tax 
gap in the United States is the result of offshore tax evasion activities where it produces an 
estimated $100 billion in unpaid taxes annually (Wolfe, 2008). The United States‘ 
Government has a number of initiatives
3
 implemented with the objective to combat the 
seriousness of the non-compliance (predominantly tax avoidance and tax evasion) problem. 
However, the tax evasion problem is still widespread and a continuous ‗threat‘ to the 
government in terms of how much tax revenue they can collect from their taxpayers.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 This figure has not been adjusted for inflation. Should the value have been adjusted, the $3 billion in 1985 
would be equal to approximately $6.3 billion in 2011 (http://www.coinnews.net/tools/cpi-inflation-calculator/).   
2
 However, after accounting for enforcement efforts and late payments, the amount of the tax gap is reduced to 
$290 billion, and represents a non-compliance rate of around 13.7 percent (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
2009). 
3
 For a comprehensive list of the initiatives and proposals, please see: ―Update on reducing the federal tax gap 
and improving voluntary compliance,‖ a document drafted by the United States Department of the Treasury 
(2009). 
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It is interesting to note that, from the document drafted by the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury (2009), they do not view the term ‗tax gap‘ as a synonymous for the ‗underground 
economy‘4 because the amount of the gross tax gap may not necessarily be the result of non-
compliance in the form of tax avoidance or tax evasion. Examples of possible ‗innocent‘ 
reasons for not complying with the tax regulation such as, confusion, carelessness or errors of 
ignorance may also contribute to the growing tax gap (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
2009). But undeniably, a significant proportion of the tax gap is highly likely to be the result 
of non-compliant activities, and this leads to ―sizeable budgetary implications, and 
implications for taxation incidence and income distribution‖ (Giles, 1999, p. 2).  
Apart from the instant revenue loss experienced by the government, other unavoidable 
negative effects of the tax gap as a result of non-compliant activities include, ―[the] growing 
disrespect for the tax system and the law, increasing complex tax legislation, the uneconomic 
allocation of resources, an unfair shifting of the tax burden and a weakening of the ability of 
Parliament and National Treasury to set and implement economic policy‖ (South African 
Revenue Service, p. 9).  These impacts will, as a result, affect the ―efficiency and equity of 
[the] tax systems‖ (Evans, 2007, p. 6), and possibly to the overall function of a country‘s 
economy. 
Contributing to the growing tax gap as a consequence of more taxpayers being 
actively engaged in non-compliant activities has been an increase in more taxpayers being 
‗targeted‘ by revenue authorities, where they are likely to face either penalties or 
imprisonment (depending on the severity and legality of the issue) imposed by the Judiciary. 
Over the years, case law has dealt with a growing number of (similar) situations where 
taxpayers have either challenged or contravened the relevant legislation, either intentionally 
                                                          
4
 Within this thesis, the ‗underground economy‘ is broadly viewed as the total value of goods and services 
produced, but without official measurement by the country that produced them (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 2009).  
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or without the requisite knowledge. As a result, a variety of different approaches and 
principles have been adopted through existing literature and particularly case law in an 
attempt to define and determine what actions are to be constituted as tax compliance and tax 
non-compliance behaviours.  
However, the highly complex tax environment has impeded the search for harmonized 
definitions for tax compliance, non-compliance and their relevant sub-categories. The last 
decade in New Zealand alone has seen a number of significant cases
5
 associated closely with 
either tax avoidance or tax evasion behaviour. The judgments of the cases appear to be 
placing an importance on the substance and form of the transaction at issue first, before 
adopting various approaches and relevant legislations in order to determine the outcome of 
the particular case. During the process of reaching the decision outcome for a particular case, 
the courts also consider previous cases that are of a similar nature to act as ‗precedents‘ for 
the case at issue. However, the problem arises when different approaches are adopted by the 
Judiciary, making it difficult for taxpayers to fully understand objectively what is deemed to 
be acceptable behaviour and what is not. 
Nevertheless, these cases have enhanced our general understanding for behavioural 
tax compliance and non-compliance, by way of example, but clearly, there is still scope for 
more research to be conducted due to the changes in taxpayer behaviours and the need to 
adopt ‗universal‘ definitions for the major terms concerned with tax compliance and non-
compliance. However, this desired outcome may be difficult because of the various 
‗approaches‘ adopted by the Judiciary to determine the nature of the tax issue, in that they 
cannot be compressed into one solid approach due to the complexity of the facts and the 
nature of the activities involved in the individual cases. As a result, this study will also look 
                                                          
5
Cases such as Ben Nevis (―Trinity‖) and Penny & Hooper can be viewed as representations of recent tax 
avoidance related cases in New Zealand, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3: Literature Review- 
New Zealand Case Law and Tax Compliance. 
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at the appropriateness of having various approaches when determining the outcome of case 
law, as well as attempting to place a ‗universal‘ definition for the key concepts of tax 
compliance and non-compliance.  
Therefore, this study focuses predominantly on two main areas, namely, existing 
literature and case law. Through the research on existing literature and case law, this study 
sets out to examine whether it is feasible to draw comparisons between how the key terms are 
understood and comprehended, as well as examining whether problems (or conflicts) may 
arise if the definitions for the concepts are becoming more consistent.  In addition, this study 
will examine possible relationships between existing studies and case law, and assess whether 
‗universal‘ definitions can (or should) be established for the terms associated with tax 
compliance, non-compliance and their sub-categories. 
1.2 Importance of the Topic  
Over the years, the number of studies and case law within the area of tax compliance 
and non-compliance has increased dramatically due to the substantial rise in the level of 
uncollected taxes by governments. With the number of existing studies and case law, one 
would assume that the definitions for the concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance 
would be defined clearly, and that any ambiguities with the concepts would have been 
eliminated (or at least reduced). Unfortunately, this has not (yet) been achieved. However, 
there is a common understanding that tax compliance refers to taxpayers who pay their share 
of tax liabilities, whereas, non-compliance refers to taxpayers who don‘t and, tax avoidance is 
legal and tax evasion is illegal. But ‗comprehensive‘ definitions for each of these concepts 
have yet to be established across studies (in particular) and case law, largely because of the 
reason that ―tax has the reputation of being a complex subject‖ (Richardson, 1967, p. 6).  
Therefore, throughout this study, the difficulties in attempting to establish a ‗universal‘ 
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definition for tax compliance and non-compliance in both areas, especially in case law 
scenarios where the facts of each case are bound to be different, will be examined closely.  
A further complication arises as a result of the emphasis of most studies focusing 
predominantly on what variables influence the behaviours of tax compliance and non-
compliance, rather than placing a greater importance on what the concepts mean and 
categorising what kind of taxpayer behaviours may constitute as being either compliance or 
non-compliance. Changes affecting taxpayers‘ willingness to cooperate may be divided 
between external and internal variables. External variables have generally included the 
examination of changes in the tax rate and the probability of audits, as well as studies 
conducted from economics‘ perspective. On the other hand, psychological studies have 
focused on internal variables, such as, taxpayers‘ knowledge and their attitude towards the 
tax system. Although the study of these variables enhance our understanding on the overall 
topic of behavioural tax compliance, a shift in the focus of study may further enhance the 
value output of a particular study in the future.  
Adding to the complexity of the topic are recent issues such as self-assessment 
opportunities, the emergence of a more global economy, and the complexity and 
sophistication of commercial transactions (Simser, 2008). Above that, more and more 
existing studies have seen the importance of distinguishing between ‗layers‘ of compliance, 
and ‗sub-categories‘ of non-compliance. However, the ability to differentiate objectively 
between the ‗layers‘ and ‗sub-categories‘ of tax compliance and non-compliance remains 
questionable, especially in circumstances where researchers have different approaches 
towards understanding a particular concept, and therefore, how the concept is categorised by 
the researcher of that particular study. These problems add to the difficulties of the Inland 
Revenue Department (IRD) or similar organizations, to determine appropriate penalty levels 
and the categorization of compliance and non-compliance behaviours demonstrated by 
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taxpayers. Not only will it be the IRD (or similar organizations) who experience the 
difficulties and challenges associated with the issue, but it is also important to consider the 
problem from the perspective of taxpayers and practitioners who are closely related to the 
various tax issues (either directly or indirectly). In addition, it is also important to consider 
those who may be ‗exposed‘ to civil and/or criminal penalties and punishments if there is no 
clear (or clearer) distinction between the concepts of tax compliance, non-compliance and the 
relevant sub-categories.  
As for case law, the difficulty associated with the establishment of universal 
definitions lie in the variety of possible legislative forms of non-compliance, as well as the 
uniqueness and individuality of the facts associated with each of the cases. Although it is 
possible to come across two cases with extremely similar circumstances, the similarity in the 
facts presented to courts cannot be treated as an ‗easy‘ method to determine the outcome of a 
particular case (although preceding case does influence the treatment of the latter case, to an 
extent). Furthermore, the nature and type of non-compliant activities at issue for each 
individual case also raise difficulties in attempting to establish universal definitions for the 
concepts at issue.  
Since there are no predetermined definitions for the concepts of tax compliance and 
non-compliance, the decision and outcome of the each case is the result of studying similar 
cases by drawing similarities and differences (by way of precedent) through the relevant 
approaches and principles. Therefore, by studying relevant case law, some possible 
similarities may become apparent as to how the understandings of tax compliance and non-
compliance have been articulated under different scenarios, and whether a pattern of use for 
the relevant concepts can be formed to establish universal definitions for tax compliance and 
non-compliance. 
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1.3 Objectives of the Study 
Before embarking onto the focus of the study, it is necessary to determine what the 
concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance represent within this study. The starting 
point for the concept of tax compliance would be to incorporate the well-established 
definition adopted by the Inland Revenue Service (IRS) where taxpayers file ―accurate, 
timely, and fully paid return without IRS enforcement efforts‖ (Jackson and Milliron, 1986, p. 
130). On the other hand, tax non-compliance is intended to convey the notion where it is the 
opposite of tax compliance, where taxpayers may be engaged in various schemes (either 
intentionally or unintentionally), and involving themselves in either: tax avoidance, tax 
evasion, and ultimately, over-compliance activities and behaviours. The effects of tax 
compliance, non-compliance and their sub-categories will be considered in more depth in the 
following chapters, through the examination of two broad areas, namely: the current 
behavioural tax literature and case law. 
There are three main objectives for this study. First, this study focuses on the issues 
and problems surrounding what are meant by tax compliance and non-compliance. This study 
also explores whether existing confusion between these two main concepts can be reduced to 
some extent in order to enhance the comparability and understandability of future studies 
within this area.  
Second, this study looks at whether the definitions on each of the concepts of tax 
compliance, non-compliance and their sub-categories can be defined and organized into 
distinct groups after reviewing relevant literature from existing research studies and case law. 
Aligned with the second objective is the need to detect whether the definitions and 
understandings of the concepts are comparable between existing literature and case law.  
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Third, this study will attempt to develop a ‗universal‘ definition that can be applied to 
each of the concepts when combining the results from existing research and case law, and 
look at the potential problems that may exist as a result of higher uniformity in the definitions. 
It will also consider any problems that may arise if definitions cannot be made more 
consistent within specific the area of behavioural tax compliance and non-compliance.  
Therefore, based on the objectives of this study, the research question is formally 
stated as:  
“Whether the issues and problems of tax compliance, non-compliance and their 
relevant sub-categories can be reduced to an extent in both existing literature and case law if 
a „universal‟ definition is to be attributed to each of the associated concepts?” 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: First, a brief summary of what 
existing international tax behavioural research and recent case law from New Zealand have 
found is presented in the form of a detailed literature review in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. 
Second, the proposed research methods for this study are described in Chapter 4. Third, the 
research results are presented in the form of a critical review of international literature and 
New Zealand case law in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. Fourth, a discussion on the research 
results, as well as the contributions of this study is analyzed in Chapter 7. Finally, the 
conclusions, key limitations and potential areas for future research are outlined in Chapter 8.  
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2.0 Literature Review- Behavioural 
Tax Compliance 
2.1. Introduction 
Based on the objectives for this study, two broad areas, namely, existing tax 
behavioural literature and case law, relating to behavioural tax compliance and non-
compliance, will be examined in detail. As noted earlier, taxation can be perceived as a 
―complex phenomenon‖ (Franzoni, 2000, p. 52) where it may be impossible to define the 
concepts of tax compliance, non-compliance, and their sub-categories objectively. For 
example, Anderson (1993) emphasizes the challenge to measure tax evasion in an ‗agreed‘ 
way between studies due to the various factors that may influence how one understand and 
apply the concepts. This is evident from Anderson‘s (1993, p. 186) study where he believes 
that, ―what is perceived to be an acceptable level of compliance at one time may not be 
acceptable at another [time].‖ 
In addition, it is plausible that the definitions for tax compliance and non-compliance 
may be addressed from a variety of perspectives, which then further complicates the problem 
for taxpayers and researchers to understand the concepts fully. The complexity of the 
problem within tax compliance is mainly separated by whether compliance is voluntary or 
enforced, and whether taxpayers are acknowledging both the ‗spirit‘ and ‗letter‘ of the law‘. 
This is known in this study as the various ‗layers‘ of tax compliance. On the other hand, non-
compliance problems are predominantly associated with its sub-categories, such as, the 
existence of sub-categories such as: tax avoidance, tax evasion, and over-compliance. 
However, the common theme between tax compliance and non-compliance is the issue of 
whether a particular behaviour is ‗intentional‘ or ‗unintentional‘. This distinction raises 
another level of difficulty for understanding the concepts, but yet, an important aspect to 
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consider, as not all taxpayer activities resulting to non-compliance are intentional and not all 
compliant behaviours were intended by the taxpayers. The chapter will now begin its analysis 
on the area of tax compliance and non-compliance. 
2.2 Tax Compliance   
Under the main category of tax compliance underlies an important behaviour 
demonstrated by a majority of taxpayers to reduce their tax liabilities legally. This is 
commonly known as legitimate tax planning (or tax minimisation), where there are two main 
objectives for it. The first objective is to; of course, reduce the tax payable by the taxpayer, 
while the second objective is to defer the payment of tax liabilities due. Undoubtedly, there is 
a difficult line to draw between tax planning (which is perfectly legitimate and acceptable) 
and tax avoidance (legal but unacceptable). In addition to the difference between tax planning 
and tax avoidance, the term ‗aggressive tax planning‘ was introduced in the study by Murphy 
(2004, p. 307), where she defines the concept as when taxpayers are ―finding ways to 
accomplish compliance with the letter of the law while totally undermining the policy intent 
or spirit behind the words.‖  
In addition, tax planning behaviour involves taxpayers finding ways to ―exploit 
deficiencies or uncertainty in the law…‖ (Murphy, 2004, p. 307). This definition, along with 
other tax compliance definitions introduced later, shares similar characteristics with the 
definitions that separate out compliance with the ‗letter‘ of the law and compliance with the 
‗spirit‘ of the law. The term ‗tax mitigation‘ has also been occurring in studies (for example: 
see Sawyer, 1996 and Evans, 2007), where it is treated in a similar manner as tax planning. 
This variation in how the concepts are understood may be due to how different countries treat 
the terms, depending on how ‗accommodative‘ they are for each of the main tax terms. 
However, caution must be made to the extent of tax minimization techniques employed by 
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the taxpayers that they do not cross to the (blurred) line of (unacceptable) tax avoidance 
behaviour.  
Therefore, since tax planning, tax mitigation, and aggressive tax planning appear to be 
other approaches for understanding the layers of tax compliance, this study will exam tax 
compliance from another perspective (as described below) to allow for a more generic, yet, 
representative analysis of what behaviours can be incorporated under the main branch of tax 
compliance.  
As a result, for the section on tax compliance, this study has set out to examine the 
distinction between compliance with the letter/spirit of the law and whether compliance is 
voluntary/enforced, rather than clearing the confusion on how the concepts are understood by 
individuals as the distinction between them are difficult and impractical to make within this 
complicated area of study. 
2.2.1 The definitions of tax compliance 
The concept of tax compliance may be explored through several possible dimensions, 
with each one varying slightly according to the perspectives of the researchers and how each 
study was conducted (Kirchler, 2007). From an online blog by Murphy (2010), the definition 
for tax compliance has been described as when taxpayers seek ―to pay the right amount of tax 
(but no more) in the right place at the right time where right means that the economic 
substance of the transactions undertaken coincides with the pace and form in which they are 
reported for taxation purposes.‖ This definition is fairly descriptive of the kind of behaviours 
that would be viewed as tax compliance, and interestingly, this definition is incredibly similar 
to the definition used by the Inland Revenue Service (IRS), where the IRS defines tax 
compliance as, ―when the taxpayer files all required tax returns at the proper time and that the 
returns accurately report tax in accordance with the Inland Revenue Code, regulations and 
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court decisions applicable at the time the return is filed‖ (Hasseldine and Li, 1999, p. 92). 
This definition is probably one of the most comprehensive present in existing literature. It 
takes into account the time and rules that are involved when a taxpayer files their tax returns; 
however, it is still not enough to cover all the possible taxpayer behaviours. This definition 
does not take into account the reasons behind why taxpayers comply. For example, Ratto et 
al. (2005, p. 3) believe tax compliance may be:  
―Influenced by opportunities to evade and personal circumstances that may impact on 
the cost of compliance, by people‟s perceptions of how they are treated by the tax 
authority and their perceptions of the enforcement system and also by interactions 
with other taxpayers.‖ 
This assumption coincides to a certain degree with the IRS‘s definition in that it does 
not take into account ―taxpayers‘ motivation regarding tax compliance‖ (Hasseldine & Li, 
1999, p. 3). Therefore, tax compliance arguably has a wider scope than what was proposed by 
Ratto et al. (2005), as it can include ―taxpayers who voluntarily comply with the tax law and 
taxpayers who comply as a result of enforcement activities‖ (Kirchler, 2007, p. 22). 
Therefore, taxpayers who ‗voluntarily comply‘ will be those taxpayers who pay their tax 
liabilities without direct the IRS‘s [or equivalent] intervention (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 2009), while the opposite occurs when taxpayers are enforced by law to comply 
with their tax obligations (to avoid penalties). The significant determinants to date for 
taxpayers to comply willingly include factors such as political, socio-psychological/tax 
morale, decision making, self-employment, and interactions between tax authorities and 
taxpayers (Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007; and Ho and Wong, 2008). Also, the variables 
examined by Jackson and Milliron (1986) contribute as factors that can determine a 
taxpayer‘s compliance attitudes. However, the impacts of those variables are outside the 
scope of this study.  
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In general, the level of tax compliance by taxpayers is partially attributable to the 
nature of the government and the structure of the tax system (Hasseldine and Li, 1999). 
Nevertheless, James and Alley (1999) propose that common definitions of tax compliance are 
―too narrow‖ as the ―degree of compliance varies‖ (Kirchler, 2007, p. 21), depending on 
whether compliance is being referred to as ―voluntary or compulsory behaviour‖ (James and 
Alley, 1999, p. 3). James and Alley (2006, p. 5)  define ‗degrees‘ of compliance as 
recognizing ―a basic difference in terms of compliance between [the] tax paid without direct 
enforcement activity and [the] tax paid as a result of it.‖  
In addition, a definition for voluntary compliance was given as taxpayers meeting 
their tax obligations ―without the need for enquiries, obtrusive investigations, reminders or 
the threat or application of legal or administrative sanctions‖ (James & Alley, 2006, p. 5). 
This definition is again very similar to the one adopted by the IRS, where they recognized 
voluntary tax compliance as, ―a system of compliance that relies on individual citizens to 
report their income freely and voluntarily, calculate their tax liability correctly, and file a tax 
return on time‖ (Perez, 2011c). Within Perez‘s web page, the concept of voluntary tax 
compliance is understood to be that, you (as a taxpayer) must ―tell the IRS what your liability 
is. And the only way to do that is to file a tax return‖ (Perez, 2011c).6 However, a tax return 
is not always easy to file, especially for taxpayers without a reasonable level of knowledge of 
the tax system. This is evident from the words used in the tax guides and pamphlets where the 
wording is either too complicated or highly subjective, depending on how a taxpayer 
comprehends a particular word/sentence.
7
 
 
                                                          
6
 The need to file a tax return may differ from country to country depending on, for example, a taxpayer‘s source 
of income.  
7
 For example, the tax guide prepared by the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) for taxpayers filing an IR3 
contains several sentences containing the words ‗if‘ and ‗or‘, where it may raise confusion as to how a taxpayer 
would answer a particular question. 
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2.2.2 A „universal‟ definition for tax compliance? 
Although a number of studies clearly describe the concept of tax compliance and how 
it is applied in studies, a surprisingly large number of studies fail to do so (Richardson and 
Sawyer, 2001). Some studies (for example: see James et al., 2001; Wenzel, 2004; Gilligan 
and Richardson, 2005; Ratto et al., 2005; Ho and Wong, 2008; Kirchler et al., 2008; and 
Kastlunger et al., 2010) use various theories from psychology or econometric domains to 
explore the concept of tax compliance and what should be taken into consideration, but they 
do not define explicitly the concept of tax compliance. There are also some studies that 
assume what tax compliance is without giving a comparison of what other studies consider to 
be tax compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008). This approach is likely to trigger confusion as to 
what tax compliance behaviour is comprised of due to the ambiguous and dissimilar 
definitions arising from different studies.  
As distinct from clearly defining or not defining tax compliance, Kastlunger et al. 
(2010, p. 2) studied tax compliance through adopting different approaches, describing that 
―there is the economic based [approach] on rational choice theory…[and] there is a socio-
psychological approach where tax compliance is seen as determined by psychological 
factors…‖ In addition, James and Alley (2002, p. 27) view tax compliance as:  
―A continuum of definitions [that] ranges from the narrow law enforcement 
approach, through to wider economic definitions and on to even more comprehensive 
versions relating to taxpayer decisions to conform to the wider objectives of society as 
reflected in the tax policy.‖ 
Although researchers are still unable to adopt a ‗universal‘ definition for tax 
compliance, these two studies show a more comprehensive idea of what tax compliance may 
be, by taking into account the importance of the need to recognize the existence of different 
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‗layers‘ of tax compliance. From the thoroughness of the definitions adopted in the studies by 
James and Alley (2002) and Kastlunger et al. (2010), this suggests implicitly that a taxpayer 
may be 100 percent ‗compliant‘, while another taxpayer may not be very ‗honest‘, but does 
not breach the requirements required for being tax compliant. This then brings the discussion 
back to the term ‗tax planning‘, where it can incorporate a number of variances on how 
‗compliant‘ a taxpayer is with their tax obligations depending on how much ‗thought‘ and 
‗effort‘ they put into their tax obligations. However, due to the impracticality of attempting to 
distinguish between the various behaviours demonstrated by taxpayers to minimize their tax 
liabilities, the importance (as stated earlier) has been placed on the ‗attitude‘ portrayed by a 
taxpayer when faced with their tax liabilities. By attitude of the taxpayer this means, to 
examine what it is to mean when a taxpayer takes into account the ‗spirit‘ and/or ‗letter‘ of 
the law, as well as considering whether compliance is voluntary or enforced. 
This notion is further reinforced by James and Alley‘s (1999, p. 8) study where they 
distinguish between a taxpayer who ‗comply‘ only because of ―dire threats or harassment or 
both‖ against a taxpayer who, as stated earlier, ―comply willingly, without the need for 
enquiries, obtrusive investigations, reminders, or the threat or application of legal 
administrative sanctions.‖ Above that, James and Alley (1999) raised an interesting point 
where they believe the degree of ‗full‘ compliance does not include payments of tax liability 
by taxpayers due to both economic and timing issues.  
From an economic perspective, ―money in the future is worth less than the same 
nominal sum of money now‖ (James and Alley, 1999, p. 8). Therefore, if taxpayers do not 
meet their tax obligations on time, then the government will need to either reduce ―the 
revenue for public expenditure‖ (James and Alley, 1999, p. 8), or ―[increase] the amount it 
has to raise elsewhere‖ (James and Alley, 1999, p. 8). As a result, James and Alley (1999, p. 
8) propose that a more appropriate definition of voluntary compliance needs to be able to 
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differentiate on ―the degree of compliance with tax law and administration which can be 
achieved without the actual application of enforcement activity [against enforced 
compliance].‖ However, more research is still required to develop a more descriptive 
definition for distinguishing between ‗layers‘ of compliance to ensure that the definitions 
adopted will be able to accommodate for the various possibilities and combinations of 
compliance behaviour, whether voluntary or enforced.  
Furthermore, James and Alley (2006) distinguish between compliance through 
complying with the ‗letter‘ of the law and compliance through complying with the ‗spirit‘ of 
the law. However, only a limited number of studies in this area have attempted to examine 
the definition for tax compliance from this perspective. The focus of dividing compliance 
between complying with the ‗letter‘ and the ‗spirit‘ of the law appears to be the next step up 
from distinguishing between ‗voluntary‘ and ‗enforced‘ compliance, which is a good 
direction of focus for future studies as it further examines the issue of considering ‗layers‘ of 
compliance.  
 2.3 Tax Non-Compliance 
Hasseldine and Li (1999, p. 91) describe tax non-compliance as a ―substantive 
problem that transcends cultural and political boundaries.‖ Being on the other end of the 
continuum to tax compliance, tax non-compliance seems to receive more attention from the 
literature where researchers have attempted to provide a more clear-cut line between 
categories of non-compliance. Kirchler (2007, p. 21) believes non-compliance represents the 
―most inclusive conceptualization referring to failures to meet tax obligations whether or not 
those failures are intentional.‖ As with tax compliance, researchers have their own 
interpretations as to what non-compliance behaviours may incorporate, but in general, there 
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are two specific types of non-compliance, usually referred to as intentional or unintentional 
tax non-compliance (Erard, 1997; James and Alley, 2002; Book, 2003; and Kirchler, 2007).  
Regardless of the perspective taken by researchers on analysing whether taxpayers‘ 
behaviours are intentional or otherwise, it is important to ―examine separately the two main 
forms of taxpayer non-compliance: non-compliance through the overstatement of deductions; 
and non-compliance through the understatement of income‖ (Richardson and Sawyer, 2001, 
p. 224). From a wider perspective, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (2009) categorized 
non-compliance into three main groups. That is, non-compliance can either be in the form of: 
non-filing (taxpayers not filing a return at all or on time), under-reporting (amount filed by 
taxpayers does not include all required amounts to be filed) and under-payment (taxpayers 
may have filed their returns but do not pay the total tax liability due).  
The three main groups of non-compliance are stated through examples where the 
causes of existing tax gaps are evident because of  taxpayers not filing certain particulars, as 
well as taxpayers either underreporting or underpaying the balances of certain transactions 
throughout the financial year (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2009). Interestingly, from the 
figures released by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (2009), under-reporting of receipts or 
over-reporting of expenses constitutes a significant portion of the gross tax gap at 82 percent, 
and the significant portion of under-reporting is the result of an understatement of individual 
income (at 50 percent). The categories of under-payment and non-filing constitute 10 percent 
and 8 percent, respectively (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2009).  
It is believed that a major source of non-compliance is the ―presence of complex and 
ambiguously defined tax rules…which create opportunities for deliberate non-compliance 
[and] promote unintentional reporting errors…‖ (Erard, 1997, p. 355). However, the 
complexity of the tax system and the sophistication of the transactions should not be treated 
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as the sole factors contributing to the growing tax gap experienced by governments. Jackson 
and Jones (1985) have outlined several key determinants of taxpayers not complying with 
their tax obligations. This has included the probability of being detected by tax authorities, 
the way in which taxes are spent by the government, the position of the taxpayer (that is, 
whether they are due for a refund or whether they have a balance due), and also, whether a 
tax practitioner was engaged. The causes and effects of several other influential factors and 
methods of non-compliance have also been examined by researchers over the years (see 
Groenewegen, 1985 and Fischer, 1993), but unfortunately, the results from those studies are 
outside the scope of focus for this study. Therefore, the presence of these determinants raises 
the issue of whether non-compliance is intentional (which is not tolerated, but unpreventable) 
or unintentional (where amendments can be made to promote future compliance).  
2.3.1 Intentional tax non-compliance 
The main branches under the categories of intentional non-compliance are not always 
distinguishable, but the ―activities are usually distinguished in terms of legality‖ (James and 
Alley, 1999, p. 31). Tax avoidance is usually referred to as taxpayers taking ―legal measures 
to reduce tax liability‖ (James and Alley, 2002, p. 31). Wenzel (2002, p. 630) defines tax 
avoidance as behaviours relating to the ―deliberate acts of reducing one‘s taxes by legal 
means.‖ This again raises the issue on the difficulty to distinguish clearly between forms of 
non-compliance as ―tax laws are not always precise‖ (Wenzel, 2002, p. 630). The ambiguity 
in the tax laws brings out an interesting thought that if taxpayers are seeking loopholes to 
minimize their tax liabilities, then even if the methods taken are legal, it may still be against 
the ‗spirit‘ of the law and in this sense, considered to be non-compliance.  
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The online definition by Murphy (2010) has a slightly different variation in the 
definition for tax avoidance when compared with other studies, where it does not appear to 
treat tax avoidance as a form of ‗deliberate‘ tax behaviour. Tax avoidance is defined by 
Murphy (2010) as where taxpayers seek to ―minimise a tax bill without deliberate 
deception…but contrary to the spirit of the law. It therefore involves the exploitation of 
loopholes and gaps in tax and other legislation in ways not anticipated by the law.‖ The 
aspect of ‗without deliberate deception‘ seems to lean towards the kind of behaviour more 
commonly known as ‗tax planning,‘ where it is commonly treated as an acceptable behaviour 
that exists within the main branch of tax compliance. Therefore, it is necessary to search for 
more studies on tax avoidance to be able to understand in more detail as to what sort of 
behaviours can be categorized under the main heading of tax avoidance, without being 
confused with other tax terms.  
To add to the complex nature of the topic, McBarnet (2003, p. 229) introduces the 
concept of ‗creative compliance‘ and defines it as ―not non-compliance…but just like non-
compliance, the essence of creative compliance is that it escapes the intended impact of the 
law.‖ In addition, McBarnet (2003, p. 240) summarized this notion as ―the product of two 
factors: the nature of [the] law and the attitude taken to it.‖  
McBarnet (2003) also explains that appears to be a conflict in the argument as to 
whether creative compliance should be classified under the heading of tax compliance or 
non-compliance. In addition, he believes the issue of creative compliance goes ―beyond tax 
avoidance‖ (McBarnet, 2003, p. 230), thus implying that it is a kind of non-compliant 
behaviour, but at the same time, McBarnet (2003) acknowledges that creative compliance is 
the result of taxpayers ―finding ways to accomplish compliance with the letter of the law 
while totally undermining the policy behind the words (McBarnet, 2003, p. 229). Within this 
argument, there is an impression that creative compliance may be recognized as a ‗layer‘ 
27 
 
within tax compliance as it does comply with the ‗letter‘ of the law, but ignores (to a 
significant degree) the ‗spirit‘ of the law. As a result, it is fundamental for future studies to 
establish how creative compliance should be defined and which branch of compliance or non-
compliance the concept should be categorized into. 
Further issues that need to be examined in relation to the concept of creative 
compliance include whether it should be categorized within tax non-compliance (due to some 
similarities it shares with tax avoidance), or whether it is perfectly acceptable, and therefore 
within the main branch of tax compliance. In addition, the general classification for the term 
creative compliance should also be looked into to determine whether it is logical (and 
practical) to treat creative compliance as an independent sub-branch within tax compliance as 
it may be difficult to draw a clear distinction between ‗full‘ compliance and ‗creative‘ 
compliance. Regardless of how creative compliance is to be treated and classified, the 
question of ―whether it is perfectly legal or not is an unanswerable question, until it has won 
or lost in court,‖ as concluded by McBarnet (2003, p. 232). 
The study by Anderson (1993) appears to have incorporated both ‗creative 
compliance‘ and ‗tax avoidance‘ into a single study. Within the study, Anderson (1993, p. 
185) had main categories of behaviours grouped in hierarchical order where both, ―legally 
unacceptable but non-criminal avoidance‖ and ―legally acceptable avoidance‖ were placed 
between ‗tax evasion‘ and ‗compliance‘, respectively. Although realizing the ―difficulty in 
drawing lines‖ (Anderson, 1993, p. 185) between possible taxpayer behaviours, this study 
raises two interesting points for further research. First, the term ‗tax avoidance‘ itself may be 
divided into sub-groups of its own. Second, it suggests that, creative compliance may be a 
synonym for tax avoidance in the wider context, but is deemed to be more serious than 
‗general‘ tax avoidance behaviours demonstrated by taxpayers. Further studies are required to 
support the ideas and statements made by Anderson (1993). But at the same time, the sole 
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focus of those studies should not be placed on attempting to differentiate between the ‗types‘ 
of non-compliance behaviour, but rather, it is crucial to place an importance on whether the 
various behaviours can be grouped together to form generalizable conclusions in order to 
reduce the current level of confusions and misunderstandings. 
In contrast to tax avoidance and how it has generally been known to be ‗legal‘ 
behaviours to reduce one‘s tax affairs, Wenzel (2002, p. 630) defines tax evasion as 
―deliberate criminal non-fulfilment of tax liabilities‖ by taxpayers. In addition, Clyne (1979, 
p. 22) believes tax evasion to mean ―fraud, dishonesty, false returns, double book entries, 
forgery and dishonest and/or illegal methods [to reduce one‘s tax liabilities].‖ 
Wenzel‘s (2002) study suggests there are several ‗types‘ of tax evasion and this may 
be further differentiated, as he argued that types of tax evasion may arise ―not only because 
different types may be available to different groups of taxpayers but also because these types 
could have different qualities and involve different processes‖ (Wenzel, 2002, p. 630). In 
addition, Wenzel (2002) differentiates between the possible types of tax evasion by 
categorizing a particular taxpayer‘s behaviour as either involving an unlawful act of 
commission
8
 or an unlawful act of omission.
9
 Murphy‘s (2010) webpage states that, as with 
tax evasion, unintentional tax non-compliance may be in the form of ―non-payment or under-
payment of taxes.‖ Furthermore, Murphy (2010) describes that these kinds of behaviour may 
be evident from the ―making of a false declaration or no declaration at all of taxes due to the 
relevant tax authorities…‖  
 
 
                                                          
8
 The example given by Wenzel (2002, p. 630) is ―a false statement on deductions.‖  
9
 The example given by Wenzel (2002, p. 630) is ―not reporting some case income.‖ 
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Tax evasion can be seen as ―a large social problem,‖ (Hasseldine, 1999/2000, p. 228) 
where this type of behaviour is usually perceived by economists who see taxpayers as ―utility 
maximizers who will evade tax whenever the projected benefit exceeds the costs‖ (Tan, 1998, 
p. 61). It has been asserted that tax evasion involves both economic and psychological factors, 
and the degree of evading taxes strategically influences the degree of compliance in general 
(James and Alley, 2006). As a result, some researchers have voiced their concern that if 
―taxpayers go to inordinate lengths to reduce their liability this could hardly be considered 
‗compliance‘ ‖ (James and Alley, 1999, p. 5).  
2.3.2 Unintentional tax non-compliance 
As with the layers and sub-categories within tax compliance and non-compliance, it is 
difficult to fully distinguish the difference between intentional and unintentional non-
compliance. Within this grey area, even the IRS does not have ―sufficient data to distinguish 
clearly the amount of non-compliance that arises from wilful, as opposed to unintentional, 
mistakes‖ (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2009, Appendix, p. 2). Without a doubt, this is 
an area requiring more work so that it becomes less difficult to be able to differentiate 
between the two generic areas within tax non-compliance.  
Studies have described unintentional tax non-compliance as ―not necessarily implying 
the violation of law‖ (Kirchler, 2007, p. 21), but that it is still unlawful with a taxpayer failing 
to meet their tax obligations (Wenzel, 2002). Such non-compliance behaviours may be due to 
several factors including the complexity of law, interpretative issues and misinformation, 
misunderstanding, and calculation errors of tax matters when dealt with by taxpayers (Erard, 
1997; Wenzel, 2002; and Book, 2003).  
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There is also the difficulty of distinguishing between ‗lazy‘ and ‗unknown‘ tax non-
compliance. Lazy non-compliance refers to ―taxpayers‘ failure to provide the appropriate 
information necessary to substantiate an item on a tax return‖ (Book, 2003, p. 1824), while 
unknown non-compliance ―results in errors caused by ambiguous, complex or changing 
rules‖ (Book, 2003, p. 1824).  
As with the distinction on tax evasion through acts of commission and omission, the 
same principle can be applied here for unintentional tax non-compliance. Acts of commission 
and omission can be viewed as synonymous for ‗lazy‘ and ‗unknown‘ tax non-compliance. 
The study by Spranca et al. (1991, p. 76) suggest that acts of commission usually involve 
―more malicious motives and intentions than the corresponding omissions; and commissions 
usually involve more effort, itself a sign of stronger intentions.‖ In contrast, acts of omission 
may be the result of ‗ignorance‘, where taxpayers believe it is ―less immoral or less bad as 
decisions, than harmful commissions‖ (Spranca et al., 1991, p. 76).  
As with the study by Wenzel (2002), Spranca et al. (1991) also believe that these two 
acts are different in terms of severity (acts of omission could be considered as less severe 
than acts of commission) and legality, but again, it is difficult to draw a clear distinction 
between omission and commission. This issue is similar to the complication of attempting to 
differentiate between ‗lazy‘ and ‗unknown‘ tax non-compliance. As a result, further research 
needs to focus on finding ways to define objectively what may be recognized as 
‗unintentional tax non-compliance‘, rather than purely giving descriptions or examples of 
what amounts to ‗unintentional tax non-compliance‘ behaviour.  Furthermore, future research 
should focus on whether it is really necessary to divide the behaviours within unintentional 
non-compliance as this further hinders the goal of having harmonized definitions for the 
general concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance.  
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2.4 Over-Compliance 
Considerable emphasis has generally been placed within the area of tax non-
compliance (or under-compliance); however, the concept of over-compliance does not seem 
to be researched to a significant degree. It was not until the late 1980s that researchers begin 
to place a focus on the issue of taxpayers paying more tax than they are legally required to, as 
opposed to not paying sufficient tax. Given its name, this area should be classified as a sub-
category of non-compliance as the sum of taxes paid is ‗theoretically‘ or ‗mathematically‘ 
incorrect. Consequently, it cannot be considered to be a form of tax compliance behaviour 
from a taxpayers‘ perspective. However, it may also be argued that, as opposed to not paying 
(or under-paying) one‘s tax liabilities and therefore causing problems in the efficiency of the 
tax system, a taxpayer has actually paid more than what was legally required, and therefore, 
should be placed somewhere in-between the two extremes of tax compliance and non-
compliance. By comparing these two forms of non-compliance (the under-payment and over-
payment of one‘s tax obligations), over-compliance is without a doubt more welcomed by 
government authorities. But when taking into account the ‗purpose‘ and ‗cause‘ of why such 
behaviours exist, then both under-compliance and over-compliance, should be eliminated, or 
at least reduced, to a tolerable extent.  
The study by Walkey and Purchas (1998) recognize over-compliance as a sub-
category within non-compliance. Within their study, over-compliance is acknowledged as a 
form of ‗mistaken‘ behaviour, where it is the result of accidental errors demonstrated by 
taxpayers. It has been stated in Roth et al. (1989, p. 21) that over-compliance can be noted as 
‗over-reporting‘ because ―the taxpayers reports a greater liability than required.‖ Most 
taxpayers are risk-averse in nature, and may prefer to over-pay the actual level of taxes due 
rather than having to pay interest costs and penalties if they are found to be underpaid after a 
tax audit.  
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A 2002/03 reform of the New Zealand tax policy and the legislation framework 
contributed to the increased level of over-paid taxes by taxpayers annually (Sung, 2009). This 
regime ―requires wages and salary earners to file a tax return by requesting a personal tax 
summary if they desire to receive their income tax refunds‖ (Sung, 2009, p. 2). Since it is no 
longer mandatory for a proportion of taxpayers to file tax returns, this has resulted in around 
$100 million of ‗over-paid‘ taxes in New Zealand to Inland Revenue each year (Sung, 2009). 
As a result, emphasis should be placed on helping taxpayers to claim their entitled over-
payment of taxes, rather than leaving it up to the taxpayers to calculate whether they have a 
refund due. This is because; the ‗extra‘ taxes collected by the government should not be 
treated as amounts to ‗balance out‘ the level of taxes lost from non-compliant activities.  
In addition, some taxpayers may be disadvantaged by the self-assessment regime 
where they do not have the knowledge about requesting a personal tax summary or filing a 
tax return (Sung, 2009). Furthermore, with tax being an extremely complex topic, some 
taxpayers may find filing a tax return to be too time-consuming, confusing or difficult (Sung, 
2009).  Regardless of the reason for not filing a tax return, it is evident that Inland Revenue 
does not ―follow up taxpayers who either do not request their personal tax summaries or do 
not claim their refunds, even if Inland Revenue is aware that theses taxpayers are entitled to a 
refund‖ (Sung, 2009, p. 31). This suggests that taxpayers themselves need to be more ‗pro-
active‘ with their own tax obligations to avoid the over-payment of taxes unintentionally.  
The study by Sung (2009) included a preliminary study on the aspect of ‗over-compliant‘ 
taxpayers who may be losing the ‗extra‘ taxes paid by way of unclaimed refunds. Sung (2009, 
p. 40) concluded that, ―it is not reasonable to rely on the self-assessment regime for over-
compliant taxpayers and have an enforcement programme for under-compliant taxpayers…‖ 
Therefore, more research is required within this area to further analyse the issues associated 
with over-compliance, and whether a universal definition could be attributed to this concept. 
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3.0 Literature Review- New Zealand 
Case Law and Tax Compliance 
3.1 Recent New Zealand Case Law Concerned with Tax Compliance and Tax Non-
Compliance 
 In general, case law tends to focus on the various kinds of actions demonstrated by 
taxpayers that would be classified as either tax avoidance or tax evasion behaviour, rather 
than utilizing a ‗pre-determined‘ definition (e.g. from a particular study or case) to determine 
on the outcome of a particular case. This is achieved through the courts interpreting and 
applying the relevant legislation. Before reviewing some of New Zealand‘s recent case law, it 
is crucial to consider the importance of section BG 1 from the Income and Tax Act 2007 
(―ITA 2007‖), known as the ‗general anti-avoidance provision‘. 10  The purpose of this 
provision is to allow for the Commissioner to ―distinguish between transactions involving tax 
avoidance and those involving legitimate tax planning‖ (Ohms, 1996a). Despite the growing 
challenge to make a clear distinction between the various forms of tax minimisation oriented 
activities, the ability to determine certain boundaries for various non-compliant activities are 
still important (although not always achievable).  
 New Zealand has had a general anti-avoidance provision since 1878 (Ben Nevis 
Supreme Court, 2008). At the time, the focus of the general anti-avoidance provision was 
mainly intended to ensure that land tax was paid by the landlord, rather than placing an 
importance on whether taxpayers have met their income tax obligations.  
 
                                                          
10
 Section BG 1 from the ITA 2007 is the equivalent of section BG 1 from the Income Tax Act 2004, section BB 
1 from the Income Tax Act 1994, section 99 from the Income Tax Act 1976, and section 108 from the Income 
Tax Act 1954. 
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However, with the growing concern over the number of taxpayers involved in non-
compliant activities, income tax was later addressed separately in 1916 when the redrafted 
provision was directed to tax avoidance (Ben Nevis Supreme Court, 2008). Although the 
general anti-avoidance provision in tax legislation was established as early as in 1879, it was 
not until the 1960s when the Commissioner began to heavily rely on the general anti-
avoidance provision in courts (Ben Nevis Supreme Court, 2008). Prior to 1965, the Land and 
Income Tax Act 1954 was in force, but from 1965 onwards, criticisms for the relevant section 
increased due to interpretational difficulties in court (Coleman, 2009), where it was difficult 
to identify when ―permissible use of specific provisions ends and [when] tax avoidance 
begins‖ (Ben Nevis Supreme Court, 2008, paragraph [71]).  In 1974, changes were made to 
the anti-avoidance provision in section 108 from the Income Tax Act 1954 to clarify the 
types of transactions the section was intended to cover, extending the definition for tax 
avoidance in order to accommodate for a wider range of possible tax advantages (Ben Nevis 
Supreme Court, 2008).  
The new definition for a ‗tax avoidance arrangement‘ was articulated as including an 
arrangement ―where one of its purposes was tax avoidance, that not being a ―merely 
incidental‖ purpose‖ (Ben Nevis Supreme Court, 2008, paragraph [81]). Although an 
improvement was made for section 108 from the Income Tax Act 1954, the amendment still 
did not ―explicitly address how to discern the relationship between allowing tax concessions 
for certain arrangements and the general anti-avoidance provision, which struck down 
arrangements having a purpose or effect of tax avoidance that was not merely incidental‖ 
(Ben Nevis Supreme Court, 2008, paragraph [83]). 
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In 2001, a comprehensive review was commissioned by the Labour government to 
review New Zealand‘s tax system, and although it was noted that there was a ―lack of 
consensus on the effectiveness of section BG 1
11‖ (Alley et al., 2009, p. 1043), the section 
remain unchanged.  
Nevertheless, the three limbs of tax avoidance from section YA 1 of the ITA 2007 
(see Appendix B) has appeared to be a useful criteria as a starting point for considering 
whether a particular act of behaviour is tax avoidance/tax evasion, because this section has 
been labelled as the ―Commissioner‘s heaviest anti-avoidance artillery‖ (Prebble, 2006, p. 
117). Without a general anti-avoidance provision (such as section BG 1), it is highly likely 
that taxpayers would be arranging their tax affairs more freely to minimize their tax 
obligations, and as was discussed in the introduction, this will be a threat to both the 
government and the country‘s economy.  
Section BG 1 ―relies heavily on the judicial process to define [the] boundary between 
legitimate and voidable tax planning‖ (Alley et al., 2009, p. 1043), but this is also a criticism 
where too much reliance has been placed by the courts to assert the boundary between 
acceptable tax planning and unacceptable tax avoidance. The general anti-avoidance 
provision has been found to be ―deceptive in their simplicity [but] they have not always been 
easy to apply in practice‖ (Penny and Hooper Court of Appeal, 2009, paragraph [110]). 
Therefore, it is important to note that the general anti-avoidance provision should only be 
seen as ―being intended to support, not override other provisions of the income tax legislation‖ 
                                                          
11
 Section BG 1 from the ITA 2007 is as follows: 
 
BG 1 Tax Avoidance 
 
Avoidance arrangement void 
(1) A tax avoidance arrangement is void as against the Commissioner for income tax purposes. 
 
Reconstruction 
(2) Under Part G (Avoidance and non-market transactions), the Commissioner may counteract a tax 
advantage that a person has obtained from or under a tax avoidance arrangement.  
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(Coleman, 2009, p. 33) when dealing with tax avoidance issues in court. The following 
section describes some of New Zealand‘s recent case law and examines the principles and 
approaches adopted by the Judiciary when determining the outcome of a particular case. This 
section will also consider how the relative concepts (especially the concepts of tax avoidance 
and tax evasion) have been defined (either implicitly or explicitly) within the cases. In 
addition, these cases will form as the basis of discussion when more cases are reviewed in 
Chapter 6.  
3.2. Tax Avoidance Cases 
3.2.1 Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd & Ors v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
[2008] SC 43/2007 NZSC 115  
This case (hereafter referred to as the ‗Ben Nevis‘ case) is concerned with a group of 
taxpayers involved in complex schemes which had the purpose and effect of avoiding tax. As 
a result, the Supreme Court (SC) held that the scheme deployed by the taxpayers was a tax 
avoidance arrangement. The Ben Nevis case is a landmark case for New Zealand. Not only 
did the case involved complicated transactions that leaned towards the grey areas of the tax 
legislation, the case also provided clarity on the application of the specific and general anti-
avoidance provisions. Also, Ben Nevis is ―New Zealand‘s first Supreme Court decision 
concerning the interpretation and application of the general anti-avoidance provision‖ 
(Coleman, 2009, p. 67).  
It was held by the minority (Elias P and Anderson J) that it is important to look at 
both the specific statutory allowances provided for the taxpayers, as well as the general anti-
avoidance provision, as the two ―do not need reconciliation‖ (Ben Nevis SC, paragraph [2]). 
The minority go on to state that ―both are to be purposively and contextually interpreted…‖ 
(Ben Nevis SC, paragraph [2]). Nevertheless, the minority did agree with the majority‘s 
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(Tipping, McGrath and Gault JJ) decision that the scheme was a tax avoidance arrangement, 
but they went into extra lengths to examine the specific tax provisions from the Income Tax 
Act, and they do not believe that those provisions are ―potentially conflicting‖ with the 
general anti-avoidance provision (Ben Nevis SC, paragraph [7]).  
The investors (appellants) were involved in a Douglas Fir forest project known as the 
‗Trinity‘ scheme, where the forest was due to be harvested 50 years later (that is, in 2048). By 
taking advantage of the forestry deduction rules, the arrangement involved complex steps 
where the investors ―effectively met the initial costs of buying the land and planting the forest 
and the continuing costs of its future maintenance and management‖ (Ben Nevis SC, 
paragraph [23]). However, under the licence and insurance premium arrangements, the 
investors did not acquire ownership of the land, nor the trees. In 1998, the investors amortised 
licence premiums in their tax returns, as well as claiming expenses unrelated to the costs of 
planting and tendering trees. As a result, the Commissioner argued that the arrangement made 
between the parties was a sham, because the taxpayers had ―altered the incidence of income 
tax by means of a tax avoidance arrangement‖ (Ben Nevis SC, paragraph [156]).  
 As noted in the case, it is important to distinguish between sham
12
 and avoidance. As 
opposed to documents not reflecting the true nature of what the parties agree on (that is, a 
‗sham‘), avoidance occurs when ―the documents may accurately reflect the transaction which 
the parties intend to implement [but] the arrangement entered into gives a tax advantage 
which Parliament regards as unacceptable‖ (Ben Nevis SC, paragraph [34]). The Supreme 
court did not accept the Commissioner‘s ‗sham‘ argument as the court held that even though 
                                                          
12
 Diplock LJ‘s Supreme Court judgment for Snook v London and West Riding Investment Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 
518,  described a ‗sham‘ in the law context as being: 
 
―Designed to lead the taxation authorities to view the documentation as representing what the parties 
have agreed when it does not record their true agreement. The purpose is to obtain a more favourable 
taxation outcome than that which would have eventuated if documents reflecting the true nature of the 
parties‟ transaction had been submitted to the Revenue authorities‖ (paragraph [33]).  
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the arrangement were entered into for the purpose or effect of obtaining a tax advantage, this 
does not itself mean that it was a sham (see Ben Nevis SC, paragraph [38]). The words such 
as, ‗contrivance‘ and ‗artificiality‘ were mentioned in the case where they were treated as 
factors indicating avoidance (see Ben Nevis SC, paragraph [97]), however, ―what is meant by 
the words contrivance and artificiality is not entirely clear‖ (Coleman, 2009, p. 74).  
The meaning of ‗purpose‘ and ‗effect‘ from a taxation context was considered in 
Newton (1958, paragraph [445]),
13
 where the word ‗purpose‘ means, ―not motive, but the 
effect which it is sought to achieve - the end in view. [On the other hand], the word ‗effect‘ 
means the end accomplished or achieved. The whole set of words denotes concerted action to 
an end - the end being avoiding tax.‖ 
As a result, the appeal made by the taxpayers to the Supreme Court in Ben Nevis was 
that they had ―satisfied the ordinary meaning of the specific provisions relied on to claim the 
deductions‖ (Ben Nevis SC, paragraph [156]), but they had failed to show ―that the specific 
provisions they relied on had been used in a manner which was within Parliament‘s purpose 
and contemplations when it enacted them‖ (Ben Nevis SC, paragraph [156]). Therefore, the 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal made by the taxpayers and concluded the taxpayers had 
been involved in a tax avoidance arrangement.  
Beneath the scheme and purpose approach emphasized by the Supreme Court lies the 
interpretation issue due to the ambiguity in tax law. For example, this was seen through the 
Supreme Court‘s approach to the interpretation of whether the taxpayers were involved in a 
sham, as opposed to a tax avoidance arrangement. Scoular and McVeagh (2009, p. 103) 
emphasize the importance of the view endorsed by the Supreme Court where ―the existence 
of tax avoidance is generally inconsistent with the existence of a sham,‖ and therefore, 
                                                          
13
 Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1 (PC). 
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―allegations of both tax avoidance and sham‖ should not be made in the same case discussion. 
In order to resolve interpretational issues, it is necessary for the court to ―choose the meaning 
that best fits with the purpose of the legislation‖ (Blanchard, 2009, p. 89).  
This judgment from Ben Nevis may seem to have magnified a certain level of 
implication on the importance to differentiate between complying with the ‗letter‘ and ‗spirit‘ 
of the law. For example, the amount of deductions claimed by the taxpayers did fall under 
specific provisions, that is, it had complied with the ‗letter‘ of the law. However, the ‗spirit‘ 
of the law was totally undermined because the intention behind taxpayers claiming the 
deductions did not fall within Parliament‘s intended scope. This was seen through the fact of 
the case where investors were claiming ―allowances in respect of amortisation of a licence fee 
for use of land for forestry purposes and in respect of premiums for insurance against the risk 
that the forest would not yield a specified return‖ (Ben Nevis SC, paragraph [6]).  
From this case, tax avoidance is deemed to have occurred when ―the object or end in 
view or design of an arrangement is alteration of the incidence of tax and that object is not 
incidental to a business purpose [and] such assessment does not entail reconstruction of the 
arrangements entered into‖ (Ben Nevis SC, paragraph [9]). That is, if the tax avoidance 
purpose or effect of an arrangement is merely incidental, then the arrangement executed by 
the taxpayers would not be considered to be a tax avoidance arrangement. The importance 
therefore lies in how the arrangement is executed, while ―bearing in mind Parliament‘s 
purpose with respect to both the specific black letter provision in question as well as the 
general anti-avoidance provision,‖ and if the tax benefit gained is outside the Parliament‘s 
intended purpose, the arrangement will amount to tax avoidance (Coleman, 2009, p. 59). 
Apart from the legal considerations, it is also important to consider ―the use made of the 
specific provision in the light of the commercial reality and the economic effect of that use‖ 
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(Ben Nevis SC, paragraph [109]), when determining whether a tax avoidance arrangement has 
been entered into. 
Therefore, the Ben Nevis case is an extremely important case in New Zealand as it 
raises several crucial factors to consider when deciding whether an arrangement is tax 
avoidance (see Appendix C). First, it raises the importance to assess equally both the fact and 
law for the cases, where a realistic assessment of commerciality and economic substance is 
necessary to determine the purpose and effect of an arrangement. Second, even if a legitimate 
legal structure (or entity) has been adopted, it may still be possible for the arrangement to be 
artificial and contrived (that is, tax savings are not merely incidental if there is a ‗consensus‘ 
between the parties involved).
14
 A ‗consensus‘ between the parties refers to whether there is a 
meeting of minds that there is an expectation on the part of each that the other will act in a 
particular way (Coleman, 2009). 
3.2.2 Penny v CIR; Hooper v CIR [2009]24 NZTC 23,406; Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue v Ian David Penny and Gary John Hooper [2010] NZCA 231;  
Penny and Hooper v Commissioner of Inland Revenue SC 62/2010 [2011] NZSC 
95 
The two plaintiffs (Messrs Penny and Hooper) were both orthopaedic surgeons in the 
public health sector in Christchurch, as well as operating private practices where the income 
from the practices was their personal income. Later, both incorporated their practices into 
companies, and they became employees of their practices, and received employment income 
in order to reduce exposure to potential negligent claims from clients. As a result of this 
transformation in the business structure, the Commissioner alleged that this transformation 
has amounted to a tax avoidance arrangement under section BG 1 of the ITA 2004 because 
                                                          
14
 This is especially evident from the Penny and Hooper case judgments (see Chapter 3.2.2). 
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the sole purpose of incorporating their practices was to reduce the amount of income taxes 
payable. Furthermore, the Commissioner was under the impression that there was a lack of 
commercial purpose for turning their practices into incorporated businesses and therefore 
issued several assessments for a number of income years to both plaintiffs. Other factors 
considered by the Commissioner included the artificially low salary levels the surgeons 
earned after the business transformation and how the formation of the business has altered the 
incidence of tax where a different rate was paid and how tax was payable by a different 
taxpayer. However, the plaintiffs believed they were not engaged in tax avoidance 
arrangements; hence they challenged the validity of the assessments. 
 The view adopted by the Supreme Court‘s decision in Ben Nevis (2008) is the 
importance to endorse a ‗scheme and purpose‘ approach. It is stated by the High Court (HC) 
in Penny and Hooper that ―the inquiry into scheme and purpose is to be conducted having 
regard to the arrangement as a whole, not to its constituent parts‖ (Penny and Hooper HC, 
paragraph [22]). In addition, as a number of steps have been taken to the formation of a 
company, it is necessary to consider that ―when conducting the formation requisite scheme 
and purpose analysis, to consider the scheme and purpose of each set of specific provisions‖ 
(Penny and Hooper HC, paragraph [22]). It was agreed that the transfer of the practices into a 
company did alter the incidence of tax, but, based on the scheme and purpose approach to the 
interpretation of the anti-avoidance provisions, ―that alteration is not, of itself, sufficient to 
bring the situation within the definition of tax avoidance‖ (Penny and Hooper HC, paragraph 
[25]). This is because of the importance to determine ―by whom income is derived and what 
tax is payable by the person deriving that income [and] whether the incidence of tax is 
consistent with the intent of these specific provisions‖ (Penny and Hooper HC, paragraph 
[25]). 
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The outcome of this particular case at the High Court was that although the plaintiffs 
did gain tax advantages from the formation of the company and transferring their business to 
it, that tax advantage was ―a change which was consistent with the specific provisions of the 
Act, and not contrary to any principle to be discerned from the scheme and purpose of the Act‖ 
(Penny and Hooper HC, paragraph [44]). It has been noted that the ―arrangement as a whole 
is not one which has the purpose or effect of tax avoidance‖ (Penny and Hooper HC, 
paragraph [81]), but rather, the tax advantages gained are to be considered as ‗merely 
incidental‘ as a result of the transformation in business structure. This decision is largely 
influenced by the Judges accepting the evidence given by Penny and Hooper that they had 
genuine reasons to adopt a corporate structure to minimize exposure to personal claims. Also, 
MacKenzie J accepted Messrs Penny and Hooper‘s evidence that they had concerns for 
potential claims and believed that this reason had been ―realistic‖ and therefore acted as the 
―motive‖ (rather than the ―purpose‖) for the transformation of their practices into businesses 
(Penny and Hooper HC, paragraph [46]).  
Again, this case applied section BG 1 from the ITA 2004 as a starting point for 
considering whether the changes in the structure of the plaintiffs‘ practices is a tax avoidance 
arrangement. The High Court adopted the views formed by the Supreme Court in Ben Nevis 
(2008) that: 
―Tax avoidance can be found in individual steps or, more often, in a combination of 
steps. In addition, it is also important to consider the „commerciality‟ of an 
arrangement, and whether there is artificiality in the arrangement to determine 
whether that particular arrangement constitutes tax avoidance. Indeed, even if all the 
steps in an arrangement are unobjectionable in themselves, their combination may 
give rise to a tax avoidance arrangement‖ (paragraph [105]).  
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The minority of the Supreme Court in Ben Nevis (2008) provided a detailed 
understanding of what tax avoidance may entail, by stating: 
―Tax avoidance occurs when the object or end in view or design of an arrangement is 
alteration of the incidence of tax and that object is not incidental to a business 
purpose. Such assessment does not entail reconstruction of the arrangements entered 
into. It requires realistic assessment of their purpose or effect‖ (paragraph [9]). 
Therefore, it is evident that the case of Penny and Hooper emphasizes the importance 
to distinguish between whether tax avoidance is the primary goal of altering a particular 
business arrangement, and whether the tax advantage is purely incidental subsequent to the 
reconstruction of a particular business arrangement. The way that this case focuses on 
distinguishing between the ‗goal‘ and ‗merely incidental‘ of an arrangement is an enhanced 
method for assessing the weighting contributed by tax avoidance behaviours as a result of 
how much tax has been ‗saved‘ by the taxpayers, as well as calculating the ‗flow-on‘ effects 
as a result of altering a particular business plan or structure. An interesting view raised from 
the result of MacKenzie J‘s opinion is that the amount of tax advantage alone cannot 
determine whether tax avoidance is present as he states in paragraph [80] that, ―the quantum 
of tax involved is unlikely to be, on its own, a reliable indicator of whether the tax avoidance 
purpose or effect is merely incidental to some other purpose.‖ 
Lastly, this case also shows the difficulty of attempting to challenge on a factor, such 
as, the undefined term of a ‗commercially realistic salary‘ that is not specifically defined in 
the legislation. This is evident from the Court of Appeal‘s judgment where it states that a 
‗realistic salary level‘ is ―not a concept known to tax law‖ (paragraph [52]). In Penny and 
Hooper, the Commissioner argued that the taxpayers were receiving an artificially low salary 
level, and should therefore be a solid factor contributing to tax avoidance. However, the High 
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Court believe the level of an ‗acceptable‘ salary for orthopaedic surgeons depended on many 
factors (such as: qualifications and experience) and there is no pre-determinate ‗market‘ rate 
for it, let alone attributing a realistic salary level for Messrs Penny and Hooper. Therefore, it 
was impractical for the Judiciary to allocate a salary figure that is ‗commercially realistic‘ for 
Messrs Penny and Hooper.  
The decision from the High Court was appealed by the Commissioner and 
surprisingly, the Court of Appeal (COA) overturned High Court‘s decision. The majority 
concluded that the appeal was allowed as the change in business structure by Penny and 
Hooper did constitute tax avoidance behaviour. The appeal made by the Commissioner did 
not ―challenge the legitimacy of the company/trust structures adopted,‖ (Penny and Hooper 
COA, paragraph [72]) but instead, the Commissioner focused on: 
―[The] manner in which the structures were used, including, most importantly, the 
decisions made by the taxpayers to allocate to themselves a salary from their 
respective companies which were…at levels substantially below those which would be 
appropriate in an arms-length commercial context‖ (Penny and Hooper COA, 
paragraph [72]).‖ 
The Commissioner submitted that, when the ‗arrangement‘ was viewed as a whole, it 
could be described as ―artificial, contrived and beyond Parliamentary contemplation as a 
legitimate business arrangement‖ (Penny and Hooper COA, paragraph [86]). 
Also, the COA noted that Messrs Penny and Hooper‘s daily work arrangements did 
not change after the formation of their businesses, as they still saw the same number of 
patients and their letters are still addressed personally to them, rather than to the company. 
This implies that the way in which a structure is ‗adopted‘ (or formed) is equally important as 
the way a structure is ‗executed‘ by the parties concerned in order to assess whether tax 
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savings are intended (or just merely incidental). Therefore, in order to assess whether there is 
a tax avoidance arrangement, it is necessary to assess ―all the circumstances including the 
extent and nature of any element of artificiality or contrivance in order to determine whether 
any particular arrangement is within or outside the contemplation of Parliament in enacting 
the tax legislation‖ (Penny and Hooper COA, paragraph [126]).  
The Court of Appeal‘s judgment for Penny and Hooper stated in paragraph [78] that 
an arrangement is ―not limited to a specific transaction or agreement but may embrace a 
series of decisions and steps taken which together evidence and constitutes an agreement, 
plan or understanding.‖ In relation to the meaning of an ‗arrangement‘, it is believed that 
although the set up of a company entity was acceptable within the legislation concerned, the 
tax advantages gained as a result of the change in the business structure was ―more than a 
merely incidental purpose or effect [of the arrangement concerned]‖ (Penny and Hooper 
COA, paragraph [122]) due to the unrealistic level of salaries paid out to Messrs Penny and 
Hooper. This is supported by the argument made in paragraph [122], where the salary levels 
could: 
―Not have been within the contemplation of Parliament that a company 
director/employee could adopt a salary of less than one-fifth of a proper commercial 
salary and thereby secure significant tax advantage while still receiving, in practical 
terms, the benefit of the company‟s entire net income for himself and his family.‖  
In contrast, Messrs Penny and Hooper argued that there has never been a case in New 
Zealand for the ―Commissioner to challenge salary levels except in very limited contexts…‖ 
(Penny and Hooper COA, paragraph [87]). Ironically, the decision from the Court of Appeal 
focuses largely on the unrealistic levels of salary paid to Messrs Penny and Hooper, rather 
than taking into account other reasons which may be legitimate for Messrs Penny and Hooper 
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for setting up the company/trust. Messrs Penny and Hooper‘s acceptance ―without hesitation‖ 
that the ―salaries were at levels substantially below [that is, less than one-fifths] what could 
have been expected if they had been employed independently at arm‘s-length [transactions]‖ 
(Penny and Hooper COA, paragraph [114]) acted as a strong indicator for the Court of 
Appeal to allow the appeal made by the Commissioner.  
Furthermore, Randerson J (part of the majority) disagreed with the need to adopt 
company structures for ―protection against negligence claims‖ (Penny and Hooper COA, 
paragraph [121]). However, it may be unfair for the Judges to decide whether a 
transformation in the structure for the company was required as they are not the direct parties 
involved in the running of the practices. Also, there is no specific provision in tax law 
preventing taxpayers from organizing their best suited business structures. As a result,  this 
argument is subjective because Ellen France J (the minority) agreed with the decision reached 
by the High Court, where, ―neither the formation of the companies with the resultant change 
in the incidence of tax nor the salary arrangements were inconsistent with the scheme and 
purpose of the Income Tax Act‖ (Penny and Hooper COA, paragraph [165]).  
Therefore, from the combined judgments reached by the Court of Appeal, it highlights 
the importance of looking at not only the ‗arrangement‘ itself, but also the events which may 
have occurred before and after the ‗arrangement‘ in question, to consider whether a particular 
‗arrangement‘ is primarily planned for tax savings (and therefore, tax avoidance) or whether 
the arrangement carried out by the taxpayer has sound commercial reasons (with tax savings 
being merely incidentals), as was seen in the High Court judgment of the Penny and Hooper 
case. 
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In August 2011, the Supreme Court (SC) found for the Commissioner, confirming 
that the allocation of Messrs Penny and Hooper‘s salaries was set at artificially low levels. As 
a result, the appeal made by Messrs Penny and Hooper was dismissed. It is acknowledged 
that although the business structures adopted were ―entirely lawful and unremarkable‖ 
(Penny and Hooper SC, paragraph [33]), it was Messrs Penny and Hooper‘s avoidance of 
paying the highest personal rate that raised the tax avoidance problem. Not only were Messrs 
Penny and Hooper‘s salaries at unrealistic levels, it was also noted by Blanchard J that ―it can 
hardly be a coincidence that this [the adoption of a new business structure] was done as soon 
as that personal tax rate was increased to 39 cents in the dollar, and not before that change 
was made by Parliament‖ (Penny and Hooper SC, paragraph [33]). The change in the timing 
of the business structure could be said to have a significant influence on the outcome of the 
case as it occurred during a time period that were both sensitive and questionable. 
Again, the question of what is a ‗commercially acceptable salary level‘ was raised. 
Both Messrs Penny and Hooper carried out the same level and extent of services as before, 
but were remunerated at a much lower rate. They both accepted that ―they would not have 
entered into these arrangements with an unrelated party and that the salaries for the years in 
question were commercially unrealistic‖ (Penny and Hooper SC, paragraph [16]). However, 
Messrs Penny and Hooper submitted that ―there is no concept of a commercially realistic 
salary to be found in the Income Tax Act…‖ (Penny and Hooper SC, paragraph [49]) and 
therefore, this factor could not be argued against them. But unsurprisingly, Blanchard J points 
out that the Act does intend for taxpayers to ―not structure their transactions with a more than 
merely incidental purpose of obtaining a tax advantage unless that advantage was in the 
contemplation of Parliament…‖ (Penny and Hooper SC, paragraph [49]).  
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In determining whether or not a commercially realistic salary is paid to taxpayers, it is 
appropriate for the Commissioner to examine the issue and ―if the salary is not commercially 
realistic or, objectively, is not motivated by a legitimate (that is, non-tax driven) reason, it 
will be open to the Commissioner to assert that is was, or was part of, a tax avoidance 
arrangement‖ (Penny and Hooper SC, paragraph [49]). This statement states implicitly that it 
may be possible for taxpayers to be paid a below market salary, but only if the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case can be reasonably justified.  
The argument of whether tax avoidance can be found in a single step or in a 
combination of steps was reinforced again in the Supreme Court judgment. It is agreed that 
the formation of the companies and trusts were within the contemplation of the law. However, 
the step taken by the taxpayers to take advantage of the tax savings led to a tax avoidance 
arrangement. This critical step was taken by Messrs Penny and Hooper where they allocated 
to themselves ―an artificially low level of salary which had the effect of altering the incidence 
of taxation,‖ (Penny and Hooper SC, paragraph [33]) and therefore, leading to the Supreme 
Court in believing that there was a tax avoidance arrangement. Paragraph [34] of the 
Supreme Court judgment states that this step, when taken, ―can make the wider arrangement 
a tax avoidance arrangement.‖ Nevertheless, it is also necessary to consider the purpose and 
effect of the artificially low salary levels on each occasion, as in this situation, this particular 
‗step‘ was taken repetitively over the years where tax savings were gained (see Penny and 
Hooper SC, paragraph [34]).  
The statement by Messrs Penny and Hooper that the formation of new business 
structures was to protect themselves from professional negligence claims was insufficient for 
the Supreme Court to deem it not to be tax avoidance behaviour. Although this ‗purpose‘ was 
accepted by the Supreme Court, it was held that ―it cannot have been the sole or a dominant 
purpose because of the protection already in place through the combination of the accident 
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compensation [the accident compensation corporation(ACC)] scheme and insurance cover‖ 
(Penny and Hooper SC, paragraph [36]). This further confirms that the tax savings from the 
artificially low salary levels were not merely incidentals, and therefore, constituted as a part 
of the tax avoidance arrangement. These considerations made by the Judiciary all lead to how 
tax avoidance behaviours may be determined, as opposed to giving an explicit definition for 
the concept itself.  
3.2.3Case Z24 [2010] 24 NZTC 14,354 (NZ TRA);  White v The Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue  [2010] HC AK CIV 2010-404-1188 
This case is very similar to Penny and Hooper where the issue arises as a result of a 
change in the restructure of the business and the allocation of an anaesthetist‘s salary at a 
relatively low level. The restructuring of the business involved the setting up of a new 
company and the arrangement involved a family trust of owned assets that was closely related 
to the private practices provided by the disputant (that is, White) and her husband. As was the 
case in Penny and Hooper, the stated reason for the restructuring was to protect the family 
from potential exposure to claims against the services provided. After the restructuring of the 
business structure, White performed the same services as before, but was either receiving no 
salary or at an artificially low level. The reason for the lack of salary was (supposedly) due to 
the insufficient level of income earned from the newly formed company. However, the 
company appeared to be paying above normal market rates to lease the orchard. 
It was held by the Taxation Review Authority (TRA) that White was ―unremunerated 
in a manner which is artificial and contrived and has no sensible reality‖ (TRA, paragraph 
[23]), and therefore, engaged in tax avoidance behaviour. Again, a two step process set out in 
the Ben Nevis case was adopted here to establish what constituted tax avoidance behaviour. 
The first step was to determine ―whether or not the taxpayer has used specific tax provisions 
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within their intended scope‖ and second, to consider ―the use of the specific provisions as a 
whole‖ (see Ben Nevis Supreme Court, paragraph [107]). It is acknowledged from the case 
that it is important to examine objectively the purpose and effect of an arrangement by 
looking at the ―overt acts done in pursuance of the whole arrangement‖ (TRA, paragraph 
[52]). However, it is not to say that the formation of any company constituted tax avoidance 
behaviour, but rather, ―it is the artificial use of these structures to reduce tax paid in respect of 
income generated through the disputant‘s personal exertions, while retaining full control over 
and benefit from that income which amounts to tax avoidance‖ (TRA, paragraph [83]). 
The allocation of an artificially low income did not amount to it being a ‗commercial‘ 
motif for the restructuring and the low level salary allocated to White was definitely not 
‗merely incidental‟ as a result of the restructure, as observed by Judge Barber. It was 
concluded that an ‗arrangement‘ was in place, and the arrangement had the purpose or effect 
of tax avoidance. The decision reached from this case supports the judgments from both the 
Ben Nevis and Penny and Hooper cases where tax avoidance behaviour can either be found in 
a single step, or in a combination of steps within a particular arrangement. The important 
factor to consider is to not only look at the arrangement itself, but also at whether the tax 
savings are merely incidental as a result of the business restructure. Furthermore, it is also 
important to examine the commercial aspects of the arrangement where the restructuring of 
the business took place.  
From these three cases, the Judges appear to have adopted a similar approach (as 
discussed above) when examining whether a particular arrangement is to be constituted as tax 
avoidance behaviour. However, this is not to say that there is only one uniform method when 
dealing with future cases of a similar nature, or ascertaining what the concept of tax 
avoidance may entail. 
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In late 2010, the decision delivered by the TRA was overturned by the High Court 
(HC), where Heath J believed that the restructuring of business did not amount to tax 
avoidance. Before arriving at the decision, Heath J considered several cases New Zealand‘s 
cases on the methods and approaches taken to decide whether a particular behaviour 
constituted tax avoidance. To a significant degree, Heath J looked at the Penny and Hooper 
case due to the similarities of the facts from the two cases. However, a difference between the 
two cases was observed in paragraph [71] where it states that ―this was not a case in which a 
reduced salary was deliberately paid. Rather, it was a case in which salary was not paid 
because the company lacked the funds to do so.‖  
Apart from considering the similarities this case shares with Penny and Hooper, the 
decision reached were based on two other grounds. First, Heath J considered that, at the time 
the structure was implemented, ―there was a realistic expectation of sufficient profit to pay a 
salary to White [the appellant], from which tax would be paid‖ (White HC, paragraph [74]). 
Second, as seen from both the Ben Nevis and the Glenharrow cases, the ‗purpose‘ and ‗effect‘ 
aspects were revisited. In paragraph [75], Heath J states ―while the effect of the arrangement 
was (for unforeseen reasons) to negate the need for White to pay income tax, its purpose was 
not to obtain an impermissible tax advantage.‖ Therefore, since Heath J held that the 
arrangement did not constitute tax avoidance behaviour as it was neither artificial nor 
contrived, tax avoidance is not present. Regardless of the outcome of the case, Coleman‘s 
(2011) online blog  believes this case to be a ―good example of the fact based approach being 
used to deciding if tax avoidance is present or not.‖  
White is currently being appealed by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue, and while 
Coleman (2011) suspects Penny and Hooper‘s Supreme Court decision would be ―influential 
in determining whether the appeal is maintained,‖ there are still some factual differences 
between the two cases.  
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The main difference between the two cases is the importance and need to examine the 
dominant purpose behind the artificially low salary level that was allocated to the taxpayers. 
In the Supreme Court judgment of Penny and Hooper, the emphasis was placed on the fact 
that even though the formation of the business structure was perfectly legal, the allocation of 
the salary level was artificial and contrived. This then led on to the decision that Messrs 
Penny and Hooper were actively involved in a tax avoidance arrangement. On the other hand, 
it is plausible for White‘s case to not be a tax avoidance matter as the allocation of either low 
or no salary levels were due to the fact that the business was not operating successfully 
(unexpected losses), and therefore, the inability of the business to pay White at the expected 
market rate. It was stated in the Supreme Court judgment of Penny and Hooper that the 
critical question to ask is why the allocated salary was at a particular level on a particular 
occasion (see paragraph [34]) in order to assess whether tax avoidance behaviour was 
involved.  
As a result, it is possible that the Court of Appeal for the White‘s case will need to 
make a distinction between the purpose and effect for the formation of the new business 
structure, and decide upon whether the ‗salary‘ and ‗tax savings‘ issues are the dominant 
purpose for the transformation in the business structure. In addition, it is important to note 
that this case did not involve complicated transactions, such as, the advancement of funds, as 
seen in Penny‘s situation, which could be ―an indicator of tax avoidance‖ (Penny and Hooper, 
Supreme Court, paragraph [19]).  
However, there is the possibility that White‘s appeal may find that the transformation 
of the business structure was implemented around a sensitive time when the individual 
income tax rate had been increased from 33 cents in the dollar to 39 cents in the dollar in 
April 2000. Although the transformation was around two years since the tax rate was changed, 
it is still likely to be argued that tax savings were not merely incidentals, and therefore, could 
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be found to be a part of the tax avoidance arrangement. To add to the likelihood of White 
being deemed to have been associated with a tax avoidance arrangement, the argument that 
the change in business structure was to gain protection from negligence claims from patients 
may not be suffice (as seen in the Supreme Court judgment of Penny and Hooper). This is 
because of the accident compensation scheme and insurance cover that are already available 
should a claim be made against the taxpayers.  
Therefore, in light of the similarities this case shares with Penny and Hooper, it is still 
likely that the appeal by the Commissioner to the Court of Appeal will be maintained (but not 
necessarily succeed), especially when Inland Revenue is beginning to ‗target tax dodgers‘ 
where new or improvised business structures have been formed to reduce their income tax 
obligations (for example: see Thompson, 2011).  
3.2.4 Alesco New Zealand Ltd and Ors v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2011] 
HC AK CIV-2009-404-2145  
Following the success of Ben Nevis and Penny and Hooper, Alesco is another tax 
avoidance case that has attracted a high level of attention from the authorities, tax 
practitioners, researchers, and ultimately, taxpayers. Unlike other tax avoidance cases, this is 
a trans-Tasman case involving an Australian (parent) company (Alesco Corporation) 
purchasing two New Zealand businesses by using a debatable funding structure called 
―optional convertible notes‖ (OCNs, the ―Notes‖) through Alesco NZ Ltd. (a subsidiary of 
Alesco Corporation).  
Each Note contained both a debt and equity component and although ―there was 
nothing artificial about the acquisitions or the way in which Alesco Corporation used the 
money to finance them‖ (Alesco HC, paragraph [10]), the focus of issue was on whether 
Alesco had a sound commercial reason to claim the interest deductions when no money was 
physically payable by Alesco through this particular transaction. It is understood that this 
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structure was chosen by Alesco‘s tax advisors because it was believed that the use of the 
OCNs would be the most tax-effective way for inter-company financing arrangements (see 
paragraph [12]).  
It was contended by the Commissioner that the arrangement was both ―artificial‖ and 
―contrived‖ (Alesco HC, paragraph [14]), but Alesco argued that it was not a tax avoidance 
arrangement as ―the financial arrangement rules are designed to deal with a transaction of this 
type [and] the Notes complied strictly with those rules‖ (Alesco HC, paragraph [44]).  
The Commissioner accepted that ―Alesco NZ Ltd. complied to the letter with the 
financial arrangement rules and the methodology for calculating a notional interest 
component...but such compliance merely provides the jurisdictional foundation for 
engagement of the general anti-avoidance provisions…‖ (Alesco HC, paragraph [41]). This 
again raises the difficulty surrounding how tax avoidance may be perceived as it was stated in 
paragraph [85] of Alesco‘s judgment that ―a taxpayer may undertake a transaction (or a series 
of transactions) that fall within specific provision of the income tax legislation, yet still fall 
foul of the general anti-avoidance provision.‖ As with the majority decision in Ben Nevis, it is 
believed that if an arrangement falls outside Parliament‘s contemplation, then it will be 
deemed as a tax avoidance arrangement, and this can therefore be seen as a characteristic 
associated with the concept of tax avoidance itself. 
Considerations such as the motive of the arrangement, and the merely incidental from 
the transaction were evident in the judgment. First, the Notes were considered to have been 
chosen with the ultimate goal of obtaining tax advantages, and thus, not considered to be 
merely incidental (see paragraph [93]). Second, it was held that at the time the Notes were 
issues, there was no commercial purpose for the transaction, and ―unlike an arm‘s length 
transaction, there was no negotiation [on the terms associated with the issuing of the Notes]‖ 
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(Alesco HC, paragraph [113]). As a result, the process was considered to be artificial and ―no 
more than window dressing to make the transaction look more justifiable from a commercial 
perspective‖ (Alesco HC, paragraph [114]).  
Therefore, despite Alesco‘s compliance with the black letter of the law, the lack of 
commerciality in the arrangement constituted it as being tax avoidance behaviour. This is 
because the tax advantages gained were outside Parliament‘s contemplation. This case 
considered aspects from Penny and Hooper where it confirmed that a tax avoidance 
arrangement could either be found in an individual step or in a number of steps depending on 
the commercial reality of the step taken by the taxpayers. Although no explicit definitions are 
formed by the Judiciary within the judgment, it is clear that the general anti-avoidance 
provision is a benchmark for assessing cases of this nature. In addition, considerations on the 
commerciality of the transaction taken by taxpayers and whether it falls within Parliament‘s 
contemplation are all crucial factors that can enhance our understanding of what may be 
viewed as tax avoidance. It is believed that Alesco New Zealand Ltd. is likely to appeal 
against the judgment as it was ordered to repay the tax that was initially ‗saved‘ through the 
use of OCNs. 
Having gone through four recent tax avoidance cases from New Zealand, there 
appears to be a general ‗trend‘ where the outcome of the case is dependent upon a list of 
factors. That is, after considering section BG 1 of the ITA 2007 (or earlier equivalent 
provision), the Judiciary focuses on the importance in determining whether an ‗arrangement‘ 
exists, and if so, the purpose and effect of an arrangement are assessed to determining 
whether tax avoidance behaviour is present. The various approaches and principles adopted 
in existing cases also act as an important foundation as it contributes to how the decisions are 
reached in courts. Therefore, the steps taken from these four cases will form as the base of 
discussion when more tax avoidance cases are examined in Chapter 6.  
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3.3 Tax Evasion Cases
15
 
 As opposed to the extremely blurred sub-category of tax avoidance, the ability to 
distinguish what tax evasion behaviour incorporates is less complicated in general. However, 
there are still an unsurprisingly large number of cases within this sub-category because 
taxpayers are still willing to take the risk of not meeting their tax obligations, and thus 
challenging the applicable tax regulations. It is evident from a number of studies (for example: 
see a detailed summary of a selected number of studies compiled by Gupta, 2006) that tax 
evasion, when compared against other criminal activities, is not perceived as a particularly 
serious type of crime.  
In New Zealand, there are two types of penalties that can be imposed for tax evasion. 
First, there is the civil penalties regime, outlined in sections 141A to 141E of the TAA 1994. 
The civil matter of tax evasion ranges from not taking reasonable care (20 percent penalty) to 
evasion or similar act (150 percent penalty). Ascroft (2010, p. 24) describes the civil regime 
as an approach to ―encourage timely payment and to promote settlements, rather than a costly 
dispute process.‖  In order to escape civil penalties, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer, 
where they must show, based on the balance of probabilities, to the Commissioner, that they 
are correct.  
In contrast to the civil penalties regime, the criminal penalties regime is set out in 
sections 143 to 143B, where each of the three offences carry substantial fines (up to $50,000), 
and under more serious circumstances, a term of imprisonment (or both). However, only 
section 143B can lead to a term of imprisonment. First, there is the ‗absolute liability 
offences‘ category of offence, dealt with in s143 and it is one where failure to do the 
specified action is sufficient proof that an offence has occurred, without the need to prove 
                                                          
15
 Unless otherwise stated, all references to the sections under Chapter 3.3 and its sub-parts are made to the Tax 
Administration Act 1994 (―TAA 1994‖).  
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taxpayers‘ knowledge or intent (Ascroft, 2010). The next category is related to ‗knowledge 
offences‘, and is dealt with in s143A, where it is deemed to have been breached when a 
taxpayer deliberately (or knowingly) breaches a tax obligation (Ascroft, 2010). The last 
category is called ‗evasion or other offences‘,16 and it is dealt with under s143B. The IRD‘s 
webpage defines this category as behaviours involving ―deliberate actions to cheat the 
revenue [and] may include a taxpayer obtaining refunds knowing that he or she if not 
lawfully entitled to them and knowingly not accounting for tax deductions to the 
Commissioner.‖ Above that, an element of intent, as well as the knowledge of the tax law, are 
seen as ‗pre-determinants‘ for deciding whether a particular behaviour amounts to tax evasion 
(Gupta, 2006). 
It is important to understand that whilst evasion is the most serious form of offence, it 
is also crucial to realize that tax evasion itself is an offence under s143B (2) (Ascroft, 2010). 
The word ‗evade‘ is not defined separately in the Act itself but common characteristics such 
as, ‗a deliberate act‘, ‗deception‘ and ‗an element of intent‘ has usually been associated with 
evasion behaviours (as described in Chapter 2.3.1).  
The following section will consider a selection of recent New Zealand cases 
associated with the criminal penalties under ss143-143B. The cases considered within this 
section were all appealed, either by the taxpayer or the Commissioner, where there was an 
objection or disagreement concerning either the conviction or sentence imposed by a lower 
court. 
 
 
                                                          
16
The different forms of what is classified as ‗similar offences‘ are outlined in s143B (1) of the TAA 1994. A 
brief summary on the categories for criminal penalties can be found at: http://www.ird.govt.nz/technical-
tax/standard-practice/shortfall/sps-inv-225-criminaloffence-evasionorsimilaroffences.html 
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3.3.1 R v Geoffrey Martin Smith CA [2008] CA275/2008 NZCA371 
Sections 143A and 143B from the TAA 1994 were breached by Smith and his wife as 
they had knowingly failed to pay PAYE and had the intention of evading such payments 
(including GST returns). An appeal to the Court of Appeal (COA) was made by Smith 
against both of his conviction and his sentence where he thought it was ―manifestly excessive‖ 
(Smith COA, paragraph [2]). It was alleged by Smith that since the Commissioner did not 
know of the ‗actual‘ amount that was undeclared and unpaid, it would be impossible for an 
accused person to invoke the defence available under s143A (4). However, both Judge 
Maze
17
 and Chisholm J
18
 pointed out that there is no requirement for the actual amount of 
unaccounted PAYE to be known by the Commissioner before an offence is deemed to have 
been committed. Paragraph [15] of the COA judgment stated that Smith‘s interpretation 
would ―defeat the statutory purpose in situations, which by no means uncommon, where there 
are poor records or, indeed, where records have been destroyed or fabricated.‖ This then led 
on to the argument that it ―could not have been Parliament‘s intention that the Crown‘s 
inability to prove the particular amount would provide an escape route for persons facing a 
charge under s143A (1) (d)‖ (Smith COA, paragraph [15]).  
In addition, it was pointed out that if there was a disagreement in the amount of 
deductions/taxes due, ―it will be for the taxpayer to satisfy the Court that his or her 
calculation is right‖ (Smith COA, paragraph [17]). As a result, the same principle can be 
applied to the dispute on GST returns where the actual amount payable does not need to be 
known by the Commissioner before it deems an offence has been committed.  
 
                                                          
17
 A Judge from the Hamilton District Court. 
18
 A Judge from the Court of Appeal. 
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The appeal was dismissed, and Chisholm J concluded that this ―was serious offending 
over a prolonged period (approximately five years) involving a substantial amount of unpaid 
tax‖ (Smith COA, paragraph [38]). The basis of this judgment highlights the severity of 
penalties that can be imposed on taxpayers who have the intention to evade, but does not 
provide an explicit definition of what evasion may be (other than making references to 
s143B). In particular, if the duration of offending is prolonged, and the financial advantages 
gained are significant, then they would be regarded as aggravating factors to the penalties 
imposed on the taxpayers as they would have had plenty of time to make appropriate 
amendments if they had no intention of breaching s143B. 
3.3.2 The Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Duncan Fraser  Dempsey [2010] HC 
WN CRI2010-485-89 
 This was an appeal made by the Commissioner to the High Court (HC) where the 
Commissioner disagreed on the sentence imposed by the District Court Judge because he 
believed that the sentence was manifestly inadequate as the taxpayer had pleaded guilty to 
accounts of evasion under s143B.  
 Dempsey was an architect/draftsman who was the sole director of Inscape Design 
Limited. However, between 2004-2005, he had ―failed to file personal income tax returns and 
income tax returns on behalf of the company‖ (Dempsey HC, paragraph [4]). This constituted 
as an offence under s143B (1) (b) (f). Dempsey accepted that there was a breach in tax law 
but he denied that his actions were intentional due to the decrease in value of work in his 
company in recent years, which had a lead-on effect that he could not afford to hire an 
accountant. In addition, he stated that he was under the assumption that since his business 
was failing; he was not in a position to have tax liabilities payable. The Judge from the 
District Court accepted the statement that ―the respondent simply did not have the money to 
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pay an accountant as his company was owed a number of substantial debts which it could not 
collect‖ (Dempsey HC, paragraph [8]).  
 It was noted that the respondent had a poor compliance rate before this offence, but as 
he ―did not appear to have obtained any assets through his offending‖ (Dempsey HC, 
paragraph [9]) and ―did not use the tax money to support a lavish lifestyle…‖ ((Dempsey HC, 
paragraph [16]), Ronald Young J (HC Judge) perceived these to be attributes of a more 
‗lenient‘ sentencing for Dempsey.  
Unlike Smith (2008) where there was no reference on the distinction of the 
seriousness of evasion behaviour, it was implied here that there was a difference in evasion 
between ―deliberate misleading‖ and in this particular case, a ―bumbling incompetence‖ 
(Dempsey HC, paragraph [16]), as demonstrated by the taxpayer. Nevertheless, it was still an 
offence under s143B and the taxpayer cannot be excused from the offence, but it may lessen 
the ―impact from a sentencing perspective‖ (Dempsey HC, paragraph [16]).  
Therefore, as with the approaches taken in tax avoidance case law scenarios, an 
important factor to be established by the Courts is the need to consider why the offence has 
occurred and assess whether the offence was for the taxpayers to gain personal financial 
advantages or whether some other (indirect) reason has led to the breach of the relevant 
sections. Although consideration on the time frame in which a shortfall of taxes paid was 
taken into account when determining appropriate penalties in Smith (2008), this case did not 
place a dominant focus on the timeframe in which the years were in question. This then raises 
the issue of whether there is a pre-set standard as to what factors
19
 have to be taken into 
account when determining appropriate penalties, and how the concept of tax evasion should 
be defined in case law. 
                                                          
19
 Factors may include, for example: the time frame, whether the financial gains were used to support a better 
lifestyle, the amount of taxes evaded, and so on. 
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3.3.3. Tonks v R [2011] CA 749/2010 NZCA 252  
 This appeal to the Court of Appeal (COA) was mainly based on why the taxpayer was 
unsatisfied by his sentence as the Crown ―did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that he 
acted knowingly and with the intention of evading the assessment or payment of tax‖ (Tonks 
COA, paragraph [6]). The issue arises due to Tonks‘ belief that the salary paid to him should 
not be taxed and thus, without the need to file personal tax returns. Based on his argument, he 
is just receiving a ‗reward‘ for his work as he is not a ―slave‖ (Tonks COA, paragraph [8]), 
and therefore, should be compensated for his contributions at work. After several attempts of 
contacts between him and the Commissioner, Tonks finally declared his income. However, 
the Commissioner had strong reasons to believe that the declared amount was significantly 
lower than the actual amount Tonks had actually earned (see Tonks COA, paragraph [16]).  
Tonks had accepted that his behaviour had been ―obstructive‖ (Tonks COA, paragraph 
[33]) but he argued that he ―genuinely and honestly believed the payment of tax was 
voluntary and that he was not obliged to pay tax or to comply with the Commissioner‘s 
requests for information with regard to his tax affairs‖ (Tonks COA, paragraph [33]). 
However, this argument was rejected by the COA based on three grounds. First, Tonks had 
advised his company‘s accountant (Mrs. Varnam) to amend the company‘s returns in order to 
show a lower level of profit, and therefore, the amount of tax liabilities payable. Second, Mrs. 
Varnam had previously advised him to pay tax on both his personal income and to file the 
company‘s required returns (see paragraph [37]).  
Both of these two reasons acted as confirmation that Tonks did have knowledge of his 
obligations prior to the court hearings. Last, the amended personal tax returns later filed by 
Tonks contained false information; this provides further assurance to the Courts that Tonks 
had knowledge on his obligation to pay tax, but he had the ―intention to evade the assessment 
or payment of income tax‖ (Tonks COA, paragraph [36]).  
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Unlike the two previous cases described earlier where only references to s143B were 
made, this case explicitly outlines the meaning for the concept of ‗evasion‘. It is stated in 
paragraph [34] that the word ―evade‖ is ―associated with the expressions ―attempts to evade‖ 
or ―does any act with intent to evade‖ [which can include] and element of intent, an intention 
to endeavour to avoid payment of tax known to be chargeable‖ (Tonks COA, paragraph[34]). 
In sum, a person ―can only evade that which he or she knows to be his or her obligation‖ 
(Tonks COA, paragraph [35]). This understanding for evasion can be said to be a modified 
version of what is stated in s143B of the Act where factors of ‗knowledge‘ and ‗intent‘ are 
important factors to consider before establishing whether the taxpayers have breached any tax 
regulations. As it may sometimes be difficult to determine whether knowledge and intent are 
present, the facts of the case presented also act as a primary source of evidence for the 
Judiciary to conclude whether the evasion or similar acts of behaviour are present. 
Furthermore, these factors act as important keywords for a comprehensive definition for tax 
evasion. 
Chapter 3 has reviewed a selection of recent tax avoidance and tax evasion cases from 
New Zealand where it provides an example of the scenarios that are presented to the Courts. 
More tax avoidance and tax evasion cases from New Zealand will be further discussed in 
Chapter 6, where it will examine a wider variety of approaches and principles that have been 
adopted by the Judiciary under different circumstances in order to establish the definitions for 
the relevant concepts relevant to this study.  
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4.0 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Due to the complexity of tax law (White, 1990) and the objectives set out for this 
study, a qualitative research method involving document analysis has been utilized. This 
method was selected so that the study was able to extract information from a wide variety of 
resources where it would provide the relevant information concerning behavioural tax 
compliance and non-compliance. Apart from the complex taxation rules and regulations, the 
main reason for opting for a qualitative based research method is because it involves ―the 
systematic collection, organization, and interpretation of textual material derived from talk or 
observation‖ (Malterud, 2001, p. 483). The costs incurred during the process of data research 
and collection was around $300, and a significant amount of this cost was associated with 
printing and photocopying of the data resources collected. 
4.2 Method 
 The various definitions of tax compliance, non-compliance, and their sub-categories 
have been gathered from various data sources. The forms of data information collected 
include: journal articles, books, conference papers, research papers, newspaper articles, and 
web pages. The inclusion of a number of data sources were selected to examine how the 
definitions have changed (and sometimes remained constant or similar) over the years. In 
general, published journal articles would be deemed to be a more reliable and respectable 
source of data information when compared against other data sources, such as, web-pages, 
but by examining a variety of sources has allowed this study to produce a more comparable 
set of results. The reason for believing that journal articles are considered to be a reliable 
form of resource is because of the time and effort that have been put into the articles 
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themselves, and that is not usually expected on web pages from the internet. Nevertheless, it 
is highly probable that specific references gathered for this study were written for ―some 
specific purpose and some specific audience‖ (Yin, 2009, p. 105), but it is believed that this 
obstacle was overcome by including a variety of data sources during the data collection 
process to ensure that an unbiased, yet, critical analysis of the researched results are reflected 
in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. 
The approach taken to gather the definitions from various studies would be classified 
as document analysis. This method has been described by Slarkin‘s (2010) web page as a 
―technique used to gather requirements during the requirements elicitation phase of a project 
[to] extract pieces of information that are relevant to the current project [that will be 
incorporated into the current study].‖ The use of documents as a source of evidence can be 
seen as providing a solid foundation for ―other specific details to corroborate information 
from other sources, [leading to possible] inferences that can be made from documents‖ (Yin, 
1994, p. 81). This approach intends to provide a ―stable, unobtrusive, exact, and broad 
coverage [of data from various sources to be combined to produce a concise set of results]‖ 
(Yin, 2009, p. 102).  
The date of publication on the data sources was not limited as it was an objective of 
this study to compare and contrast the many forms of definitions that have been established 
between studies over the years. As the topic of behavioural tax compliance is fairly 
widespread, several studies have placed a focus on the variables that influence the behaviours 
of tax compliance and non-compliance, while other studies have focused on 
case/experimental scenarios where they seek to test whether taxpayers change their standard 
of compliance behaviour under different circumstances. However, it is due to the different 
emphasis of those studies that has allowed for this study to collect the various forms of 
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definitions that have been adopted over the years in order to produce a critical review based 
on the objectives set out in Chapter 1.  
The nature of some studies has made it necessary that they were excluded from this 
research due to time and resource constraints, as will be described in more detail in Chapter 
8. The studies excluded from this study are mainly finance or economics based papers where 
their focus differs to a significant degree from the objectives set out in this study. However, a 
limited number of finance and economics based papers were still looked at if their 
methodology of study had not been significantly focused on mathematical functions. In 
addition, to reduce the risks associated with translation, non-English texts have also been 
excluded. Despite those exclusions, there are still a significant number of studies that were 
available to be examined for this study to provide a generalizable set of researched results.  
The second part to the data collection method involved the gathering of case law 
judgments in order to assess the similarities and differences on the principles and approaches 
taken to arrive at a decision as to what is meant by the concepts important to this study. In 
order to limit the scope of research, only case law from New Zealand has been considered for 
this study. Both web pages of commentaries and online case judgments have acted as 
important sources of data evidence required to draw generalizable conclusions on the 
approaches and principles that have been adopted by the Judiciary over the years.  
As opposed to not clearly limiting the year of study for existing literature, the year of 
the case law has been limited to a significant extent. Due to the number of cases within the 
area of behavioural tax compliance and non-compliance, it was necessary to draw clear 
boundaries that this study would only focus on recent cases from New Zealand, and also, 
only cases that originated from around 2008. The focus on recent cases meant that the 
approaches and principles taken by the Judiciary are reflective of the current rules and 
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regulations. In addition, the focus on recent case law can potentially reduce the risks of 
―economic, technological, social and political changes‖ (Richardson, 2004, p. 301) that may 
occur over time where it may have an influence on the nature of researched results obtained 
for this study. Thus, this approach has allowed for a more detailed analysis on the current 
approaches and principles taken by the Judiciary under case law scenarios where the 
researched results would reflect aspects of relevancy and practicality.  
The majority of New Zealand‘s case law was gathered from the Brookers Online 
database where keywords such as ‗tax avoidance‘ and ‗tax evasion‘ were used to gather the 
relevant cases. Most New Zealand cases were gathered from the Courts of New Zealand web 
page, while summaries of recent court decision were located from the Inland Revenue 
Department‘s web pages. Additional information on the facts of the cases were usually 
extracted from existing literature where it provides detailed commentaries and discussions on 
the approaches and principles taken; as well as decisions reached in courts. 
A considerable amount of time had been spent on the internet searching through 
databases such as Google Scholar, JSTOR, Science Direct, and BrookersOnline in order to 
collect resources from both international existing literature and New Zealand case law. 
Various keywords have been used to allocate the relevant studies and case law judgments. 
Keywords such as ‗tax avoidance‘ and ‗tax evasion‘ produced the greatest number of results 
for existing literature. In addition, whilst searching for sub-categories within tax compliance 
and non-compliance, keywords including: ‗tax compliance‘, ‗tax non-compliance‘, ‗tax 
minimization‘, ‗tax planning‘, ‗creative compliance‘, and ‗over-compliance‘ were also used 
to allocate the relevant studies. Unfortunately, some of those search phrases were less 
successful, and this was especially evident in the area of research on ‗creative compliance‘ 
and ‗over-compliance, as the area of research around these keywords are currently very 
limited from a research perspective. Apart from gathering data online, loans from libraries, 
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either from the University of Canterbury‘s libraries or from various public libraries was also 
necessary as some older articles and books were unavailable online.  
In addition to the examination of existing literature and case law, a letter was sent to 
the New Zealand Commissioner of Inland Revenue (hereafter referred to as the 
―Commissioner‖) requesting his views and comments on the current principles and  
approaches adopted in case law scenarios by the Judiciary. The letter sought his views on the 
appropriateness and conclusiveness on the current state of the definitions for tax compliance, 
non-compliance, and their relevant sub-categories. The overall objective for sending the letter 
was to buttress the main findings from the case law collected for this study in order to 
produce a more comprehensive set of results as to how the concepts of tax compliance and 
non-compliance are treated under case law scenarios. 
As the letter to the Commissioner did not intend to seek confidential information or 
for the respondent to act outside his ordinary obligations, a formal approval from the 
University of Canterbury‘s Human Ethics Committee was not required. A copy of the letter 
that was sent to the Commissioner can be found in Appendix F. The letter to the 
Commissioner was posted on 10 January 2012. A follow-up email was sent to the 
Commissioner on 23 February 2012. Unfortunately, no response was received from the 
Commissioner at the date of submission. 
Finally, to conclude the findings for this study, a letter was also sent to two tax 
practitioners around New Zealand.
20
 The objectives of the letter included gathering their 
views and opinions on the current approaches taken by the Judiciary under case law scenarios, 
as well as collecting their perspectives on the issues of behavioural tax compliance. In 
                                                          
20
 The two tax practitioners (tax barristers) were selected as they have vast experience in tax avoidance and 
litigation matters. It was hoped that through their knowledge and experience around behavioural tax compliance 
and non-compliance, the response letter from them would be both informative and invaluable for the purpose of 
this study. 
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addition, the letter also intended to collect ideas as to how they would define the concepts 
(and sub-concepts) of tax compliance and non-compliance. The letter began with an 
introduction into the area of research, followed by questions where they are divided under 
one of the five main headings. The tax practitioners were given an information sheet which 
outlined a brief summary of the study, as well as their rights and what was expected from 
them. In addition, they were also asked to sign a consent form where they formally give their 
permission for including their contributions to this study. The approved letter from the 
Human Ethics Committee; as well as the information sheet and the letter sent to the tax 
practitioners can be found in Appendix D and E, respectively. 
Although the letter did not intend to seek confidential information, nor did it require 
the tax practitioners to act outside their normal duties, a low-risk application was still made to 
the University of Canterbury‘s Human Ethics Committee. The application was made to 
prepare for a possible interview if the tax practitioners had preferred to answer the questions 
in person. Approval from the Human Ethics Committee was received on 9 January 2012. Due 
to the sensitivity of the research topic, the tax practitioners‘ identities have been kept 
confidential within this study; and so they will be referred to as tax practitioner A and B. The 
letter to the tax practitioners were posted on 30 January 2012. A follow-up email was sent to 
the tax practitioners on 23 February 2012. The response letter from tax practitioner A was 
received on 27 February 2012. The response letter has provided an interesting perspective on 
the matter of tax compliance and non-compliance. Details of the response will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. Unfortunately, no response was received from tax practitioner B at the date of 
submission.  
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4.3 Analysis  
Within each of the existing studies gathered, emphasis was placed on how the 
concept(s) were either implicitly or explicitly acknowledged or defined by the researcher(s). 
For the studies that did not clearly state what the concepts had intended to accommodate for 
the actions of within their particular study, a separate discussion can be found in the next 
chapter in order to observe possible reasons for the case. In addition, the inclusion of those 
studies that do not define the concepts is intended to examine whether possible patterns may 
be found between them so that they can lead to some possible explanation as to why 
particular studies do not explicitly define the concepts of tax compliance and non-
compliance. This study contains references of existing literature and case law up to and 
including 31
st
 December, 2011.  
A separate table is used for each of the concepts of tax compliance, non-compliance 
and their sub-categories to show how the definitions have been formed over the years 
between different studies. The five tables are namely: tax compliance, tax non-compliance, 
tax avoidance, tax evasion and over-compliance. These five tables represent the five main 
concepts that are of particular importance for this study (see Chapter 5). 
The order of the definitions within each of the tables is based on the chronological 
order of the publication date for the studies. In addition, to allow for a more detailed 
examination, each of the definition is measured against two or three factors to determine the 
definitions‘ descriptiveness and comprehensiveness. The two or three factors were selected 
by extracting distinctive characteristics from the definition gathered from Chapter 2 and are 
used as they represent the foundation of the research process for this study. Although they 
may not be as comprehensive as some of the definitions gathered after the initial stage of 
research, they remain as the skeleton of the research process when more definitions were 
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collected for this study. The factors extracted from each of the definitions for the concepts are 
described in more detail in Chapter 5 under the appropriate headings.  
As for the chapter concerning case law, the analysis has been divided between two 
sub-sections, namely, tax avoidance and tax evasion. This allows for a clear discussion on the 
cases that are of non-criminal (tax avoidance) and criminal (tax evasion) nature. The details 
of the facts from the cases were not examined individually. Instead, the primary emphasis has 
been placed on the approaches and principles taken by the Judiciary whilst determining the 
outcome of the case. That is, rather than providing a detailed summary on the facts of each 
case, this study has grouped the main points considered by the Judiciary when determining 
whether a particular behaviour is tax avoidance or tax evasion. In rare situations where an 
explicit definition has been provided for the concepts of tax avoidance and tax evasion (that 
is, over and above the definitions provided for in the legislation), the definitions have been 
inserted in the appropriate paragraphs. 
In addition, as part of the analysis on existing literature and case law, aspects of the 
response letters from tax practitioner A are included in the discussion of the research results 
in Chapter 6 and the responses received from tax practitioner A can be found in Appendix E. 
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5.0 A Critical Review of the 
Research Results- Existing 
Literature 
5.1 Introduction  
Researched results from existing literature and case law gathered for this study have 
highlighted the difficulties and challenges researchers have faced over the years in order to 
enhance our understanding on the key concepts of behavioural tax compliance and non-
compliance. Not only did the definitions vary between the date of publication, the nature of 
study and the scope of study, but the definitions also varied between the researcher‘s own 
interpretations to the key concepts within their studies. It is therefore due to these factors that 
we continue to have slight variations in the definitions for the concepts of tax compliance and 
non-compliance. As well as the explicit definitions, some studies have outlined several 
examples to facilitate the explanation as to what those concepts may accommodate, but 
clearly, this approach is still insufficient to fully capture what the essence of what the 
concepts may entail.  
However, it is evident that there are some definitions that are more logical and more 
comprehensive than others, but without a doubt, the majority of the definitions to date still 
lack the consistency that is expected from defining a certain concept/behaviour of tax 
compliance and non-compliance. Although some distinctions between the definitions for the 
concepts may seem minor, it is still imperative that a distinction is made between the ‗layers‘ 
or ‗sub-categories‘ of tax compliance and non-compliance, especially given the unwelcome 
state the governments are experiencing due to the increase in taxpayers involving themselves 
in acts to avoid (or reduce partially) their ‗true‘ tax obligations. Nevertheless, it is because of 
these non-compliant activities demonstrated by taxpayers that lead to our widened 
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understanding of what is acceptable and what isn‘t through the cases that have been presented 
to the courts over the years.  
As with Chapters 2 and 3, research results have also been divided into two separate 
chapters. Chapter 5 examines the results from existing literature as to what has been 
established over the years on the concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance. A table for 
each of the relevant concepts has been inserted to provide a summary of how the studies have 
defined the concepts (either explicitly or implicitly) within their particular studies. Chapter 6 
then focuses on how New Zealand‘s case law have dealt with the various forms of non-
compliance behaviour (predominantly tax avoidance and tax evasion) through the analysis of 
the approaches and principles adopted by the Judiciary. Within the examination of the 
approaches and principles taken by the Judiciary, emphasis has been placed on whether the 
definitions of the concepts have been made clear as to what acts constitute as either tax 
avoidance or tax evasion behaviour.  
5.2. Behavioural Tax Compliance Literature 
 Despite the various forms of definitions for the concept of tax compliance, it has 
generally been agreed in studies that ‗tax compliance‘ portrays the idea that taxpayers do 
comply with the relevant legislation when meeting their tax obligations. This form of 
understanding is evident from many studies, including the studies conducted by: Jackson and 
Milliron (1986); Attwell and Sawyer (2001); Richardson and Sawyer (2001); and Verboon 
and van Dijke (2007). However, the aspect of ‗complying with relevant legislations‘ should 
only be considered as the ‗skeleton‘ of what tax compliance behaviour truly encompasses. 
Because of the complexities in tax laws, Devos (2004, p. 224) believes ―there is not a 
standard all-embracing definition of compliance [that can be] adopted across all tax 
compliance studies.‖ 
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The definition adopted by the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is slightly 
more descriptive, in the sense that it covers more than just one aspect of what the concept of 
tax compliance entails. Their definition of tax compliance is when taxpayers have met the 
―reporting requirements [and] that the taxpayer files all required tax returns at the proper time 
and that the returns accurately report tax liability in accordance with the Internal Revenue 
Code, regulations and court decisions applicable at the time the return is filed‖ (Richardson 
and Sawyer, 2001, p. 142). This definition covers three main aspects: (A) the filing of 
accurate returns, (B) at the proper time, and (C) in accordance with relevant legislations. 
These three characteristics have been used as benchmarks to measure the effectiveness and 
comprehensiveness of the definitions listed in the table below. The purpose of this is to 
evaluate how the definitions of the concept of tax compliance have changed (or remained 
fairly constant) over the years and whether additional, but often ignored aspects, may have 
been introduced into particular tax compliance studies over the years. 
Table 1: Definitions of ‘Tax Compliance’ 
Details of 
Study 
Definition from study Factors 
considered 
Additional Notes 
(where applicable) 
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Jackson  and  
Milliron 
(1986) 
Taxpayers filing accurate, timely and fully 
paid return without IRS enforcement efforts. 
√ √  Former definition used by 
the IRS. 
Roth et al. 
(1989) 
 
The taxpayer files all required tax returns at 
the proper time and that the returns accurately 
report tax liability in accordance with the 
Internal Revenue Code, regulations, and court 
decisions applicable at the time the return is 
filed. 
√ √ √ The definition used by the 
IRS. 
Jenkins and 
Forlemu 
(1993) 
The timely filing and reporting of required 
tax information, the correct self-assessments 
of taxes owed, and the timely payment of 
those taxes without enforcement action. 
√ √  Accommodates possible 
‗layers‘ of compliance. 
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Study 
Definition from study Factors 
considered 
Additional Notes 
(where applicable) 
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Hasseldine  
and Li (1999) 
 
The taxpayer files all required tax returns at 
the proper time and that the returns accurately 
report tax liability in accordance with the 
Internal Revenue Code, regulations, and court 
decisions applicable at the time the return is 
filed. 
√ √ √ The definition used by the 
IRS. 
Franzoni 
(2000) 
Compliance with the law typically means: (i) 
true reporting of the tax base, (ii) correct 
computation of the liability, (iii) timely filing 
of the return, and (iv) timely payment of the 
amounts due. 
√ √ √ A similar definition 
adopted by both the IRS 
and the IRD. 
Attwell and 
Sawyer (2001) 
The taxpayer files all required tax returns at 
the proper time and that the returns accurately 
report tax liability in accordance with the 
Internal Revenue Code, regulations, and court 
decisions applicable at the time the return is 
filed. 
√ √ √ The definition used by the 
IRS. 
Richardson  
and  Sawyer 
(2001) 
The taxpayer files all required tax returns at 
the proper time and that the returns accurately 
report tax liability in accordance with the 
Internal Revenue Code, regulations, and court 
decisions applicable at the time the return is 
filed. 
√ √ √ The definition used by the 
IRS. 
James  and 
Alley (2002)  
A continuum of definitions [which] ranges 
from the narrow law enforcement approach to 
wider economic definitions and onto versions 
of taxpayer decisions to conform to the 
obligations of tax policy and co-operation 
with the society. 
  √ Acknowledges the 
existence of having more 
than one standard 
definition for tax 
compliance, that is, the 
‗layers‘ of compliance. 
Braithwaite 
(2003b) 
The extents to which taxpayers do what is 
expected of them and are prepared to 
cooperate with the authority. 
  √  
Tan  and  
Sawyer (2003) 
The taxpayer files all required tax returns at 
the proper time and that the returns accurately 
report tax liability in accordance with the 
Internal Revenue Code, regulations, and court 
decisions applicable at the time the return is 
filed. 
√ √ √ The definition used by the 
IRS. 
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Devos (2004) The taxpayer files all required tax returns at 
the proper time and that the returns accurately 
report tax liability in accordance with the 
Internal Revenue Code, regulations, and court 
decisions applicable at the time the return is 
filed. 
√ √ √ The definition used by the 
IRS. 
Devos (2006) Compliance with reporting requirements, 
meaning that, the taxpayers files all required 
tax returns at the proper time and that the 
returns accurately report tax liability in 
accordance with the Internal Revenue Code, 
regulations, and court decisions applicable at 
the time the return is filed. 
√ √ √ The definition used by the 
IRS. 
Burton 
(2007b) 
There are different forms of compliance. 
Taxpayers at the base of the compliance 
pyramid are said to ‗voluntarily‘ comply 
because they submit to or even adopt the 
compliance culture of the tax administration, 
while those at the pinnacle of the pyramid are 
subject to enforced compliance. 
   Takes into account the 
‗layers‘ of tax 
compliance. 
Verboon  and  
van Dijke 
(2007) 
The willingness of people to comply with tax 
authorities by paying their taxes. 
  √ Considers that some 
compliance may not be 
voluntary. 
U.S. 
Department of 
the Treasury 
(2009) 
The Internal Revenue Code places three 
primary obligations on taxpayers:  
(1) To file timely returns 
(2) To make accurate reports on those 
returns; and 
(3) To pay the required tax voluntarily and 
timely. Taxpayers are compliant when 
they meet these obligations (without 
direct IRS intervention). 
√ √ √ From a document 
prepared by the U.S. 
Department of the 
Treasury themselves. 
Kirchler  and  
Wahl (2010) 
Leads to the honest payment of taxes, the 
underlying intentions of the behaviour can 
either by voluntary or enforced by authorities. 
[It is] the most inclusive and neutral term for 
taxpayers‘ willingness to pay their taxes. 
√   Considered the possible 
‗layers‘ of compliance. 
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Study 
Definition from study Factors 
considered 
Additional Notes 
(where applicable) 
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Murphy 
(2010) 
Seeking to pay the right amount of tax (but no 
more) in the right place at the right time 
where right means that the economic 
substance of the transactions undertaken 
coincides with the place and form in which 
they are reported for taxation purposes. 
√ √ √ Tax compliance should 
not include instances 
where there is an over-
payment of taxes. 
Prince Rasaq 
Kunle Quadri 
et al. (2010) 
Encompasses all activities necessary to be 
carried out by the taxpaying public in order to 
meet the statutory requirements of tax law. 
This includes the preparation of tax returns 
that must be filed by individuals and 
organizations. 
√  √  
IRD (2011g) Compliance is when: 
-everyone pays and receives the right amount 
[of tax] 
-we [the IRD]receive the right information at 
the right time 
-everyone files and pays on time 
-we [the IRD] provide confidence and 
certainty to our customers. 
√ √ √ This definition takes a 
similar approach from the 
IRS‘s definition of tax 
compliance.  
 
5.2.1 The „layers‟ of tax compliance 
The accommodative nature of the tax compliance definition adopted by the IRS has been 
cited in a number of studies, such as: Roth et al. (1989); Hasseldine and Li (1999); Attwell 
and Sawyer (2001); Richardson and Sawyer (2001); Tan and Sawyer (2003); Devos (2004) 
and Devos (2006). Before this definition was adopted, the previous definition of tax 
compliance by the IRS used to be, ―[when taxpayers file] all accurate, timely and fully paid 
return without IRS enforcement efforts‖ (Jackson and Milliron, 1986, p. 130). Both forms of 
these definitions are very descriptive as to what behaviours can be perceived as tax 
compliance behaviour, but at the same time, both of these definitions have left out the 
presence of the ‗layers‘ of tax compliance.  
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Braithwaite (2003a, p. 24) believes that ―a definition of tax compliance ideally should be 
one that captures issues of theoretical importance as well as giving practical direction for 
measuring the concept.‖ The IRS‘s definition may have covered the ‗theoretical‘ aspects, but 
it lacks the part on giving ‗direction‘ as to whether compliance is ‗voluntary‘ or ‗enforced‘. 
This seemingly comprehensive approach for defining the concept of tax compliance is 
evident from a number of studies, for example, the study by Jenkins and Forlemu (1993) does 
not provide a distinction between voluntary and enforced compliance. That is, taxpayers may 
have met the three factors from the IRS definition described earlier, but their ―motives for 
compliance‖ (Kirchler et al., 2008, p. 210) have been ignored. In addition, some studies (for 
example: Alm et al., 1993 and Prince Rasaq Kunle Quadri et al., 2010) examined the causes 
and reasons for voluntary compliance, but they do not provide an explicit definition for the 
concept, nor do they examine the differences between voluntary and enforced compliance.  
James and Alley (2002, p. 30) believe enforced compliance to arise in situations when 
taxpayers comply ―because of dire threats or harassment [from the tax authorities] or both,‖ 
whereas, voluntary compliance is the opposite. It is believed that voluntary compliance can 
be enhanced in situations where the ―taxpayers feel that they have a voice in the way their 
taxes will be spent…‖ (Alm et al., 1993, p. 287). In addition to the fairness factor, other 
behavioural factors described by Jackson and Milliron‘s (1986) study should also be 
perceived as influential factors for contributing to the level of voluntary compliance.  
In addition, James and Alley (2002, p. 30) raise an interesting idea that enforced 
compliance cannot be viewed as ―proper compliance‖ due to the involvement of the tax 
authorities in order to collect its tax revenue. From McBarnet‘s (2003, p. 229) theory, 
voluntary compliance can be treated in the same manner as ‗committed compliance‘, as this 
is when ―taxpayers choose to comply willingly [when] faced with a tax bill.‖ On the other 
hand, enforced compliance may be viewed as ‗capitulative compliance‘, where ―taxpayers 
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choose to comply unwillingly; [that is, they] complain but pay up nonetheless‖ (McBarnet, 
2003, p. 229). That is, they have ―no choice but to meet the request [of their tax liabilities 
due]‖ (Braithwaite, 2003b, p. 276), or it may be viewed as taxpayers demonstrating signs of 
tax resistance (Wahl et al., 2010). James and Alley (2002) describe possible audits and fines 
to be the cause and result of enforced compliance as taxpayers are usually risk averse in 
nature where non-compliance activities would be kept out of the view of the authority. These 
factors are not usually included within the definitions of enforced compliance, but they act as 
the basis of what enforced compliance may entail as these examples enhance our 
understanding of what we can expect from enforced compliance behaviours. The same 
approach could be taken for circumstances where a ‗universal‘ definition is to be developed 
for voluntary compliance as it is evident from the literature gathered for this study that 
voluntary compliance is compliance without enforcement efforts and is the opposite of 
enforced compliance.  
As opposed to the distinction between voluntary and enforced compliance, Birch et al. 
(2003) differentiate tax compliance between taxpayers who comply with the ‗letter‘ of the 
law against taxpayers who are complying with the ‗spirit‘ of the law. An unofficial 
recognition for voluntary compliance may be seen as taxpayers who have complied with both 
the ‗spirit‘ and ‗letter‘ of the law, while enforced compliance only roughly equates to 
taxpayers complying with the ‗letter‘ of the law. It may be argued that it is unnecessary to 
define tax compliance by distinguishing between complying with the letter and spirit of the 
law because regardless of what the intention was, taxpayers have met their applicable tax 
obligations.  
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Nevertheless, it is still relatively important to define tax compliance in the manner that 
will be able to differentiate between compliance with the ‗letter‘ and ‗spirit‘ of the law as 
enforcement efforts made by the government are likely to have an impact on tax revenue and 
budgetary implications in the long-run. Birch et al. (2003, p. 67) suggest that definitions of 
tax compliance that do not at least meet the criteria covered by the IRS definition would be 
perceived as ―rather simplistic.‖ The absence of a clearly defined definition for the concept of 
tax compliance has ‗encouraged‘ more taxpayers to take advantage of the grey areas of tax 
law, and thus, involving themselves in the exploitation of tax loopholes, leading to the 
forever-increasing tax gap experienced by governments around the world.  
As a result of the inconsistencies and variations that arise between behavioural tax 
compliance studies, James and Alley (2002) and Kastlunger et al. (2010) have each 
developed a continuum attributable to the possible ‗layers‘ of tax compliance as opposed to 
simply defining the concept. According to James and Alley (2001, p. 27), one end of the 
continuum is the ‗narrow‘ approach, that is, the ―law enforcement approach,‖ where it is 
purely concerned with whether taxpayers comply. In contrast, the other end of the continuum 
is the ‗wider‘ approach, where it takes into account the possible tax compliance behaviours, 
and accommodates for the ―wider economic definitions‖ (James and Alley, 2002, p. 27), 
where it considers various factors that can influence the level of compliance demonstrated by 
taxpayers.  
The application of the continuums highlight the issue of whether it is ever possible (and 
practical) to define the concept of tax compliance in one simple sentence as there are too 
many factors and variables affecting how tax compliance can or should be defined. In 
addition, due to the many ‗layers‘ of tax compliance, one may consider it to be more practical 
to have a definition for each of the ‗layers‘ of compliance behaviour, that is, a different 
definition is prescribed to ‗voluntary‘ and ‗enforced‘ tax compliance. Consequently, Verboon 
80 
 
and van Dijke (2007) believe that in order to fully capture what the concept of tax compliance 
incorporates, it is important for researchers to examine why taxpayers comply so as to be able 
to acknowledge the various ‗layers‘ of tax compliance in order to reduce confusion and to 
enable necessary changes to be made to the tax system to promote (voluntary) tax 
compliance.
21
 Nevertheless, James and Alley (2002) realizes the difficulty of attributing an 
explicit definition for tax compliance as there may be a difference in the interpretation of 
what tax compliance behaviour is, and what it may entail. Therefore, in order to adopt a 
descriptive definition for each of the ‗layers‘ of tax compliance, it is necessary to examine 
whether external factors, such as the ―exchange between the paid tax and performed 
government services‖ (Torgler, 2007, p. 74), are equitable when viewed from the taxpayers‘ 
perspective as this will have an influence on whether compliance is voluntary or enforced, 
and ultimately, how ‗layers‘ of tax compliance should be defined.  
As opposed to straight definitions or continuums for understanding the concept of tax 
compliance, the approach taken by the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) is through the 
adoption of a compliance model (see Figure 1 below). It is a model which evaluates the 
attitudes and behaviours of taxpayers‘ compliance in New Zealand (Sung, 2009). The shape 
of the compliance model is a pyramid. The top of the pyramid consists of the small portion of 
taxpayers who decide not to comply and the bottom of the pyramid represents the large 
number of taxpayers who are willing to do the right thing. Although the compliance model 
does not capture the intent or motive of why a taxpayer complies, it is useful for determining 
the attitudes of the four main groups of taxpayers when faced with their tax liabilities.  
 
                                                          
21
 For more details on why taxpayers comply, see McKerchar (2001).  
81 
 
Figure 1: The Inland Revenue Department’s Compliance Model22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Having considered the influence external variables have on tax compliance behaviour, it 
may be agreed that the definition of tax compliance adopted by the IRS is currently the best 
suited representation for the concept, whilst bearing in mind that a continuum exists for the 
need to differentiate between the ‗layers‘ of tax compliance. Unfortunately, none of the 
studies in literature gathered have attempted to combine tax compliance and its ‗layers‘ 
together to form an even more comprehensive definition for tax compliance.  
This study agrees with Devos‘ (2008, p. 3) statement that ―there is no standard all 
embracing definition of compliance adopted across all tax compliance studies.‖ Hasseldine 
and Li (1999, p. 2) recognize the difficulty currently experienced by researchers as it states 
that ―tax compliance is often a complicated procedure that requires detailed knowledge and 
                                                          
22
Accessed from: http://www.ird.govt.nz/technical-tax/prosecution-framework/prosecution-framework.html 
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effort.‖ Having said that, Picciotto (2007, p. 2) states it is also important to be certain that the 
interpretation and understanding of rules do not differ between the parties concerned.  
Therefore, given the current state of the situation, this study supports James et al. (2001, 
p. 159) remark that ―[it is] clear that there are different definitions of tax compliance and 
different approaches to the issue [due to various factors].‖ Thus, although a ‗universal‘ 
definition for tax compliance may not be practical given the current state of what existing 
literature has examined, it does not imply that the current definitions of tax compliance are 
inadequate, but rather, more emphasis should be placed on how to objectively determine the 
‗layers‘ of compliance, and how they can be defined so that the definition can function 
smoothly under different circumstances. In addition, in order to define the ‗layers‘ of tax 
compliance in a ‗universal‘ manner, support from various domains of study (for example, 
behavioural-based psychological and sociological studies) are also important as they would 
be able to facilitate and enhance how the different behaviours are recognized under different 
circumstances. However, it may be unhelpful and unproductive for futures studies to further 
divide the ‗layers‘ of tax compliance if just a little more confirmation could be reached on the 
differences between voluntary and enforced compliance and compliance with the ‗letter‘ and 
the ‗spirit‘ of the law.  
5.3. Behavioural Tax Non-Compliance Literature 
In the most basic terms, tax non-compliance is the ―antithesis of compliance, it 
represents the failure by a taxpayer to meet all of their compliance obligations in a timely and 
accurate manner‖ (Tan and Sawyer, 2003, p. 432). Non-compliance behaviours demonstrated 
by taxpayers can be said to represent the actions of what compliant taxpayers would not do. 
Although some taxpayers may get caught and be punished by the authorities for not 
complying should they get caught, some still attempt to challenge and exploit the loopholes 
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within the grey areas in the tax system. It has been estimated that the rate of non-compliance 
grows at a massive 10 percent per annum (Tan and Sawyer, 2003) and at least 50 percent of 
the taxpayers who file a tax return have in some way engaged in some form of tax non-
compliance (Tan and Sawyer, 2003). Because of the growing concern over the ever 
increasing non-compliance rate, much emphasis has been placed by researchers to focus on 
this area of concern.  
Generally, existing literature has focused not only on definitions of non-compliance, but 
also on the sub-categories within non-compliance, predominantly tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. However, recent issues such as creative compliance and over-compliance have also 
started to be in the spotlight for research. It is interesting to note here that although there is a 
significant number of studies on non-compliance, a majority of those do not place a 
significant weighting on definitions for just the concept of non-compliance, instead, existing 
literature have focused on the existence of sub-categories within non-compliance. This is 
perhaps because of the rather self-explanatory name of non-compliance, where it arises 
because of the failures by taxpayers to meet their tax obligations (Webley et al., 1991). 
Kirchler (2007, p. 21) believes non-compliance behaviour represents the ―most inclusive 
conceptualization referring to failures to meet tax obligations, whether or not those failures 
are intentional.‖ From this definition, it is evident that there are two main factors associated 
with the concept of tax non-compliance, namely: (A) the failure to meet tax obligations, and, 
(B) the failure may be intentional or unintentional. These two factors from Kirchler‘s (2007) 
study will act as the benchmark for other definitions listed in the table below. 
 
 
 
84 
 
Table 2: Definitions of ‘Tax Non-Compliance’ 
Details of 
Study 
Definition from study Factors 
considered 
Additional Notes 
(where applicable) 
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Jackson and 
Milliron 
(1986) 
There are many areas in the distinction between 
intentional and unintentional non-compliance. 
 √ Recognizes the many sub-
categories that exist within 
the branch of non-
compliance. 
Robben et 
al. (1990) 
The failure, intentional or unintentional, of 
taxpayer to meet their tax obligations. Whether 
deliberate or unintentional, non-compliance is 
relatively widespread. 
√ √ A relatively 
accommodative definition 
for the possible behaviours 
within the branch of non-
compliance. 
Webley et 
al. (1991) 
The intentional and unintentional failure of 
taxpayer to pay their taxes correctly. 
√ √  
Jenkins and 
Forlemu 
(1993) 
The failures to file returns, report income, 
calculate deductions properly, [and] pay [taxes] 
correctly and on time.  
√   
Erard 
(1997) 
Implies a failure, in the opinion of a tax 
examiner, to meet one‘s tax obligations. 
√  The ‗opinion‘ of the tax 
examiner may differ from 
the ‗opinion‘ of a taxpayer.  
Hasseldine 
and Li 
(1999) 
Result from deliberate choices; it can also occur 
because of carelessness, omissions, and 
misinterpretations of requirements.  
 √ Takes into account both 
intentional and 
unintentional non-
compliance. 
Tan (1999) Arises either due to a failure to file a tax return, 
misreporting taxable income, or misreporting 
allowable deductions from taxable income. 
√  More of a description of 
non-compliance, as 
opposed to a definition. 
Wenzel 
(2002)  
[Non-compliance] includes intended as well as 
unintended failures to meet tax obligations (e.g. 
because of misinformation, misunderstanding, or 
calculation errors). 
√ √ Takes into account both 
intentional and 
unintentional non-
compliance. 
Kasipillai et 
al. (2003) 
The term encompasses both intentional evasion 
and unintentional non-compliance which is 
likely due to calculation errors and inadequate 
understanding of tax laws. 
 √ Takes into account both 
intentional and 
unintentional non-
compliance. 
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Tan and 
Sawyer 
(2003) 
[The] antithesis of compliance, it represents the 
failure by a taxpayer to meet all of their 
compliance obligations in a timely and accurate 
manner. 
√   
Tedds 
(2006) 
Income tax that is legally owed but is not 
reported or paid.  
√   
Burton 
(2007b) 
Occurs where there is a departure from ―what the 
ATO [Australian Taxation Office] regards as the 
policy purposes of the Parliament‘s tax laws.‖ 
√   
Kirchler 
(2007) 
The most inconclusive conceptualization 
referring to failures to meet tax obligations 
whether or not those failures are intentional. 
Does not necessarily imply violation of the law. 
√ √  
U.S. 
Department 
of the 
Treasury 
(2009) 
Non-compliance takes three forms: 
(1) Underreporting (not reporting one‘s full tax 
liability on a timely filed return); 
(2) Underpayment (not timely paying the full 
amount of tax reported on a timely-filed 
return); and 
(3) Non-filing (not filing required returns on 
time and not paying the full amount of tax 
that should have been shown on the required 
return). 
√  More of a description of 
non-compliance, as 
opposed to a definition. 
Kirchler and 
Wahl 
(2010) 
Refers to the behavioural outcome of paying less 
tax than obligated. Underlying intentions of this 
behaviour could be minimizing tax payments by 
legal tax avoidance or by the violation of tax law. 
√   
Prince 
Rasaq 
Kunle 
Quadri et al. 
(2010) 
Failure to meet any of the obligations listed 
below may be considered to be non-compliant: 
-registration in the tax system  
-timely filing or lodgement of requisite taxation 
information 
-reporting of complete and accurate information; 
and payment of taxation obligations on time 
√  This definition is similar to 
the definition that is 
currently being adopted by 
the IRD.  
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A number of non-compliance definitions from the table distinguish between ‗intentional‘ 
and ‗unintentional‘ non-compliance because of the growing importance to consider both of 
these types of taxpayer behaviours (Devos, 2008). However, it may also be argued that non-
compliance is only a ―neutral term‖ (Webley et al., 1991, p. 3) where the sub-categories 
within non-compliance are fairly dominant and it may be unnecessary for the concept of non-
compliance itself to take into account those possible behaviours. Webley et al. (1991, p. 2) 
continue to state that the non-compliance concept ―does not assume that an inaccurate tax 
return is unnecessarily the result of an intention to defraud the authorities and it recognizes 
that inaccuracies may result in the overpayment of taxes.‖ The aspect of the ‗overpayment‘ of 
taxes relates to the over-compliance sub-category of non-compliance, as will be explained in 
more detail later in this chapter.  
Intentional and unintentional non-compliance does not appear to have been defined 
separately in existing literature, but there have been a number of studies that have described 
as to what contributes to intentional and unintentional non-compliance. Before outlining what 
can amount to intentional and unintentional non-compliance, Carroll (1992, p. 44) has 
provided a detailed example of what amounts to non-compliance in general by stating that 
non-compliance may arise when a ―taxpayer is ignorant, lazy, careless, deliberately cheating, 
following occupational groups or workplaces, heeding incorrect advice from the IRS, [or by] 
making a symbolic protest against the tax system.‖ By incorporating possible behaviours that 
may amount to non-compliance, this detailed list provide readers with a basic understanding 
of how complicated the category of non-compliance is, as the fault may have either 
originated from the Inland Revenue authorities (by giving out incorrect information) or the 
taxpayers themselves (by choosing not to comply with the tax regulations).  
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5.3.1 Intentional and unintentional non-compliance 
 The area of research on intentional non-compliance would have perhaps received the 
most amount of attention from researchers. In order to intentionally engage in non-compliant 
activities, some understanding of the tax system is believed to be a pre-requisite. Within 
intentional non-compliance, the two main sub-categories are tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
Although it is often difficult to distinguish between the two forms of non-compliance activity, 
they are ―usually distinguished in terms of legality‖ (James and Alley, 2002, p. 31) Even 
within tax avoidance and tax evasion, there may be some other minor categories that exist 
within, but the focus of study is mainly focused on the sub-categories of tax avoidance and 
tax evasion within tax non-compliance, and so, those minor sub-categories would not be 
examined closely. Tax avoidance is viewed objectively
23
 where the onus of proof is on the 
taxpayer as to whether they have been engaging in tax avoidance related activities. On the 
other hand, in order to establish tax evasion or related behaviours, it is necessary to assess the 
presence of ‗knowledge‘ and ‗intent‘ demonstrated by a taxpayer.  
In contrast, unintentional non-compliance has not generally received as much attention 
in existing literature. The main cause of unintentional non-compliance has been found to be 
the result of the complexity of the tax systems in each country. Because of interpretation 
issues with the applicable rules and regulations, some taxpayers may unconsciously pay an 
amount that differs from their actual tax liability. For example, Hasseldine and Li (1999, p. 
92) describe unintentional non-compliance may occur as a result of ―carelessness, omissions 
and misinterpretations of requirements,‖ or it may also be the result of ―inadvertent memory 
lapses, calculation errors, or inadequate knowledge of tax laws‖ (Robben et al., 1990, p. 342).  
                                                          
23
 For more details on how tax avoidance is determined objectively, see Ch‟elle Properties (NZ) Limited v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue SC 46/2007 [2007] NZSC 73. 
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Despite a number of studies focusing on the causes of unintentional non-compliance, 
there remain areas of unexplored literature as to how the concept of unintentional non-
compliance can be defined in a ‗universal‘ manner. The absence of a definition has caused 
difficulties for the tax authorities to determine whether tax shortfalls unpaid by taxpayers are 
the cause of unintentional non-compliance, but some may argue that it is a challenge to 
determine the real cause of non-compliance by a taxpayer, that is, whether the cause of non-
compliance was genuine or otherwise. In addition, James and Alley (2002) believe having no 
knowledge of a particular tax law/obligation does not equate to unintentional non-
compliance. Therefore, it may be possible at this stage to only understand what causes and 
behaviours may be considered to be unintentional non-compliance due to the difficulties 
associated with attributing a ‗universal‘ definition for the concept. Moving away from 
unintentional non-compliance, the following section discusses the main sub-categories within 
intentional non-compliance, with an emphasis on the concepts of tax avoidance, tax evasion 
and over-compliance.  
5.3.2 Tax Avoidance  
This sub-category within the branch of non-compliance has been researched extensively 
over the years. The term has generally been considered as a form of ‗legal‘ method for 
taxpayers to reduce their tax liabilities. However, it is considered as a more aggressive 
approach when compared against other forms of legitimate tax minimization techniques 
(Webley et al., 1991 and Tooma, 2008), as it has even been labelled as a ―cunning‖ method to 
avoid tax liabilities (Prebble, 2011, p. 10). The concept of tax avoidance is probably one of 
the most difficult concepts to define within the category of non-compliance due to the 
similarities it shares with tax evasion and other less common forms of non-compliance. 
However, Orow (1995a) believes that the issues and problems associated with tax avoidance 
are because of the unavoidable and inescapable payment of tax liabilities. It is interesting to 
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note that unlike the concept of tax evasion, tax avoidance was not a term that was applied in 
government documents until the early 19
th
 Century (Hughes, 2009).  
Both tax avoidance and tax evasion have the common ultimate goal to escape the 
payment of true tax obligations faced by a taxpayer. However, the distinction between the 
two can usually be recognized between the approaches taken by a taxpayer when carrying out 
an activity (McBarnet, 1992). Tax avoidance involves the legal use of methods to ―neutralize 
its impacts‖ (McBarnet, 1992, p. 341), where it seeks to reduce a taxpayer‘s payment of 
taxes. On the other hand, tax evasion involves the application of methods that ―simply ignore 
or break the law‖ (McBarnet, 1992, p. 341).   
Wenzel‘s (2002, p. 360) definition of tax avoidance is described as ―the deliberate acts 
of reducing one‘s taxes by legal means.‖ The three characteristics that will be used as 
benchmarks for the definitions outlined in the table below are: (A) a legal behaviour, (B) a 
deliberate act that involves planning and/or an arrangement; and (C) to reduce tax liabilities.  
Table 3: Definitions of ‘Tax Avoidance’24 
Details of 
Study 
Definition from study Factors 
considered 
Additional Notes 
(where applicable) 
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Richardson 
(1967) 
Reducing the burden of tax by legal 
means. 
√  √  
Van Hoorn Jr. 
(1974) 
It is considered as referring to an attitude 
of unethical and, indeed, unlawful 
behaviour, although it is actually a 
neutral term. 
    
 
                                                          
24
 Some of the tax avoidance definitions from Table 3 are from the United States of America (USA) and in their 
tax law context, tax avoidance is regarded as acceptable behaviour and within the law. It is regarded in the USA 
as a synonymous for tax mitigation or tax minimization.  
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Clyne (1979) Planning your commercial life in such a 
way as to become liable to pay no tax, or 
to pay as little tax as possible.  
 √ √  
Gassner 
(1983) 
Refers to taxpayers‘ freedom to present 
their income in such a form that they pay 
the minimum in tax by respecting the 
―letter of the law‖. 
 √ √ One of the few definitions to 
look at the issue from the 
‗letter‘ and ‗spirit‘ 
perspective.  
Groenewegen 
(1985) 
Tax minimization by legally taking 
advantage of the tax reduction potential 
of certain sections of the tax act. 
Avoidance therefore involves the 
taxpayer in legal though artificial action 
which combines tax saving with a (more 
roundabout) achievement of the 
transaction‘s principal objective. 
√ √ √ A relatively accommodative 
definition for tax compliance 
as it considers both the 
objective and goal for 
minimizing one‘s tax 
obligations. 
Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs 
(1987) 
Tax planning or abstention from 
consumption. 
 √   
Pyle (1989) [The] entirely legitimate use of tax 
loopholes in order to minimize one‘s 
(income) tax burden. [Taxpayers may be] 
behaving quite legitimately, although in 
some cases perhaps cynically, in order to 
reduce one‘s tax payments. 
√ √ √  
Alm et al. 
(1990) 
Any legal activity that lowers taxes. √  √ The words ‗any legal‘ may 
not necessarily limit to acts 
of tax avoidance if other 
sub-categories of non-
compliance are taken into 
consideration.  
Webley et al. 
(1991) 
Involves every attempt by legal means to 
prevent or reduce tax liability which 
would otherwise be incurred… It 
presupposes the existence of alternatives, 
one of which would result in less tax 
than the other.  
√ √ √ The words ‗every attempt‘ 
may be too broad for tax 
avoidance as some attempts 
to reduce tax liabilities may 
be the result of legitimate 
tax planning. 
McBarnet 
(1992) 
Accepted as lawful. The use of legal 
techniques to avoid tax. 
√ √ √  
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Orow (1995a) The unacceptable or illegitimate 
minimisation of tax liabilities which do 
not break the law. [That is,] an 
illegitimate means of obtaining a tax 
advantage.  
√  √  
Ohms (1996b) Involves a transaction entered into for 
the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit. 
 √ √  
Sawyer 
(1996) 
Disallowing certain expenditure as a 
deduction or deeming certain revenue 
flows to be taxable income, thereby 
creating a further tax liability.  
 √ √  
Armstrong 
and Robinson 
(1998) 
Constitutes legal methods by which a 
taxpayer can reduce their tax bill. 
√ √ √  
Hopper et al. 
(1998) 
The reduction of tax liability based on a 
literal interpretation of tax legislation, 
but outside the intention/purpose of the 
tax legislation and having the principle 
effect of altering the incidence of income 
tax. 
  √ Considers the ‗letter‘ and 
‗spirit‘ of law even though 
the objective is to reduce 
one‘s tax liabilities.  
Walkey and 
Purchas 
(1998) 
Taxpayers legally structure transactions 
in order to minimize their taxable 
income, and therefore their taxation 
liability. 
√ √ √ May be perceived as more of 
a definition for tax planning, 
rather than tax avoidance.  
Franzoni 
(2000) 
Individuals reduce their own tax in a way 
that may be unintended by tax legislators 
but is permissible by law. Avoidance is 
typically accomplished by structuring 
transactions so as to minimize tax 
liability. 
 √ √  
James and 
Alley (2002) 
Legal measures to reduce tax liability.  √  √ Too broad to really grasp the 
concept‘s true nature (that is, 
does not quite capture what 
tax avoidance may involve). 
Wenzel 
(2002) 
Deliberate acts of reducing one‘s taxes 
by legal means. 
√ √ √  
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Braithwaite 
(2003a) 
A number of cautious minimizing 
strategies, number of aggressive 
minimizing strategies, and effort to 
minimize [tax liabilities].  
 √ √ The use of the phrase 
‗aggressive minimizing 
strategies‘ may be too harsh 
for tax avoidance as it may 
be better suited for other 
more serious forms of non-
compliance (for example: a 
taxpayer taking an abusive 
tax position).  
Kasipillai et 
al. (2003) 
Is legal and denotes the taxpayers‘ 
ingenuity to arrange his affairs in a 
proper manner so as to reduce the 
incidence of tax. 
√ √ √  
Kirchler et al. 
(2003) 
An attempt to reduce tax payments by 
legal means, for instance, by exploiting 
tax loopholes. 
√ √ √  
Freedman 
(2004) 
All arrangements to reduce eliminate or 
defer tax liabilities that are not illegal. 
√ √ √ This definition is too broad 
for the concept of tax 
avoidance.  
Sandmo 
(2004) 
Within the legal framework of the tax 
law. It consists in exploiting loopholes in 
the tax law in order to reduce one‘s tax 
liability; converting labour income into 
capital income that is taxed at a lower 
rate provides one class of examples of 
tax avoidance. 
√ √ √  
Tedds (2006) Legal actions taken to reduce tax 
liability. 
√ √ √  
Hofmann et 
al. (2008) 
The legal reduction of income and/or the 
legal increase of expenditures by a 
creative design of the tax statement (It is 
legal and moral). 
√ √ √ Takes into account that 
avoidance is not unique to 
only the minimization of 
income, but also 
expenditures.  
McLaren 
(2008) 
An act within the law. √ √  This definition is considered 
to be too generic, and does 
not consider the essence of 
tax avoidance behaviours.  
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Simser (2008) [Tax avoidance] is perfectly acceptable. √   It is questionable as to 
whether it refers to 
‗acceptable‘ within the law 
or ‗acceptable‘ in general 
when compared against other 
tax minimization techniques. 
Tooma (2008) Involves the legal exploitation of the 
letter of the law to one‘s own advantage, 
without regard to the broader purpose of 
the tax laws. 
√  √  
Griffiths 
(2009) 
Tax avoidance is imprecise, open-
textured, incoherent and indefinable. 
   Describes the tax avoidance 
problem rather than 
providing a definition for the 
concept.  
Hughes 
(2009) 
The use of schemes which do not breach 
the letter of the law but do breach its 
underlying intention or spirit. Tax 
avoidance is [a] legal activity, as opposed 
to tax evasion. 
√ √  Notes the importance of 
distinguishing between the 
‗letter‘ and the ‗spirit‘ of the 
law. 
Trombitas 
(2009) 
As a general proposition, tax avoidance 
arises in situations where the letter of the 
law says (or permits) that tax is not 
payable or that tax savings are allowed, 
but the policy of the tax law (based on the 
legislative scheme) has it that tax should 
be paid or not reduced. In other words, 
tax avoidance always arises in situations 
when the letter of the law is met but the 
spirit (or policy) of the law is breached.  
Tax avoidance is undesirable. 
√  √ Notes the importance of 
distinguishing between the 
‗letter‘ and the ‗spirit‘ of the 
law. 
Balestrino 
(2010) 
It is tax dodging, where it is a riskless but 
costly activity. 
 √  A general definition as most 
tax minimization activities 
are considered to be ―costly‖. 
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Kirchler and 
Wahl (2010) 
[Tax avoidance] is legal. Taxes are 
intentionally reduced by legal means 
trough taking advantage of loopholes in 
the tax law. 
√ √ √  
Lim (2010) Tax savings that arises from both the 
general tax reduction methods and tax 
shelters that are occasionally of 
questionable legality to minimize tax 
liability. In other words, the tax 
avoidance measure conceptually captures 
the cumulative number of transactions to 
minimize tax liabilities.  
 √ √  
Murphy 
(2010) 
Seeking to minimize a tax bill without 
deliberate deception (which would be tax 
evasion) but contrary to the spirit of the 
law. It therefore involves the exploitation 
of loopholes and gaps in tax and other 
legislation in ways not anticipated by the 
law. 
 √ √ As there is a fine line 
between acceptable tax 
minimization and tax 
avoidance, it is questionable 
as to whether this definition 
is too lenient for tax 
avoidance as it may involve 
deliberate actions from the 
taxpayers‘ behalf. 
Sikka and 
Willmott 
(2010) 
Considered to be lawful. √   This definition may be 
considered as a more 
appropriate definition if it 
were to define all legal ways 
to reduce one‘s tax burden. 
That is, this definition is 
again too simplistic 
Elliffe (2011) Involves a taxpayer entering into an 
arrangement that alters the incidence of 
tax. The transaction actually entered into 
by them generates the income or 
expenditure that is returned in the tax 
return. 
    
Keating and 
Keating 
(2011) 
Taxpayers who arrange their affairs to 
reduce the potential tax liability 
 √ √  
Perez (2011a) Minimizing your taxes through legal, but 
aggressive, tax planning strategies. The 
opposite of tax avoidance is tax evasion. 
√ √ √  
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It is interesting to note that the definitions brought up by Hughes (2009), Murphy (2010) 
and Perez (2011a) all compared tax avoidance against tax evasion, where they believe the 
former to be the ‗opposite‘ of the latter in terms of legality. This may be considered as a  
general understanding when looking at the definitions from the tables but it is by no means 
adequate as it is important to also consider other legal forms of tax minimization techniques 
where they may  all be considered as ‗opposites‘ of tax evasion.  
The difficulties involved in defining the concept of tax avoidance have led to some 
studies to ‗extract‘ other sub-categories within the branch of tax avoidance. For example, Van 
Hoorn Jr. (1974) states that there are different variations as to how the concept of tax 
avoidance is recognized in each country, for example, the term, ‗abusive tax position‘ is 
unique to the New Zealand context where it is understood as a more serious form of tax 
Details of 
Study 
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(where applicable) 
  
L
eg
a
l 
b
eh
a
vi
o
u
r 
D
el
ib
er
a
te
 
a
ct
 
R
ed
u
ce
 t
a
x 
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s 
 
Prebble 
(2011) 
Tax avoidance falls between tax evasion 
and mitigation on the scale of tax 
minimising behaviour…Unlike evasion, 
avoidance is not criminal, and is often 
said to be legal. Avoidance exploits the 
tax law to use it in ways unintended by 
Parliament by following its black letter 
requirements but not its spirit. 
√ √  Distinguishes between 
complying with the ‗letter‘ 
of the law and complying 
with the ‗spirit‘ of the law.  
University of 
Auckland 
(2011) 
Tax avoidance is not a criminal offence. 
It does not turn on misrepresentations 
being made to Inland Revenue; on the 
contrary, taxpayers accused of tax 
avoidance have commonly disclosed to 
Inland Revenue far more information 
about their affairs than they are required 
to by law.  
√   Questionable as to whether 
‗additional‘ information has 
really been disclosed to 
Inland Revenue as tax 
avoidance is usually related 
to omissions where 
taxpayers have not disclosed 
sufficient information...  
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avoidance.
25
 Griffiths (2009, p. 165) states that abusive tax position is like ―abusive 
avoidance where it attracts penalties.‖ 
Abusive tax position is deemed to have occurred ―if a taxpayer enters an arrangement 
with the dominant or substantive intention of producing a tax advantage and cannot show that 
he has a reasonably arguable position…‖ (Sawyer, 1996, p. 484). The boundary between 
acceptable tax planning and tax avoidance (unacceptable, but legal) is not always 
distinguishable, but the balance between the economic substance and the complexity of an 
arrangement is perceived as a key identifier as to whether a particular behaviour is acceptable 
or otherwise (Sawyer, 1996). Both tax avoidance and abusive tax position leads to the result 
of less tax payable, and so it is reinforced in the Interpretation Statement 0061 (IS0061) 
issued by the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) that the avoidance of tax is not limited to 
only the concept of tax avoidance. Unlike situations where a taxpayer takes an abusive tax 
position, tax avoidance does not require a dominant purpose of avoiding taxes as tax 
avoidance is viewed objectively. As a result of these complications, nearly all studies have 
taken a slightly different approach when defining the concepts associated with the tax 
avoidance issue. 
A number of existing studies have found that the sole purpose of engaging in tax 
avoidance arrangement by taxpayers is to reduce the amount of taxes payable (paid) through 
legal means (Richardson, 1967; Clyne, 1979; Hawes, 1996; Armstrong and Robinson, 1998; 
and Dyreng et al., 2007). Taking advantage of the grey areas of tax law can arise from a 
number of possible actions, including, ―income splitting, postponement of taxes, and tax 
arbitrage across income that faces different tax treatments‖ (Alm, 1999, p. 741). These 
factors then contribute to how the concept of tax avoidance has been defined over the years.  
                                                          
25
 For more information on abusive tax position, see the IRD‘s (2005) Interpretation Statement on Abusive Tax 
Position.  
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However, the scope of tax avoidance should be more widespread that what has been 
proposed by existing studies as some of the tax avoidance approaches identified by Alm 
(1999) may be perfectly legal and completely acceptable in some countries. In addition, 
Dyreng et al. (2007, p. 62) states there are ―numerous provisions in the tax code that allow or 
encourage firms to reduce their taxes.‖ This is supported by Tooma‘s (2008, p. 16) study that 
all ―taxpayers should be allowed to arrange their affairs so as to pay the least tax possible.‖ 
Therefore, a comprehensive definition for the concept of tax avoidance should consider the 
degree or extent in which arrangements have been carried out by taxpayers. In addition, it is 
important to bear in mind that the definition of tax avoidance may differ between each 
country due to the approach taken as to what could be considered as standard acceptable 
behaviour. 
26
 
In order to go beyond the general understanding that tax avoidance leads to less taxes 
payable legally, Richardson (1967, p. 8) proposes that there are two other distinct 
qualifications associated with the behaviour of tax avoidance. The first is that ―avoidance 
must be an objective of a transaction,‖ and second, the taxpayer must be doing more than just 
―deliberately seeking those tax benefits‖ (Richardson, 1967, p. 8). However, this approach 
may be considered to be more appropriate for understanding the concept of abusive tax 
position. 
Another approach taken is evident from Bracewell-Milnes‘ (1980) study where the issue 
is separated between ‗objective‘ and ‗subjective‘ tax avoidance. Within the study, Bracewell-
Milnes (1980, p. 13) describes ‗subjective‘ tax avoidance as the ―narrower concept‖ between 
the two, where it accommodates behaviours that are ―both intentional and factitious in the 
sense that the taxpayer desires to retain the economic substance of a transaction while 
                                                          
26
 For example, the United States‘ tax authorities accept that taxpayers may be involved in acts of tax avoidance 
(and thus the distinction between ‗acceptable‘ tax avoidance and ‗unacceptable‘ tax evasion), but in New 
Zealand‘s context, both tax avoidance and tax evasion are unacceptable. 
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mitigating ten tax consequences by an adjustment of its form‖ (Bracewell-Milnes, 1980, p. 
13). On the other hand, objective tax avoidance arises when there is a ―tax reduction of any 
kind and for and motive‖ (Bracewell-Milnes, 1980, p. 13), where it may involve actions from 
contemplating schemes for deliberate avoidance of taxes to unplanned tax reductions.  
Despite the general consensus established across studies that tax avoidance is a form of 
legal behaviour to reduce one‘s tax obligations, studies have yet to develop methods to divide 
between acceptable tax planning, abusive tax position and tax avoidance behaviours. This 
then has an effect on how tax avoidance can be defined in a ‗universal‘ manner. This is 
predominantly the result of the difficulties associated with the ability to clearly distinguish 
between the concepts because of the ―grey area between tax avoidance and tax minimization 
[and possibly other behaviours associated with tax avoidance]‖ (Hawes, 1996, p. 15). In 
addition, as some researchers have used different terms when studying the tax avoidance 
concept, this then complicates the issue as they are bringing their own interpretations of the 
concept into their individual studies.  
Picciotto (2007) raises an interesting approach for viewing the tax avoidance problem 
where tax avoidance behaviours can be viewed as a ‗game‘.27 This ‗game‘ is ―one in which 
the players seek to interpret the rules to their advantage, but in a formalist and technicist 
manner, that is, by referring only to the apparent internal logic of the rule-system, without 
feeling any need to justify their interpretation of a rule by reference to broader considerations‖ 
(Picciotto, 2007, p. 11). However, the difficulties associated with distinguishing between 
legal and illegal methods of tax minimization is still blurred, as it is up to the extent in which 
a taxpayer minimizes their tax obligations, because the line between the two will always be 
hard to determine. Therefore, although it appears that some issues surrounding the tax 
avoidance problem has been clarified, there remains a high level of confusion as to what tax 
                                                          
27
 See Braithwaite (2003a) and Picciotto (2007) on how they have compared tax avoidance to a ‗game‘. 
99 
 
avoidance entails and when particular tax avoidance behaviour crosses the line to illegal tax 
evasion behaviour.  
Nevertheless, the cause of the inconsistencies from the definitions established over the 
years is mainly the result of the differences in perspectives from the taxpayer and the Inland 
Revenue (or equivalent) organizations. Some behaviours, when viewed from the taxpayers 
perspective, may be perfectly acceptable as it aligns with the ‗black‘ letter of the law, but this 
may lead to a contravention of certain sections from the Inland Revenue‘s perspective, and 
undoubtedly, vice versa. As a result, a ‗universal‘ definition for tax avoidance would be 
difficult to articulate in practice because of the differences in the understanding of the term 
between taxpayers and the Inland Revenue organizations. However, the legality aspect 
between tax avoidance and tax evasion acts as an important distinction between the two 
concepts as it sets the boundary for what is acceptable under the tax avoidance umbrella 
(Orow, 1995b). The following section considers some of the sub-categories associated with 
the concept of tax avoidance, where a brief description on each of the concepts have been 
intended to enhance our overall understanding on the broad concept of tax avoidance.  
5.3.2.1 Tax mitigation 
The concept of tax mitigation has also been referred to in some studies and especially in 
the Challenge (1986)
28
 and Ben Nevis (2008) cases. Tax mitigation has been described as a 
form of legal and acceptable method to reduce one‘s tax liabilities (Sawyer, 1996; Evans, 
2007; Hughes, 2009; and Baker, 2011). This concept can be understood to be a term that 
exists between the domains of unacceptable tax planning and tax avoidance (Sawyer, 1996 
and Hughes, 2009), or it may be considered to be a complementary term for legitimate tax 
minimization (Baker, 2011). Prebble (2011, p. 8) explains tax mitigation as behaviours that 
                                                          
28
 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Limited [1986] 8 NZTC 5,219. 
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follow ―both the letter and the spirit of the law, whereas, avoidance follows the former but 
not the latter.‖ However, this is not a term that is commonly referred to in literature as its 
characteristic with tax avoidance is too alike and some courts have found it unhelpful to 
separate the two concepts (Evans, 2007; and Ben Nevis Supreme Court, 2008). This can be 
supported by Lord Nolan‘s judgement in the Willoughby‘s (1997)29 case where he explains:  
―The hallmark of tax avoidance is that the taxpayer reduces his liability to tax without 
incurring the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by any 
taxpayer qualifying for such reduction in his tax liability. The hallmark of tax mitigation, 
on the other hand, is that the taxpayer takes advantage of a fiscally attractive option 
afforded to him by the legislation, and genuinely suffers the economic consequences that 
Parliament intended to be suffered by those taking advantage of the option‖ (paragraph 
[73]). 
5.3.2.2 Creative compliance 
 In Chapter 2, the essential but often unexplored notion of creative compliance was 
described briefly where it is considered to be under the branch of non-compliance. After 
further research, only a very limited number of studies (see Shah, 1996; McBarnet 2003 and 
2007) have a tendency to separately address this concept from tax avoidance. McBarnet and 
Whelan (1991) made it clear within their particular study that the concept of creative 
compliance is not unique to only accounting and law domains, but this concept may also be 
meaningful and useful in other areas of practice and research.  
Due to the ‗improved‘ techniques involved in an attempt to reduce one‘s tax liabilities 
legally, the concept of creative compliance is in no doubt to be more accepted and applicable 
in practice now, compared to a decade or so ago. McBarnet (2007, p. 1) defines creative 
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 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Willoughby [1997] 4 ALL ER 65. 
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compliance as ―the use of technical legal work to manage the legal packaging, structuring and 
definition of practices and transactions, such that they can claim to fall on the right side of the 
boundary between lawfulness and illegality.‖ More plainly, it is the practice of ―using the 
letter of the law to defeat its spirit, and to do so with impunity‖ (McBarnet, 2007, p. 1). It is 
important to acknowledge that creative compliance behaviours are not behaviours that have 
violated the law, but rather, it is associated with taxpayers taking advantage of the grey areas 
of the legislation. For example, McBarnet and Whelan (1991, p. 850) perceive creative 
compliance to be a ―prerequisite to a successful ‗off balance sheet financing‘ transaction 
(OBSF).‖ This move is to allow the ―funding or refinancing of a company‘s operations in 
such a way that, under legal requirements and existing accounting conventions, some or all of 
the finance may not be shown on its balance sheet‖ (McBarnet and Whelan, 1991, p. 850). 
The other study by McBarnet (2003) describes the core of creative compliance as 
representing the way that taxpayers manage their tax obligations in accordance with the 
‗letter‘ of the law, while undermining the other important, but often ignored, ‗spirit‘ of the 
law.  
Despite preliminary studies concerned with creative compliance, it is still too early to 
reach a conclusion as to whether creative compliance is a more appropriate fit under the main 
category of tax compliance than non-compliance due to the absence of further studies to be 
conducted by different researchers. However, what can be agreed on the concept of creative 
compliance is the ‗active‘ involvement of taxpayers in arrangements to reduce their true tax 
liabilities in a legal manner. This is supported by an earlier study by McBarnet and Whelan 
(1991, p. 848) where they explained the process of creative compliance as ―…the active 
response of those subject to the law, not just in political lobbying over legislation but in post 
hoc manipulation of the law to turn it- no matter what the intentions of the legislators or 
enforcers- to the service of their own interests and to avoid unwanted control.‖ 
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As a result, the categorization of creative compliance should be dependent upon the 
extent of the activities involved to reduce the ‗true‘ tax liabilities of a taxpayer in order to 
determine whether it is a form of tax compliance or non-compliance behaviour. If it is to be 
recognized as a form of non-compliance behaviour, then the issue of how it is placed on a 
spectrum ranging from legal tax planning to illegal tax evasion needs to be determined. This 
is because of the result of an inconsistency between Anderson‘s (1993) study where it deems 
creative compliance to be more serious than ‗general‘ tax avoidance and Picciotto‘s (2007) 
study where it recognizes creative compliance to be a sub-branch that exists within the branch 
of tax avoidance. Therefore, although the concept of creative compliance is still missing a 
‗universal‘ definition, some solid foundation has been set on the essence of what the concept 
entails, in particular, it has been agreed from various studies that it is a legal behaviour, and 
this is achieved through the utilization of the ―legal forms which hide the reality of 
relationships, economic statutes and risk [to minimize one‘s true tax liabilities]‖ (McBarnet 
and Whelan, 1991, p. 854). 
5.3.2.3 Tax flight  
 The study by Kirchler et al. (2003) extracted a term that stands in between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion, called tax flight. It is not a term that is frequently discussed in 
existing literature, but it is without a doubt, one of the many grey areas that cannot (or has not) 
been discussed independently from tax avoidance and tax evasion (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 
2003). Tax flight refers to the ―relocation of businesses, only in order to save taxes, for 
instance by making use of offshore tax havens‖ (Kirchler et al., 2003, p. 3). The term has also 
been perceived as the product of either tax avoidance or tax evasion behaviour where money 
has been transferred offshore to reduce taxes payable (Gibson, 2010). But according to 
Kirchler et al. (2003), tax flight is to be placed between tax avoidance and tax evasion 
because of the similar effects it shares with the two. Not only is tax flight considered morally 
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wrong, but it also lacks the economic reality in what is usually evident in a tax avoidance 
arrangement; however, it is not a criminal offence like tax evasion (Kirchler et al., 2003).  
Another difference between tax avoidance and tax flight is the belief that tax flight is 
―associated with an intention to save taxes, with an impression that taxes are substantially 
lower abroad as well as with double tax agreement and costs of relocation‖ (Kirchler et al., 
2003, p. 9), where as tax avoidance is a legal way to save taxes, but with ―cleverness and a 
good idea as well as with costs‖ (Kirchler et al., 2003, p. 9).  That is, tax savings are 
considered as the central motive for tax flight and tax avoidance, whereas, tax evasion is 
associated with ―thoughts of illegality, risk or by criminal prosecution‖ (Kirchler et al., 2003, 
p. 9). In general, tax flight is considered to be fairer than tax avoidance and tax evasion, but 
still perceived as an immoral behaviour. Tax flight is believed to impose negative impacts to 
the government by way of reduced tax revenues (Kapoor, 2011), but this is outside the scope 
of this study. Further analysis is required to determine whether tax flight should be 
considered as a product of tax avoidance or evasion, or whether it should be placed in 
between the two terms. But in the mean time, one may not see the importance of further 
defining immaterial terms within tax avoidance and tax evasion as it does not disentangle the 
complexities associated with the avoidance/evasion problem, but rather, it complicates the 
problem in an unhelpful manner. 
5.3.3 Tax Evasion 
Tax evasion represents the utmost serious form of tax non-compliance. Unlike tax 
avoidance, tax evasion has always been associated with the illegal methods taken by 
taxpayers to reduce their tax liabilities intentionally, or with their pre-requisite knowledge. 
Although an illegal approach to reduce tax payment, when viewed from an economic 
perspective, tax evasion is on the same scale of negative influence as tax avoidance because 
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of its fiscal result experienced by the government (Orow, 1995a). In order to establish the 
presence of tax evasion, it is important to distinguish the level of knowledge and/or intent 
demonstrated by the taxpayer around the situation. Similar to other forms of non-compliance, 
tax evasion has also been at the core of research for many studies over the years due to the 
seriousness of the problem and the difficulties involved in classifying particular taxpayer 
behaviours as a form of tax non-compliance.  
Clotfelter (1983, p. 364) believes ―the line separating ‗evasion‘ from simple mistakes 
in judgement or calculation is usually a difficult one to draw.‖ As a result, Kolm (1973) and 
Porcano (1987) both realize that the tax evasion problem cannot be fixed and we should 
accept the fact that ―some degree of tax evasion [should be] expected and tolerated‖ 
(Porcano, 1987, p. 48). This is especially true as the strategies and attempts to achieve a 
higher compliance rate are both costly and to an extent, impossible for tax authorities.  
Although tax evasion is regarded as a form of illegal behaviour when compared against 
other forms of non-compliance, but when compared against other forms of crime, tax evasion 
is not regarded as morally wrong or considered as a serious form of crime (Song and 
Yarbrough, 1978; Kasipillai et al, 2003; Gupta, 2006; and Gupta, 2007), especially if the 
monetary amount at issue is insignificant. Song and Yarbrough (1978) conducted a study 
where it found that tax evasion is considered by some taxpayers as only a slightly more 
serious crime than stealing a bicycle. This is perhaps due to the belief that tax evasion is 
‗victimless crime‘ where tax evaders do not physically experience the impact of their non-
compliant behaviours.
30
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 Tax evasion was defined in R v Hargraves and Stoten [2010] QSC 188 as: 
―Not a game, or a victimless crime. It is a form of corruption and is, therefore, insidious. In the fact of 
brazen tax evasion, honest citizens begin to doubt their own values and are tempted to do what they see 
others do with apparent impunity. At the very least, they are left with a legitimate sense of grievance, 
which is itself divisive. Tax evasion is not simply a matter of failing to pay one‟s debt to government. It 
is theft, and tax evaders are thieves (paragraph [41]).‖ 
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Tax evasion is defined by Wenzel (2002, p. 630) as taxpayers engaging in 
arrangements involving ―deliberate criminal non-fulfilment of tax liabilities,‖ and using this 
definition as a benchmark, three factors can be extracted, namely: (A) An illegal activity, (B) 
the involvement of deliberate acts, and (C) less payment of taxes due. The following table 
incorporates a selection of tax evasion definitions that has been applied in existing literature 
over the years. 
Table 4: Definitions of ‘Tax Evasion’ 
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Radcliffe 
Commission 
(1955) 
All those activities which are responsible 
for a person not paying the tax that the 
existing law charges upon his income. Ex 
hypothesis he is in the wrong, though his 
wrong doing ranges from the making of a 
deliberately fraudulent return to a mere 
failure to make his return or to pay his tax 
at the proper time.  
 √ √ This definition has 
also been cited by 
Tooma (2008) and 
Orow (1995a and 
1995b). 
Carter 
Commission 
(1966) 
Adopted the Radcliffe Commission‘s 
definition and added that tax evasion is 
illegal; [and] avoidance is not.  
Radcliffe Commission‘s definition of tax 
evasion is - All those activities which are 
responsible for a person not paying the tax 
that the existing law charges upon his 
income. Ex hypothesis he is in the wrong, 
though his wrong doing ranges from the 
making of a deliberately fraudulent return 
to a mere failure to make his return or to 
pay his tax at the proper time.  
√  √ A thorough 
definition for tax 
evasion from the 
1960s, and 
unfortunately, recent 
studies are unable to 
provide a better 
definition for the 
concept.  
Richardson 
(1967) 
Reducing the burden of tax by illegal 
means. 
√  √  
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Van Hoorn Jr. 
(1974) 
An action by which a taxpayer tries to 
escape his legal obligations by fraudulent 
means. 
√  √  
Clyne (1979) Means fraud, dishonesty, false returns, 
double book entries, forgery and dishonest 
and/or illegal methods. 
√  √  
Bracewell-
Milnes (1980) 
Tax fraud.    One of the few 
studies that views 
tax evasion in the 
same manner as tax 
fraud. 
Lewis (1982) Between evasion by commission and 
evasion by omission and that between 
intentional and unintentional evasion. 
    
Gassner 
(1983) 
Begins when the ―letter of the law‖ is not 
accepted. 
   An interesting (and 
unique) approach to 
look at the concept 
of tax evasion, as the 
‗letter‘ of the law 
may have been long 
ignored with other 
less serious forms of 
non-compliance.  
Groenewegen 
(1985) 
An illegal act involving fraud. Evasion is 
therefore essentially not paying a legal 
assessable tax liability. It therefore 
assumes a fraudulent intention on the part 
of the taxpayer. 
√ √ √  
Porcano 
(1988) 
[Taxpayers who] do not pay their fair 
share; they reduce their tax payments 
through various schemes. Some degree of 
evasion is expected and tolerated. 
  √ Recognizes that 
even with a zero 
tolerance rate for tax 
evasion, the outcome 
may not necessarily 
be as expected 
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Wallschutzky 
(1988) 
Paying less tax than would otherwise be 
the case and it is achieved by means which 
are outside the law. 
Only one form of non-compliance, albeit 
the most serious. 
√  √  
Pyle (1989) Hiding part of one‘s income from the 
income tax authority. [Tax evasion] is an 
illegal activity, although it should be 
emphasized that the activities which 
generated the income need not be illegal. 
√   Raises the 
importance to 
distinguish between 
the nature of the 
income generated 
and the treatment of 
that particular 
income amount. 
Alm et al. 
(1990) 
The reduction in tax liability by illegal 
means. 
√  √  
Robben et al. 
(1990) 
Deliberate acts of non- compliance which 
result in the payment of less tax than is 
actually owed. 
 √ √  
Webley et al. 
(1991) 
Illegal. It can involve acts of commission 
or omission 
√    
McBarnet 
(1992) 
Illegal. [Tax evasion is] subject to civil or 
criminal penalties. 
√    
Hawes (1996)  Against the law. [Tax evasion] is about 
telling lies and cheating. Tax evasion is 
about not declaring income, or lying about 
your expenses. Tax evasion is about 
deliberately understating your taxable 
income or over claiming your deductions. 
√ √ √ Considers the 
possible behaviours 
from the taxpayers‘ 
part. These 
descriptions are a 
good example for 
understanding tax 
evasion. 
Ohms (1996a) An offence requiring criminal intent (mens 
rea) and proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
Within this process some taxpayers choose 
to simply to omit income or falsify 
deductions. 
√ √   
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Ohms (1996b) Involves an intention to avoid payment of 
tax where there is actual knowledge of 
liability or the circumstances should 
indicate it.  
 √   
Prebble 
(1996a) 
An unadorned failure to report assessable 
income.  
  √  
Prebble 
(1996b) 
For example, someone may be guilty of 
tax evasion where: 
- She labels a component of a 
transaction that she undertakes with a 
name that would have the effect of 
minimizing tax (for example, ―gift‖ 
rather than ―payment‖); 
- The label is wrong; 
- She fails to disclose the transaction to 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
in detail sufficient for the 
Commissioner to decide whether the 
label is correct; 
- She under-declares her income 
because she returns it on the basis that 
the label is right, although it is in fact 
wrong.  
 √ √ This is more of an 
example for tax 
evasion, rather than 
an explicit definition 
for the concept.  
Sawyer (1996) An illegal underlying activity. [It is] the 
most severe form of non-compliance and 
represents a wilful or knowing breach of a 
tax obligation. 
√ √   
Armstrong and 
Robinson 
(1998) 
Comprises illegal methods of tax dodging.  √  (√) Tax dodging is 
understood within 
this study as 
taxpayers not 
meeting all their true 
tax liabilities.  
Hopper et al. 
(1998) 
The deliberate non-compliance with tax 
legislation resulting in the non-payment of 
tax liabilities which have been incurred.  
Tax evasion implies the use of fraud or 
concealment to escape the payment of tax, 
or to obtain a reduction or repayment of 
tax that is not legally due. 
 √ √  
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Walkey and 
Purchas (1998) 
The deliberate and illegal action taken by 
taxpayer to avoid paying tax. 
√ √ √  
Alm (1999) Consists of illegal and intentional actions 
taken by individuals to reduce their legally 
due tax obligations. 
√ √ √  
Sandford 
(1999) 
The failure, by an individual or 
organization, to pay tax legally due, or 
alternatively the claim of a refund to 
which they are not legally entitled. Tax 
evasion embraces both deliberate acts and 
unintentional evasion arising from 
ignorance of the law or forgetfulness. Tax 
evasion ranges from minor omissions to 
major fraud. 
√ (√) √ Tax evasion may 
arise from both 
intentional and 
unintentional acts.  
Franzoni 
(2000) 
[Occurs] when individuals deliberately fail 
to comply with their tax obligations. [Tax 
evasion] is unlawful, and hence punishable 
(at least in theory). 
√ √ √  
McIntosh and 
Veal (2001) 
Where taxpayers deliberately understate 
their income or claim deductions they are 
not entitled to.  
 √ √  
James and 
Alley (2002) 
Illegal measures to reduce tax liability. √  √  
Wenzel (2002) Deliberate criminal non-fulfilment of tax 
liabilities. 
√ √   
Braithwaite 
(2003a) 
An option [for taxpayers] who dislike tax 
and have located themselves outside the 
reach of the law, at least psychologically.  
√ √  Tax evasion may not 
simply arise as a 
result of the dislike 
for the law, 
therefore, does not 
capture the full core 
of tax evasion. 
Kasipillai et al. 
(2003) 
Illegal. The deliberate acts of non-
compliance resulting in payment of lower 
taxes than are actually owed. 
√ √ √ A fairly 
comprehensive, but 
simple, definition for 
tax evasion. 
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Kirchler et al. 
(2003) 
An illegal reduction of tax payments, for 
instance by underreporting income or by 
stating higher deduction-rates. 
√  √  
Murphy 
(2003) 
A strategy [that may involve a] non-
compliant or fraudulent activity. 
    
Sandmo 
(2004) 
A violation of the law. When the taxpayer 
refrains from reporting income from 
labour or capital which is in principle 
taxable, he engages in an illegal activity 
that makes him liable to administrative or 
legal action from the authorities. In 
evading taxes, he worries about the 
possibility of his actions being detected. 
√  √  
Murphy 
(2005) 
Strategies that may involve non-compliant 
or fraudulent activity. 
    
South African 
Revenue 
Service (2005) 
In an income tax context, it typically 
involves the non-payment of a tax that 
would properly be chargeable if the 
taxpayer made a full and timely disclosure 
of income and allowable deductions. 
(Common examples of tax evasion include 
a ‗deliberate failure‘ to report a full 
amount.) 
 √ √  
Cummings et 
al. (2006) 
Is an illegal activity. √    
Gupta (2006) Occurs where a taxpayer has made a 
deliberate or intentional attempt to cheat 
Inland Revenue.  
 √  This definition may 
be too broad as 
deliberate and 
intentional attempts 
may not necessarily 
refer to acts of 
evasion. 
IRD (2006) Occurs when a taxpayer deliberately 
breaches a tax obligation. Evasion requires 
intentional behaviour or subjective 
recklessness; negligence and carelessness 
are insufficient. 
 √  Confirms the idea 
that tax evasion 
requires intent 
and/or knowledge 
from the taxpayers‘ 
part. 
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Tedds (2006) Income tax that is legally owed but not 
reported or paid. 
  √  
Gupta (2007) Occurs when a taxpayer has made a 
deliberate or intentional attempt to cheat 
Inland Revenue. Tax evasion and 
defrauding the revenue are for most 
purposes synonymous; definitions of one 
may serve as definitions of the other.  
√ √  Suggests that tax 
fraud may be a 
synonymous term 
for tax evasion. 
Hofmann et al. 
(2008) 
A deliberate illegal act to reduce tax 
burden (It is an illegal behaviour and 
immoral).  
√ √ √  
McLaren 
(2008) 
An act outside the law. √    
Simser (2008) [Tax evasion] is unacceptable.    It is a statement on 
tax evasion, rather 
than a definition. 
Tooma (2008) The ‗unlawful escaping‘ of tax liability. 
Tax evasion involves taxpayers to 
deliberately misrepresenting or concealing 
the true state of their affairs to tax 
authorities to reduce their tax liability. 
That is, evasion requires deceit on the part 
of the taxpayer. 
√ √ √  
Coleman 
(2009) 
A contract to evade tax currently due is 
illegal and void. Evasion of tax is an 
offence – the offence requires knowing 
action with intent to evade. 
√ √   
Hughes (2009) Illegal activity. Taken to denote criminal 
offences, such as the deliberate omission 
or understatement of income undertaken 
with the intention of not paying tax where 
such payments are required by law. 
√ √ √  
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Balestrino 
(2010) 
Risky because of the possibility of 
pecuniary sanctions if discovered. 
   Does not explicitly 
imply that tax 
evasion is illegal, 
but the definition 
implies that if 
discovered, there 
will be 
consequences. 
Kirchler and 
Wahl (2010) 
Tax evasion… is illegal, as taxpayers 
break the law deliberately through 
understating income (e.g. failing to report 
assets) and/or through exaggerating 
deductions (e.g. falsely reporting personal 
expenses as business expenses. 
√ √ √ A fairly 
comprehensive, but 
simple, definition for 
tax evasion. 
Murphy 
(2010) 
The illegal non-payment or under-payment 
of taxes, usually resulting from the making 
of a false declaration or no declaration at 
all of taxes due to the relevant tax 
authorities, resulting in legal penalties 
(which may be civil or criminal) if the 
perpetrator of tax evasion is caught. 
√  √  
Sikka and 
Willmott 
(2010) 
Involves practices that contravene the law. √    
Xynas (2010) Always been regarded as unacceptable at 
law. Tax evasion can occur where 
taxpayers employ fraudulent methods to 
evade the payment of taxes. 
  √  
Elliffe (2011) Failure by a taxpayer to discharge a known 
tax obligation. 
 √  May also be other 
forms of non-
compliance, thus, 
this definition is too 
broad for tax 
evasion. 
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It is evident from the definitions that tax evasion is regarded as a form of illegal 
behaviour, but unlike tax avoidance, the concept of tax evasion is ―not specifically defined in 
the income tax legislation‖ (McIntosh and Veal, 2001, p. 11). As with the definitions for the 
concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance, the length and the comprehensiveness of the 
definitions for tax evasion also differ.  
With the growing number of studies conducted around tax evasion, one should consider 
that an adequate definition for the concept should cover more information than just the 
legality aspect. It is also extremely important to examine whether such behaviours are 
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Keating and 
Keating (2011) 
Taxpayers who deliberately cheat the tax 
system. 
 √  May also be other 
forms of non-
compliance, thus, 
this definition is too 
broad for tax 
evasion. 
Perez (2011b) Minimizing or eliminating your taxes by 
using illegal tax strategies. Opposite of tax 
avoidance. Illegal strategies might include 
outright lying or cheating on a tax return, 
or might involve using your or more 
abusive tax schemes.  
√  √  
Prebble (2011) Tax evasion is illegal and often 
criminal…There are different types of 
evasion, but typical examples involve the 
understating of income.  
√  √ A rather common 
approach for 
understanding the 
concept of tax 
evasion. 
University of 
Auckland 
(2011) 
Tax evasion is tantamount to fraud. It is a 
criminal offence. 
√   Implies that tax 
evasion and fraud 
may be considered 
as complementary 
terms.  
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intentional or otherwise, and whether the taxpayer had the knowledge that they were acting 
against the relevant legislation. The definitions that go beyond considering the legality of the 
concept could be considered to be more accommodating, as it takes into account a wider 
variety of possible taxpayer behaviours because the elements of ‗intent‘ and ‗knowledge‘ 
(mens rea) are considered to be pre-requisites for the establishment of tax evasion behaviours 
(IRD, 2006). 
Tooma‘s (2008, p. 14) study develops an excellent definition as to what tax evasion could 
encompass by stating:  
―Tax evasion is the unlawful escaping of tax liability. Tax evasion involves taxpayers to 
deliberately misrepresent or conceal the true state of their affairs to tax authorities to 
reduce their tax liability. That is, evasion requires deceit on the part of the taxpayer.‖  
This is the most comprehensive definition gathered for this study, and probably, the most 
thorough definition available for the concept of tax evasion. This definition covers not only 
the legality issue, but it goes beyond recognizing the behaviours from a taxpayer‘s 
perspective. That is, in order to not comply with the tax system, the taxpayer must 
demonstrate that they have some measure of understanding of the tax system where they can 
work around ways to conceal their true tax obligations (Kirchler et al., 2001 and Kasipillai et 
al., 2003). Tax evasion may arise from a number of scenarios, including deliberate 
behaviours on the understatement of income or profits, or, the overstatement of deductions 
and expenses (McBarnet, 1992 and McIntosh and Veal, 2001), as well as the ―falsification of 
invoices, or making false claims to allowances‖ (McBarnet, 1992, p. 336). 
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With regard to tax evasion where ‗knowledge‘ is required to be demonstrated by 
taxpayers, some studies (for example: Clyne, 1979; Bracewell-Milnes, 1980; Armstrong and 
Robinson, 1998; Murphy, 2005; and Gupta, 2007) have taken this concept more seriously and 
consider the intentional evasion of taxes to be on the same scale of seriousness as ‗tax fraud‘. 
Tax evasion has been described as a form of tax fraud, but some distinctions are still 
necessary to be made between the two concepts. For example, tax fraud may be considered to 
be more serious, complicated, and involving larger dollar amounts of unpaid taxes than tax 
evasion, and vice versa. Some web pages (for example: Investopedia, 2011; Brager, 2012; 
and Law Firms.Com, 2012) have described tax fraud in the same manner as tax evasion; 
where commentators state that tax fraud involve intentional failures from the taxpayers‘ part 
to file accurate tax returns.  
Some web pages (for example: Department of Taxation and Finance, 2011 and Rain 
Minns Law Firm, 2011) have gone as far as combining tax evasion with tax fraud together by 
using a conjunction (for example, by inserting an ‗and‘/ ‗or‘) between the two terms. 
Investopedia‘s (2011) web page state tax fraud occurs ―when an individual or business entity 
wilfully and intentionally falsifies information on a tax return in order to limit the amount of 
tax liability. Tax fraud essentially entails cheating on a tax return in an attempt to avoid 
paying the entire tax obligation. Examples of tax fraud include claiming false deductions; 
claiming personal expenses as business expenses and not reporting income.‖ Baker (2011, p. 
7) describes tax fraud as a ―criminal matter… [and] must involve intentional behaviour or 
actual knowledge of the wrongdoing,‖ with keywords such as: knowledge, intent, and 
dishonesty being correlated with the concept of tax evasion. Although it may appear that 
these two concepts share similar characteristics between them, there are no extensive studies 
to date that can formally support this proposition, possibly because of the belief that this is a 
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subjective issue involving the perceptions and behaviours of researchers, taxpayers, tax 
authorities, and ultimately, how the tax system function between countries.  
Not only has tax evasion been classified as a type of ‗fraud‘, Robben et al. (1990) and 
Webley et al. (1991) have loosely classified ‗tax cheating‘ as a complementary concept to tax 
evasion. Tax cheating has been identified by Robben et al. (1990, p. 342) as involving 
―deliberate acts of non-compliance which result in the payment of less tax than is actually 
owed… [it is the] intentional underpayment of taxes.‖ Due to limited research conducted 
around the concept of tax cheating, and to an extent, tax fraud, it is still unclear as to whether 
it is a synonym for tax evasion or whether it is a completely new sub-category entirely that 
studies have yet to examine closely. This is because, Webley et al. (1991, p. 3) defined the 
concept of tax cheating with a slightly different approach where it considers such behaviours 
as incorporating ―deliberate acts of non-compliance [but it] does not entail the difficulty of 
legal proof of tax evasion.‖ No other literature gathered for this study mentioned the concept 
of tax cheating.  
As the definitions for the concept of tax evasion remain inconsistent, it is still unclear to a 
significant degree as to whether distinct sub-categories of tax evasion can or should be 
formed. However, it is evident that more research is required around this area, and the 
dominant focus should be placed on establishing what can be acknowledged and recognized 
as tax evasion behaviour, rather than attempting to differentiate the possible sub-categories 
that may exist within tax evasion. This will allow for better contribution to literature as the 
classifications of sub-categories within sub-categories itself are believed to be unproductive 
due to the complex nature of the topic. In addition, regardless of the sub-categories that may 
exist within tax evasion, the illegality and knowledge aspects will not change, and by looking 
at just the name given to the concepts of ‗tax fraud‘ and ‗tax cheating‘, it is not hard to 
determine a possible relationship that it shares with tax evasion.  
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5.3.4 Over-compliance 
The existing literature in the areas of tax compliance and non-compliance has been both 
wide-ranging and diverse. However, the concept of ‗over-compliance‘ has not been 
researched to the same degree since researchers have focused primarily on other more 
dominant sub-categories of non-compliance. Roth et al. (1989, p. 21) define over-compliance 
as a form of ―over-reporting [where] taxpayers report a greater liability than required.‖ Two 
factors associated with the concept of over-compliance are evident from this definition: (A) 
complying incorrectly with tax laws, and (B) the overpayment of taxes. As there is currently 
very limited research conducted on this concept, the table of definitions prepared for this 
particular concept is extremely short.  
A few studies (for example: Erard, 1997; James and Alley, 2002; Burton, 2007a; and 
Sung, 2009) have implicitly acknowledged that there are circumstances where taxpayers may 
have over-paid their tax liabilities and hence, the ‗existence‘ of over-compliance. Despite its 
difference in nature with other forms of non-compliance, over-compliance is associated with 
situations on the ‗overstatement‘ of tax liabilities, and thus, cannot be placed under the 
category of tax compliance. Nevertheless, this sub-category of non-compliance has 
commonly been over-looked by researchers and Inland Revenue authorities, possibly because 
of its ‗riskless‘ nature to the government.  
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Table 5: Definitions of ‘Over-Compliance’31 
 
 
Armstrong and Robinson (1998, p. 332) believe over-compliance situations to be ―rare‖, 
causing the focus of research on other forms of non-compliance (under-compliance). Within 
their study, they describe briefly the concept of ‗excessive compliance‘; where it is defined as 
situations where ―some taxpayers, whether from the fear of the Inland Revenue, loyalty to the 
government, laziness, or some other reason, strive to comply with their perceived intent of all 
the tax laws‖ (Armstrong and Robinson, 1998, p. 331). Based upon this definition, some may 
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Roth et 
al. (1989)  
The taxpayers report a greater liability 
than required. 
 √ Either intentionally or 
unknown to the 
taxpayer at the time.  
Webley 
et al. 
(1991) 
Does not assume that an inaccurate tax 
return is unnecessarily the result of an 
intention to defraud the authorities and it 
recognizes that inaccuracies may result in 
the overpayment of taxes. 
√ √ Recognizes over-
compliance by stating 
that there may be 
instances where non-
compliance is the 
result of the 
overpayment of taxes.  
Burton 
(2007a) 
Arises where a person does not comply 
with a legal obligation and this produces 
an advantage to the revenue. 
√ √ This definition does 
not capture the 
essence of over-
compliance as this 
particular behaviour 
usually arises in 
situations where 
taxpayers believe they 
have complied with 
relevant legislations. 
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mistake it as the definition intended for the concept of tax compliance where taxpayers are 
complying with the ‗letter‘ and; to an extent, the ‗spirit‘ of the law.   
However, the second part of the definition from Armstrong and Robinson‘s (1998, p. 
332) study states that ―if the motivation is fear, the taxpayer may be straining the virtue of 
justice, since s/he is demanding more taxes out of her/himself than is required of other 
taxpayers in similar situations.‖ The possible reasons associated with ‗excessive compliance‘, 
whether or not a complementary term to over-compliance, can be interpreted as causes for 
over-compliance, rather than an explicit definition for the concept. It can be viewed that 
excessive compliance reflects situations where taxpayers have paid more taxes than what is 
required from them, and over-compliance represents situations where taxpayers did not 
obtain their entitled tax refunds at the end of the year to bring the balance back to zero. Either 
way, confirmation from other studies is still required to determine whether excessive 
compliance is intended to hold the same definition/understanding as over-compliance or 
whether it is a completely different concept.  
Possible causes of over-compliance were suggested by Andreoni et al. (1998, p. 822) 
where people ―tend to overestimate both the probability and magnitude of penalties [and 
possibly the audit probability], or may fear social stigma or damage to their reputation if they 
are exposed as cheaters.‖ Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) also looked at factors concerning 
why some people prefer to over-comply from a business environmental regulations 
perspective. Although the study failed to provide an explicit definition for the concept of 
over-compliance, it did find that reasons of reputation or anticipation of stricter future 
regulations have the potential to ‗encourage‘ over-compliance. Although both of these studies 
acknowledge situations where over-compliance may be considered as having a prominent 
existence within the area of non-compliance, they both failed to define the concept. 
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Nevertheless, the studies provide a solid foundation as to what factors are associated with the 
problem of over-compliance, and this contributes to the understanding of the over-
compliance problem in the future when working towards the goal of finding an appropriate 
definition for the concept. 
Burton (2007a, p. 1) studied the area of over-compliance in great depth where he argues, 
―the ‗compliance pyramid‘… adopted in both Australia and New Zealand - suffers from 
significant short-comings,‖ as it fails to consider the area of over-compliance from the 
perspective of taxpayers.
32
 Unlike other forms of non-compliance, where it is the government 
that suffers from uncollected tax revenues, over-compliance means that it is the taxpayers that 
suffer, either because of a lack of tax knowledge, or the belief that the tax refund process is 
too ―daunting‖ (Timaru Herald, 2008 and Forbes, 2009).  
Over-compliance is a relatively new concept when compared with other sub-categories 
of non-compliance, but the concept itself should not be perceived as a ‗new‘ area of focus as 
the issue has existed in tax returns in the US since the 1980s (Burton, 2007a). In addition, 
Burton (2007a, p. 2) notes that it has been found in recent literature that there are incidents in 
Ireland where ―taxpayers failed to claim tax benefits to which they were entitled, resulting in 
[the] overpayment of tax.‖ As a result, this raise a possibility that taxpayers from around the 
world may, for a number of reasons, be paying more tax than is legally required/expected, 
where they miss out on legitimate tax refunds in various circumstances. 
This is especially evident in New Zealand‘s context where there is a self-assessment 
regime, and not all taxpayers are required to file an annual tax return. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, New Zealand has a self-assessment regime where it has undoubtedly collected 
more tax from wage and salary taxpayers than before the legislative change, if they do not 
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 See Figure 1 from Chapter 2 for the Compliance Model adopted by the Inland Revenue Department. 
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file annual tax returns at all. For example, it has been estimated by online articles that 
uncollected refunds from year 2000 onwards are at a whooping $700 million (Morall, 2008 
and Timaru Herald, 2008). The figure of $700 million was derived from, ―a combination of 
miscalculated deductions from salaried employees and wage earners, missed exemptions and 
rebates, and an overall lack of awareness about the opportunity to set the record straight‖ 
(Morall, 2008). The lack of the ‗awareness‘ feature raises an interesting factor where it may 
represent as one of the important factors associated with over-compliance because if 
taxpayers had the knowledge that they are over-complying, then it is highly unlikely that 
situations of over-compliance would continue to exist.  
The Inland Revenue Department‘s (IRD) website provides an online calculator for 
individuals to determine whether they are due for a tax refund, but online tax refund 
companies are becoming the more popular choice. The various online tax refund companies 
are useful tools for finding out whether a refund is due as they are situated in convenient mall 
locations around the country, but they do not provide explicit definitions for the concept of 
over-compliance as it only recognizes the fact how taxpayers may have ‗over-paid‘ their tax 
obligations and therefore, the need for them to claim tax refunds.  
New Zealand Tax Refunds Limited is a popular online tax refund company, and 
because of the self-assessment regime, the company showed a ―1401 percent revenue growth 
in the period to March 31, 2011‖ (Wood, 2011). This company (along with other online tax 
refund companies) promotes a faster, easier and risk-free form of filing a tax return where 
taxpayers will find out ―within 60 seconds‖ and get their eligible refunds deposited into their 
bank account ―within 2 days‖ (Anonymous, 2011). By utilizing the calculator provided by an 
online tax refund company, taxpayers will need to pay a percentage of their refund (usually 
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around 20 per cent) in the form of fees to the refund company, and this may seem unfair to 
some taxpayers where they have to pay for getting what was rightfully theirs back.
33
 
The focus of this study is not to emphasise how online tax refund companies are 
expanding at an alarming rate, but at the high percentage of taxpayers who utilize these 
online tools and how much taxpayers would actually receive if they had taken the time and 
effort to file a tax return. New Zealand Tax Refunds have found that ―93 percent of their 
customers have overpaid their tax in the past five years and the average customer refund for 
2011 is $339‖ (Anonymous, 2011). This reflects the perceived complexity of the tax law in 
New Zealand and how over-compliance issues and the concept itself are often over-looked by 
tax authorities.  
Unlike problems associated with other forms of non-compliance, over-compliance 
problem only affects certain groups of taxpayers (especially younger people and those that 
have had a significant change in their income level over the year), thus the limited number of 
research conducted around this concept. But for the articles that have been gathered for this 
study, similarities are apparent between them where they have provided several reasons for 
contributing to the problem of  over-compliance; however, due to the lack of evidence 
available to date, one cannot objectively determine whether this particular action is 
‗acceptable‘ or ‗desirable‘. Nevertheless, more attention should be taken by taxpayers to pay 
only the correct amount of tax (not more, not less), and revenue authorities should be more 
pro-active in assisting taxpayers to obtain their eligible refunds, other than providing an 
online calculator and the distribution of pamphlets regarding the tax refund process.  
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 Taxpayers will not be charged a fee if they are not due for a tax refund. That is, taxpayers will only pay if they 
are due for a refund, with the commission rate varying between companies and the amount of refund due. 
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The calculator provided by online tax refund companies, and the documents provided by 
the IRD do not explicitly define the concept of over-compliance, but they do act as a means 
of counteracting the problem, and to an extent, ‗encourage‘ taxpayers to only pay the 
‗correct‘ amount of tax. As with other forms of non-compliance where it is unavoidable and 
lead to the ‗underpayment‘ of taxes, the issue of over-compliance is likely to continue into 
the future for as long as the self-assessment regime is in place and if taxpayers continue 
experiencing problems comprehending tax laws and regulations. As a result, it seems there 
may be a long time before the characteristics associated with over-compliance can be 
combined to form a ‗universal‘ definition for the concept.  
5.4 Studies That Do Not Define Tax Compliance and Non-Compliance 
As noted in the earlier chapters of this study, a significant number of existing studies 
have not explicitly defined any of the concepts of tax compliance, non-compliance, and their 
sub-categories. After some extensive research, it is believed that the reasons for this can 
generally be divided into three main categories; with each of them described in this section. 
First, a high proportion of studies that do not define the concepts were set out to 
examine the issues of tax compliance and non-compliance, and they have focused primarily 
on what factors or models influence the behaviours of tax compliance and non-compliance. 
For example, the studies by Wenzel (2002), Taylor (2003), Kirchler et al. (2008) and 
Kastlunger et al. (2010) are all studies that have emphasized on how norm processes, gender 
difference and the development of frameworks for tax compliance influence a taxpayer‘s 
attitude towards the tax system, and ultimately, their compliance behaviour. The study of how 
gender differences affect a taxpayer‘s compliance behaviour by Kastlunger et al. (2010) 
acknowledges that ethical standards, audit probabilities, and gender are all important factors 
to consider whilst studying the level of compliance by men and women. Apart from the focus 
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on gender differences, Ho and Wong (2008) focus on how ethics can influence compliance 
behaviour. They conducted their study by focusing on individual taxpayers in Hong Kong, as 
well as reviewing existing literature within the ethics domain. Despite the absence of 
definitions for tax compliance and non-compliance, the study by Ho and Wong (2008) did 
analyze how different frameworks and models can enhance a researcher‘s understanding and 
application on the area of behavioural tax compliance and non-compliance. Lastly, Devos 
(2006) conducted a comparative analysis between New Zealand and Australia‘s tertiary 
students on their attitudes towards non-compliance, and particularly, tax evasion; while 
Marriott et al. (2010) studied the causes and consequences of tax evasion but also failed to 
provide an explicit definition for the concept of tax evasion. However, this paper does 
acknowledge the effects of tax evasion by stating that such behaviour ―contravenes fiscal 
equity and can distort international competition and capital flows‖ (Marriott et al., 2010, p. 
369). 
This approach has proven to be popular as a number of other studies
34
 have also 
adopted this approach if their objective of study had been to study/evaluate factors and 
models that influence tax compliance behaviours, rather than placing a focus on how a 
particular concept of tax compliance and non-compliance should be defined. 
In addition, studies by Crane and Nourzad (1992) and Sheffrin and Triest (1992) not 
only examined the impact variables have on the level of compliance behaviour, but they also 
adopted different models to examine levels of tax compliance behaviour. These studies did 
not produce a definite understanding of what the concepts of tax compliance and non-
compliance meant, but through the examination of such models, they concluded that there are 
different perspectives available for the study on behavioural tax compliance and non-
compliance. For example, Sheffrin and Triest (1992) implemented an economic model of tax 
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 For example, studies by: Hasseldine (1998), Chan et al. (2000), Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui (2006), Richardson 
(2006), Lavoie (2008), Damjanovic and Ulph (2009), and Leder et al. (2010) have adopted similar approaches to 
Ho and Wong‘s (2008) study. 
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compliance where it considers that there are sociological (social norms) and psychological 
(individual attitudes) perspectives for determining issues associated with tax compliance.  
Second, from the level of existing literature within this area, it would be unsurprising 
to come across studies that have replicated previous studies. This can be achieved by either 
expanding or extracting main points of focus from a particular study to further produce a 
more updated and comprehensive version of that particular study. This is especially evident 
from Jackson and Milliron‘s (1986) study on the various behavioural factors where it has 
been used as a foundational study by many researchers over the years. For example, the study 
by Richardson and Sawyer (2001) updated and expanded Jackson and Milliron‘s (1986) study 
by reviewing developments in the literature over the years on how taxpayers‘ behaviour may 
be influenced by various factors.  
Furthermore, as a result of many researchers adopting prior literature as a starting 
point for their own study, some researchers have also ‗transferred‘ the definitions of the 
concepts over to their own study. For example, Braithwaite (2003a) adopted James and 
Alley‘s (1999) version of the definitions for the concepts of tax compliance and non-
compliance into its own study. This shows that although the topic of behavioural tax 
compliance and non-compliance may be broad, there are bound to be some similarities 
between studies, and rather than creating a ‗new‘ definition that may not necessarily 
supersede the comprehensive effectiveness of an existing definition, then why not maximize 
the effect a particular form of definition may bring for the concepts of tax compliance and 
non-compliance? 
Third, due to the approach taken by the researchers, some studies have given 
examples for the concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance instead. By providing 
examples of what behaviours contribute to the categories of tax compliance and non-
compliance, this provides readers with some insight as to what the researcher was trying to 
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achieve and convey within their study. The study by Braithwaite (2003a) did not include any 
explicit definitions for the concepts but instead, offered some good examples that are related 
to non-compliance and tax evasion. For example, Braithwaite (2003a, p. 33) describe several 
possible actions that may lead to tax evasion, including the ―non-lodgement, non-payment of 
tax debt, failure to declare income, provider of cash-in-hand services, purchaser of cash-in-
hand services, and over-claiming deductions.‖  
This may be perceived as a more effective way for promoting what amounts to tax 
compliance and non-compliance as some existing definitions may not be as comprehensive 
and accommodating when compared with studies that provide a list of examples instead. This 
is especially evident in studies that offer very limited understanding of what is meant by the 
concepts as some definitions are short and do not capture the essence of what the concepts are 
supposed to incorporate. In addition to providing examples of what some of the concepts are 
generally known by researchers, some studies have also provided a list of possible actions 
that can amount to either tax compliance and non-compliance behaviours. Carroll (1992, p. 
44) states, non-compliance can result from situations where the ―taxpayer is ignorant, lazy, 
careless, deliberately cheating, following common practices in occupational groups of 
workplaces, heeding incorrect advice from the IRS, making a symbolic protest against the tax 
system or the uses of money…‖  
As opposed to providing examples of what amounts to a specific type of tax 
compliance or non-compliance behaviour, Baker (2011) outlined the three key terms, 
consisting of: tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax mitigation, where the paper was set out to 
examine why a clarification should be made between the concepts. However, the study lacks 
clarity as to what the concepts actually mean because it did not provide explicit definitions 
for each of the key concepts. Nevertheless, the study did recognize that if the concepts are 
placed on a spectrum; then tax mitigation is acceptable, and tax evasion is similar to tax fraud 
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as it requires intent or knowledge from the taxpayer‘s behalf. As well as describing the 
through a ‗spectrum of conduct‘, the study also utilized some case law judgments that are 
related to the concept of tax mitigation. However, based on the objective set out from Baker‘s 
(2011) study, some form of definition for the concepts was expected. 
The studies that provide examples as opposed to defining the concepts do not make 
them less valuable to the literature we have available within this area. They simply provide a 
different perspective on how the complicated problem can be tackled by researchers. It may 
be argued that it is not as productive to attempt to ‗build‘ a definition if the issues relating to 
the categories within tax compliance and non-compliance cannot be reduced to a further 
extent. In addition, it may also be perceived readers that by providing examples of what 
amounts to certain behaviours of tax compliance and non-compliance, those studies are still 
making progress with the attempt to reduce the level of confusion that may arise between the 
sub-categories of tax compliance and non-compliance. There are of course other reasons as to 
why some studies do not explicitly define the concepts of tax compliance and non-
compliance, and this section has only provided a few of the possible main causes on why this 
may have been the case.  
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6.0 A Critical Review of the 
Research Results- New Zealand 
Case Law 
6.1 Introduction to New Zealand Case Law  
New Zealand‘s tax system requires its taxpayers to voluntarily comply with their tax 
obligations. However, not all taxpayers are honest with their tax affairs, and this has led to a 
number of tax avoidance and tax evasion related cases. The following section discusses 
recent examples of New Zealand case law and in order to provide a clearer picture on the 
issue, it is separated under the main headings of tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
6.2 Tax Avoidance Cases 
Section BG 1 from the Income Tax Act 2007 (―ITA 2007‖) is the current core general 
anti-avoidance provision because it applies to arrangements that have been entered into with 
the purpose or effect of avoiding tax. This statutory section is commonly the first step taken 
by the Courts to establish whether it is a tax avoidance case. The distinction between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion may not always be easy to establish but in Peterson (Privy 
Council, 2006, paragraph [60])
35
 , the court stated that ―the line to be drawn between ‗tax 
evasion‘ and ‗tax avoidance‘ is clear enough. The former is criminal. The latter is not. It may 
be socially undesirable but it is within the letter of the law.‖ 
 In order to invoke section BG 1, it is important to identify whether there was an 
arrangement. If section BG 1 applies, then the tax avoidance arrangement is void against the 
Commissioner for income tax purposes. The Supreme Court from Ben Nevis (2008, 
paragraph [106]) describe the function of section BG 1 as a section that is intended to 
                                                          
35
 Peterson v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2006] 3 NZLR 433 (PC). 
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―prevent uses of the specific provisions which fall outside their intended scope in the overall 
scheme of the Act. Such use gives rise to an impermissible tax advantage which the 
Commissioner may counteract.‖ The statutory definitions for ‗arrangement‘, ‗tax avoidance‘, 
and ‗tax avoidance arrangement‘ are set out in section YA 1 of the ITA 2007 (see Appendix 
B). In case law, the emphasis has been placed on examining the purpose and effect of the 
arrangement itself, and not on the taxpayers‘ intentions (Coleman, 2009). 
Looking at the legislation itself, it is clear that the ―Parliament has not provided an 
exhaustive definition [for tax avoidance] and has left it to the courts to identify tax 
avoidance.‖ (IRD, 2011f, paragraph [11]). This is supported by the judgment from Ben Nevis 
where it was agreed that the general anti-avoidance provision has been left ―deliberately 
general‖ by the Government (Ben Nevis Supreme Court, 2008, paragraph [112]). 
Furthermore, Coleman (2009, p. 33) states that the ―general anti-avoidance provision is thus 
seen as being intended to support, not override other provisions of the income tax 
legislation.‖  
The limitation on the scope of how section BG 1 can be interpreted in court and by 
the taxpayers, and what tax avoidance incorporates, has caused a significant level of 
confusion under different circumstances as there is often a narrow distinction between 
acceptable tax minimization and unacceptable tax avoidance.
36
 As a result, there is a 
tendency for the courts to formulate their own (extended or amended) definitions of tax 
avoidance.  
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 For example, in Penny and Hooper, it was held by the Supreme Court that there was a tax avoidance 
arrangement due to the setting of the artificially low salary levels to the taxpayers. Whereas, the High Court in 
White held the setting of low or no salary level to White was not artificial or contrived, thus not a tax avoidance 
arrangement.   
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In contrast to the various forms of definitions for the concept of tax avoidance, it is 
believed that the term ‗arrangement‘, as set out in section YA 1, is widely defined as it 
―provides for varying degrees of enforceability and formality‖ (IRD, 2011f, paragraph [165]). 
It is a term that has been defined to cover the various means between two or more parties on 
their plans and the effect of those actions (see Newton, 1958; Peterson, 2006; and BNZ 
Investments Ltd, 2009).
37
 Unlike tax evasion, ‗knowledge‘ is not a factor that is required to be 
present, and thus, it is possible under tax avoidance scenarios that one party may not 
necessarily know about the tax avoidance aspects of the arrangement (as seen in Peterson, 
2006).    
The facts of a particular case play an important role in determining the outcome of the 
case, therefore creating a conflict as to what the concept of tax avoidance may entail as there 
is no one pre-defined ‗universal‘ definition for the concept. Elliffe (2011, p. 461) state ―one 
of the tensions existing in tax avoidance arrangements is that they often have the very same 
presence of non-commerciality, concealment, and artificiality which have featured in some of 
the criminal prosecutions involving deceit and evasion.‖ This raises the difficulty involved in 
distinguishing between tax minimization and tax avoidance; and tax avoidance and tax 
evasion.  
In addition to the difficulties involved between legal and illegal tax planning 
activities, there is also a necessary distinction to be made between tax mitigation and tax 
avoidance. It was made clear in Challenge (Privy Council, 1986)
38
 that tax mitigation is not 
captured under section 99 (now section BG 1) because ―the taxpayer‘s advantage is not 
derived from an arrangement, but from the reduction of income which he accepts or the 
expenditure which he incurs‖ (Dunbar, 2006, p. 354). Tax mitigation was discussed in 
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 BNZ Investments Limited & Ors v The Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2009] HC WN CIV-2004-485-1059. 
38
 The Privy Council was been replaced by the Supreme Court from January 2004. 
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Chapter 5.3.2.1. under tax avoidance but from a case law perspective, it may not necessarily 
be correct to treat the term in the same manner as tax avoidance if it could not be captured 
under section BG 1, but it is reasonable to conclude that it is indeed an unhelpful term as 
there is usually a very fine line between what constitutes as acceptable tax minimization (and 
thus tax mitigation) and tax avoidance.  
6.2.1 Tax avoidance defined 
Elliffe and Cameron (2010, p. 453) see tax avoidance as schemes that are ―cleverly 
designed to fit within the words, and increasingly, particular schemes of the Act.‖ This 
statement may be translated as taxpayers as complying with the black letters of the law, but 
not suffering from the economic burden of the transactions; or more commonly known as: 
challenging Parliament‘s intention (or contemplation). Orow (1995b, p. 318) believes cases 
of tax avoidance in general involve ―an artificiality criterion [that] has often been considered 
to play a significant if not critical role in determining the true character and legitimacy of 
transactions for tax purposes.‖ In other words, a tax avoidance case involves the legal effect 
and consequences of an arrangement. Tax avoidance arrangements are different from shams 
as shams have been ―created and constructed in such way so as to create false impressions of 
its true legal character and as such are void in law‖ (Orow, 1995b, p. 318). Furthermore, 
Prebble (1996, p. 62) reinforces the difference by stating that a sham is ―often designed to 
hide other forms of fraud… Despite having entered into a transaction that is a sham, a 
taxpayer may correctly report his income… one reason for constructing shams is to hide 
transactions that evade tax.‖ The distinction between a tax avoidance arrangement and a sham 
was later applied in Ben Nevis (Supreme Court, 2008), as illustrated in Chapter 2. Apart from 
the economic substance and reality of the agreement between a tax avoidance arrangement 
and a sham, it may be argued that a sham is highly deceitful as it does not reflect the real 
agreement that the parties had initially intended, thus leaning towards acts of evasion because 
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of its dishonest nature. The draft Interpretation Statement on tax avoidance (IRD, 2011f, 
paragraph [21]) gives a classic definition of tax avoidance by stating that it is: 
―An arrangement structured so the taxpayer gains the benefit of the relevant 
provision in an artificial or contrived way. An arrangement may be artificial if it has 
been structured to ensure the provisions of the Act are applied to its legal form in a 
way that does not reflect the commercial reality and economic effects. High levels of 
complexity or unusual commercial practice may also, but will not necessarily, 
indicate that an arrangement is artificial or contrived.‖  
This is a comprehensive tax avoidance definition, but it is not often this thoroughly 
defined in case law scenarios. For example, Ben Nevis (Supreme Court, 2008, paragraph 
[107]) states that tax avoidance arises when the taxpayer has used specific provisions, ―and 
thereby altered the incidence of income tax, in a way which cannot have been within the 
contemplation and purpose of Parliament when it enacted the provision.‖ These two 
definitions of tax avoidance both (implicitly or explicitly) raised the ‗artificiality‘ factor that 
is commonly found in tax avoidance arrangements.  
However, it is not a term that is defined in the legislation, so it creates uncertainty 
about what the concept actually means or covers ―and this is therefore not the most principled 
way to approach the issue‖ (Trombitas, 2009, p. 356). Nevertheless, it is believed that a tax 
avoidance arrangement could entail one or more factors of the following factors, for example:  
―Artificiality, contrivance, pretence, circularity of funds, timing mismatches, 
unnecessary insertion of steps into a transaction, lack of a business purpose, a 
divergence between the economic and legal effects of a transaction and dealings 
between non-arm‟s length parties…‖ (Elliffe and Cameron, 2010, p. 451).  
133 
 
6.2.2 Approaches and principles adopted by the Judiciary 
As there is no comprehensive statutory definition for the concept of tax avoidance, the 
courts often have to go through the process of applying and adopting certain approaches and 
principles in order to determine whether a particular arrangement constituted tax avoidance. 
Although the approach and principle themselves do not explicitly define the concept of tax 
avoidance, they serve as a helping tool for ascertaining what tax avoidance may entail, as the 
facts of each case are both unique and incomparable. 
The approach taken for determining whether an arrangement was outside Parliament‘s 
contemplation is a useful tool adopted by the courts for deciding whether a particular 
behaviour constitutes tax avoidance. Based on Ben Nevis (Supreme Court, 2008), if an 
arrangement is not implemented in a manner that is consistent with Parliament‘s purpose, 
then it would be considered as a tax avoidance arrangement. The approach takes into account 
the economic effects and the commercial reality of the arrangement, and thus is able to 
identify the parties involved and those affected by the particular arrangement (IRD, 2011f).  
In Case W33 (2004),
39
 the dentist‘s salary had been fixed from his corporate trustee at 
a significantly lower figure than prior to the setting up of the trusts resulting in a significant 
amount of tax saved. The dental practice had been carried on essentially as it had before; 
leading it to be a tax avoidance case as there is a lack of commercial reality in the setting up 
of a family trust (as opposed to the practice being owned by a partnership). Therefore, ―if, 
after understanding the commercial and economic reality, the tax outcomes sought, based on 
the legal form of the arrangement, are not what Parliament would have intended, the 
arrangement will be outside Parliament‘s contemplation [and thus, a tax avoidance 
arrangement]‖ (IRD, 2011f, paragraph [227]). The decision reached in Penny and Hooper is 
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consistent with this case, hinting that the Judiciary continue to emphasis on certain main 
points when determining whether it is tax avoidance.  
An example where the taxpayers had not suffered the economic burden intended by 
Parliament would be the Glenharrow (Supreme Court, 2008)
40
 case where it involved the 
issue of the purchase price of a second-hand mining licence. The value of the mining licence 
was considered by the courts to have been grossly inflated at $45 million. It was genuinely 
believed by Glenharrow that the arrangement with Mr. Meates (the seller) was in accordance 
with the overall purpose of the Good and Services Act 1985 (―GST 1985‖) as it had only met 
the black letter requirements, and so the court believed that the arrangement was not 
consistent with the intent and application of the GST 1985, and thus a tax avoidance case.  
Another example is evident from the Penny and Hooper (Supreme Court, 2011) case 
where it was held by the Judges that the artificially low salary levels fixed for Messrs Penny 
and Hooper could not have been what Parliament had contemplated (and thus tax avoidance), 
even though what is considered to be a ‗commercially realistic salary‘ for orthopaedic 
surgeons is not separately defined in the legislation. In order to establish whether it was a tax 
avoidance arrangement, the monetary amount gained by the taxpayers is irrelevant for 
determining whether section BG 1 applied. From what the Courts have established over the 
years (for example: see Marx v CIR
41
; Carlson v CIR
42
 and Penny and Hooper), it is evident 
that a tax avoidance arrangement can exist even if the tax advantages gained are insignificant 
in monetary value as section BG 1 applies to the facts of the case, and not the financial 
advantage obtained by the taxpayers (Dunbar, 2006). However, tax avoidance case law 
demonstrates a trend similar to the one found in tax evasion cases where the financial amount 
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gained by the taxpayers are usually significant, and the amount is likely to have been ‗saved‘ 
over a period of time (see Chapter 6.3.2. The ‗Degrees‘ of Tax Evasion). 
Another common (but similar) principle adopted by the Judiciary for determining 
whether there is a tax avoidance arrangement is by distinguishing between the purpose and 
effect of an arrangement. If there is more than one purpose within an arrangement, then the 
dominant purpose (as opposed to the merely incidentals) is the main focus for determining 
whether it is a tax avoidance arrangement. In Penny and Hooper, it was concluded by the 
Supreme Court (2011) that the tax advantages gained were not merely incidentals and thus, 
they were engaged in a tax avoidance arrangement because of the lack of economic reality in 
the setting up of family trusts to avoid negligence claims (see Chapter 2 for more details).  
As a result of the lack of commercial explanation in Penny and Hooper, the Judiciary 
have now adopted a stricter approach for assessing whether the tax advantages gained by 
taxpayers have a dominant economic aspect to it. If not, then it is highly likely that one can 
confirm the existence of tax avoidance. Economic reality can be said to exist when there is a 
commercial effect to the arrangement, that is, taxpayers have utilized the tax incentives whilst 
objectively taking into account the context and purpose of the legislation (Elliffe and 
Cameron, 2010). However, this distinction is not always easy for taxpayers to follow because 
of the uncertainties and loopholes in certain areas of tax law (Ben Nevis Supreme Court, 
2008). 
Tax avoidance was deemed to have existed in Krukziener (High Court, 2010)
43
 where 
Krukziener paid no tax over the years as he had been living off loans taken from his various 
companies. Courtney J was dissatisfied with the argument that there was no arrangement as 
the loans were genuine liabilities where no income tax was payable. It is stated in paragraph 
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[23] that ―a significant indicator of the existence of an arrangement was the fact that the 
current account advances were repaid only when non-taxable distributions became available,‖ 
therefore, the lack of economic reality within the arrangement itself and the financial 
advantages gained by Krukziener confirms it as a tax avoidance case.  
The importance of the economic reality of an arrangement emphasized by the courts 
confirms this aspect as a critical factor to consider as to whether it is indeed tax avoidance. 
This approach is evident through two cases. First, Russell  (Court of Appeal, 2011)
44
 is a case 
associated with the implementation of the ‗Russell Template‘, it is a scheme that involves 
―entities controlled by Russell purchasing a profitable trading company (or companies) from 
the client…which the client continued to run as if no ownership change had occurred [so that 
no tax is paid]‖ (Russell COA, 2011). The courts confirmed the execution of the ‗Russell 
Template‘ to be a tax avoidance arrangement due to the high level of artificiality associated 
with the steps taken within the arrangement that is carried out by the parties involved.  
Second, the structured finance transactions through the use of a template, known as 
‗repo‘45 deals that were constructed in BNZ Investments Ltd (High Court, 2009) was also 
considered as a tax avoidance arrangement. The ‗repo‘ deals were believed to have ―no 
commercial rationale, logic or purpose‖ (BNZ Investments Ltd HC, paragraph [512]), because 
of its ―lack of business substance‖ (BNZ Investments Ltd HC, paragraph [515]), and thus the 
decision that it was a tax avoidance arrangement. 
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 The ‗repo‘ deals essentially meant that the ―transactions were structured to enable the New Zealand banks to 
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Lastly, Alesco (High Court, 2011)
46
 is a recent tax avoidance case where the 
arrangement between the parties lacked a commercial purpose. The case involved Alesco‘s 
purchase of two New Zealand companies through the use of a structure called ‗optional 
convertible notes‘ (OCNs) to fund the purchase. The OCNs are a hybrid debt-equity financial 
instrument, and although no interest was payable to Alesco, they claimed interest deductions. 
The court stated that under the situation where no real economic cost was borne by the 
taxpayers, there is no commercial purpose other than to obtain a tax advantage (Alesco HC, 
paragraphs [134] and [135]), thus, outside Parliament‘s contemplation (Alesco HC, 
paragraphs [94] and [147]). 
Therefore, although the concept of tax avoidance is not always defined within case 
law judgments, but through the application of the statutory definition provided in the ITA 
2007 and the relevant principles and approaches taken by the Judiciary, there is a solid 
explanation for what may be considered as tax avoidance. Apart from the legal steps taken to 
minimize one‘s tax liabilities, the importance to identify the presence of an arrangement is 
also an important factor in case law scenarios. The application of the statutory definition for 
tax avoidance and what constitutes as a tax avoidance arrangement alone does not thoroughly 
explain the boundaries of the concept, but with the help of the approaches and principles 
adopted by the courts over the years, there appears to be a growing trend for an in-depth 
examination (and debate) on the purpose and effect of an arrangement and if certain factors 
are met, then the Judiciary can generally conclude that it is a case of tax avoidance. Apart 
from the approaches and principles adopted by the courts over the years, it is evident that 
there lacks the number of definitions available for the concept itself, but the considerations 
made by the Judiciary and the descriptions provided by them are seen as useful tools for 
understanding what the concept of tax avoidance may incorporate.  
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6.3 Tax Evasion Cases 
The existing literature gathered for this study clearly describe how the concept of tax 
evasion is usually defined, by noting that it involves illegal, deliberate acts to avoid meeting 
one‘s tax obligations. As a criminal act, acts of tax evasion usually lead to either civil or 
criminal penalties, including imprisonment.  
Taylor (Supreme Court, 1963)
47
 shows that the mental element in evasion can vary, 
and at a minimum, a deliberate intent to not pay tax. McGregor J in Taylor said ―the word 
―evade‖ associated with the expressions ―attempts to evade‖ or ―does any act with intent to 
evade‖ includes an element of intent, that is, ―an intention to endeavour to avoid payment of 
tax known to be chargeable‖ (Taylor Supreme Court, paragraph [262]). This definition was 
later adopted in Dhillon (Court of Appeal, 2009)
48
  and Tonks (Court of Appeal, 2011). In 
addition, Coleman (2009, p. 11) state tax evasion is deemed to have occurred when ―there is a 
statutory obligation to disclose one‘s income and the taxpayer deliberately understates their 
income…‖ Lastly, Fepuleai (Court of Appeal, 2008)49  provide a comprehensive definition 
for the concept of tax evasion by stating: 
―…What does “evasion” mean? …There has got to be an element of wilfulness, it‟s 
more than a mere failure to account or pay as a result of an accident or a mistake, it 
is more than omission or neglect…It involves an intention to avoid assessment or 
payment where there is an obligation to pay tax or file a return. That is, an intent to 
endeavour to avoid the assessment or payment of tax where there is an awareness that 
the assessment must be made or that the tax is payable‖ (paragraph [27]).  
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6.3.1 The characteristics of tax evasion 
A number of recent cases have been examined from the Inland Revenue Department‘s 
web pages where it is clear that acts of tax evasion require, at a minimum, the establishment 
of the ‗knowledge‘ factor, along with at least one other factor from the following diagram 
(Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: The Characteristics Associated with Acts of Tax Evasion 
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The characteristics identified above represent the ‗foundations‘ or ‗requirements‘ 
necessary to establish that tax evasion behaviour has occurred, with the ‗knowledge‘ and 
‗intentional‘ factors being the most crucial factors among them. However, these 
characteristics are not usually accounted for in the definitions for the concept of tax evasion 
as they are commonly viewed as ways of examples where tax evasion begins. Section 141E 
of the Tax Administration Act 1994 (―TAA 1994‖) set out various acts or omissions which 
would constitute a similar act to evasion (IRD, 2006), and if breached, the taxpayer will be 
required to pay the appropriate penalties, as outlined in sections 143-143B. However, the 
concept of tax evasion is not specifically defined in the TAA 1994. In order to intentionally 
evade tax liabilities, the taxpayer must have knowledge of the situation that they are not being 
100 percent honest to the Inland Revenue authorities. Apart from the legality factor, it is 
evident that the ‗knowledge‘ factor is what sets tax avoidance behaviours distinct from acts of 
tax evasion. 
  After establishing that the ‗knowledge‘ factor has been satisfied, a taxpayer is deemed 
to have involved themselves in tax evasion behaviours by adopting one or more of the factors 
outlined in Figure 2. For example, Ms. Emanuel (IRD, 2011d) had received notifications 
from the Inland Revenue authorities to provide her business activities to support her GST 
claims, but she claimed she had lost them ―when she was moving house and she could not 
reconstruct these records either‖ (IRD, 2011d), but instead, she later provided ―altered, false, 
incomplete, or misleading information‖ (IRD, 2011d) on those GST returns. This showed that 
Ms. Emanuel had knowledge that she was providing misleading information to the Inland 
Revenue authorities by providing false information. Mr. Pongi (IRD, 2011b) was another 
taxpayer (in a separate incident) who had intentionally decided to not comply with relevant 
tax obligations by not filing any GST or company returns when he was ―well aware of his 
responsibilities‖ (IRD, 2011b).  
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Tax authorities identify tax evasion behaviours to be serious and by deliberately 
trying to evade meeting one‘s tax obligations, the taxpayer must be occupied in ‗calculating‘ 
ways to avoid complying with the tax rules even though they are aware of what is expected 
from them from a compliance perspective. Another example could be seen from Mr. 
Haggie‘s case (IRD, 2010b) where he deliberately ignored notices from the Inland Revenue 
authorities and even disappeared from his known address to avoid filing honest tax returns. 
These three cases have all satisfied the requirement of the ‗knowledge‘ factor required to 
establish that it is an act of tax evasion where they knew they have not met all of their tax 
obligations, and in one way or the other, have deliberately done something to conceal their 
acts of under-compliance. 
An interesting case was heard at the New Plymouth District Court in 2010 where Mr. 
Blackman ―deliberately set out to try and cheat the tax system by failing to declare income‖ 
(IRD, 2010a). His intentional behaviour of attempting to avoid tax payment was not the only 
issue presented to court, it was also his ―ridiculous, hollow argument over his supposed lack 
of understanding of the ‗$‘ symbol…‖ (IRD, 2010a). Despite his lack of understanding of the 
symbol, his obligations remain unchanged, where he was fined for knowingly not declaring 
his income.  
Apart from the common cases of deliberately not disclosing accurate tax returns to the 
Inland Revenue authorities, there has also been cases where behaviours of tax evasion (or 
fraud) can be found through ―a complex structure of associated companies and trusts‖ (IRD, 
2009a). However, it is not the only determinant for tax evasion in this case as Mr. Duncan 
was also involved in claiming GST deductions for fictitious transactions that either never 
occurred, or were later cancelled. There have also been cases where taxpayers have attempted 
to claim deductions and/or refunds on fictitious purchases of a helicopter, livestock purchases 
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(IRD, 2008c); frivolous personal reasons (IRD, 2008b); false loan applications (IRD, 2008a); 
and fabricated documents on the purchase of various musical instruments (IRD, 2008d).  
These are only a few of the recent examples of case law where taxpayers have been 
deemed to be involved in tax evasion (or similar acts). It is evident that tax evasion may be 
found in a number of possible situations and the difference between case law scenarios 
compared with existing literature is its abundance number of examples, as opposed to only 
mentioning its ‗illegality‘ and ‗deliberate‘ characteristics. It is from the behaviours of 
taxpayers described in case law that we understand what characteristics may contribute for a 
taxpayer to be engaged in evasion-related activities. The seriousness of each offence is not 
considered within this study as it is not the intention of the author to examine the 
appropriateness of the penalties imposed for tax evasion. However, it has been a feature of 
this study to look at the ‗degrees‘ of tax evasion and how they are distinguished between one 
another under different circumstances.  
6.3.2 The „degrees‟ of evasion 
As with the discussion on the concept of tax compliance where it is reasonable to 
conclude that there are ‗layers‘ of compliance, tax evasion case law has also adopted the 
approach of distinguishing between ‗innocent‘ and ‗fraudulent‘ evasion. Lord Templeman 
from Challenge (Privy Council, 1986, paragraph [513])
50
 explains that evasion occurs in 
situations when ―the Commissioner is not informed of all the facts relevant to an assessment 
of tax. Innocent evasion may lead to a reassessment. Fraudulent evasion may lead to a 
criminal prosecution as well as reassessment.‖ Sawyer (1996, p. 486) observes this 
description of evasion being ―dangerously close to avoidance, especially when an abusive tax 
position is included.‖ In the decision judgement for Challenge (Privy Council, 1986, 
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paragraph [561]), Lord Templeman provided a clear statement on the difference between the 
two forms of evasion by stating:  
―The distinction illustrates a key requirement of evasion, which is the necessary 
mental element or mens rea. A taxpayer must intend to avoid the payment of tax. If a 
taxpayer does not correctly meet their tax obligations because they have genuinely 
relied on information that has been provided which was incorrect, or in some other 
way they make an innocent mistake, then they are a party to innocent evasion.‖ 
This statement operates as a solid foundation for distinguishing between the two 
forms of evasion by noting the importance between someone who deliberately cheats the tax 
system and someone who may have under-complied due to a lack of understanding of the tax 
law. In addition, Elliffe (2011, p. 454) states that ―recklessness must not be confused with 
negligence‖ as recklessness requires taxpayer‘s knowledge or deliberate disregard towards 
the tax system, whereas, negligence does not require there to be presence of the ‗knowledge‘ 
factor, thus difficult to establish it as tax evasion behaviour. An example of recklessness 
would be the case of Zaheed (Court of Appeal, 2010)
51
  where the taxpayer was aware of his 
legal obligations but had failed to file GST and PAYE returns. Whereas, negligence could be 
found in the case of Fepuleai (Court of Appeal, 2008) where it was argued that the taxpayer 
had no ‗knowledge‘ that he was ―deliberately applying funds elsewhere to defeat his 
obligations of payment to the IRD [Inland Revenue Department]‖ (Fepuleai Court of Appeal, 
paragraph [14]).  
The Interpretation Statement IS0062 (2006) on tax evasion issued by the Inland 
Revenue Department include a criteria (see Appendix A) that the Commissioner may 
consider before imposing a penalty, but these pre-set standards may also be acknowledging 
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the fact that there may be different ‗degrees‘ of seriousness under tax evasion scenarios. That 
is, the seriousness of tax evasion behaviours demonstrated by taxpayers under different 
circumstances. The following section looks at how the ‗degree‘ of seriousness for tax evasion 
can be determined by examining the intention behind why and for how long the taxpayer had 
failed to meet their tax obligations. The amount of monetary value at issue under tax evasion 
scenarios vary between $36,000 by Ms. Emanuel (IRD, 2011d), and up to $35 million  by 35 
taxpayers (IRD, 2009d), therefore, it cannot be regarded as an influential factor for 
determining whether it is tax evasion. In addition, the ‗degree‘ of evasion cannot be simply 
determined by looking at the number of charges involved in each case, as not all charges may 
carry the same ‗weighting‘, thus, the focus for determining the seriousness of the issue should 
revolve around the characteristics outlined in Figure 1.  
However, the cause and effect for evading tax liabilities is an important factor to 
consider as it was evident from the Dempsey (High Court, 2010) case where the taxpayer had 
failed to meet tax obligations because of a lack of understanding on what is expected of him 
and his business was given a more ‗lenient‘ sentence than Mr. Smith, who had intentionally 
used the tax money to fund a lavishing lifestyle (Smith Court of Appeal, 2008). The District 
Court Judge for the Dempsey (2010) case stated in paragraph [12] that he had taken into 
account Mr. Dempsey‘s ―personal circumstances and the fact that this continued bad 
management and failure to comply [was not because of] greed or personal gain…‖ This 
intuitively implies that taxpayers who have obtained lower personal benefits may have been 
involved in a less serious form of evasion than taxpayers who evade for the dominant purpose 
of advancing their personal benefits.  
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Similar cases have been presented to the courts over the years where taxpayers have 
used the money owed or gained in an illegitimate manner to further enhance their personal 
living standards; that is, taxpayers who evade with ignorance. This is evident from Ms. Foot‘s 
(IRD, 2011e) case where she used undeclared income and fraudulent GST refunds to fund her 
overseas travel. Another taxpayer, Mr. Smith (IRD, 2009b), deliberately set up a separate 
copy of records for the Inland Revenue Department with the intent to escape certain tax 
payments. He then used the undeclared income ―to fund a lifestyle that included overseas 
travel, purchasing expensive motor vehicles and importing pedigree dogs‖ (IRD, 2009b). 
Another example would be Mr. Hunter‘s (IRD, 2008b) case where he ―deliberately avoided 
paying tax for frivolous personal reasons‖ and then used the unpaid amounts to spend on 
―holidays, doing things, having a good time … [and] wasted a lot of it‖ (IRD, 2008b). 
These have been examples where the taxpayers have intentionally failed to meet their 
tax obligations, but instead, ‗upgraded‘ their personal bank accounts, but with the result of 
being sentenced in a more severe manner than if they had not used the illegitimate money to 
support a lavishing lifestyle. Therefore, the ‗reason‘ for the incomplete records obtained by 
the Inland Revenue authorities may to an extent, play an important role when determining the 
severity of the case, as not only is it important to draw a distinction between ‗innocent‘ and 
‗fraudulent‘ evasion, but it is also important to assess how the taxpayers have ‗exploited‘ the 
illegitimate tax money that has been either under-paid or over-claimed.  
There also appears to be a common trend for tax evasion behaviours to be conducted 
out over a long period of time. It would be generally agreed that the longer the period that a 
taxpayer has been involved in acts of evasion, the larger the dollar amounts at issue, and thus, 
the easier it becomes for the court to determine that it is a case of serious fraudulent evasion.  
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For example, Mr. Ambler (IRD, 2011c) failed to file GST returns between July 2005 
and March 2009, as well as failing to file income tax returns between 2006 and 2008. This is 
a case where a taxpayer has deliberately failed to meet their tax obligations over a prolonged 
period of time and it is undoubtedly a calculated attempt to disregard the tax laws. Mr. 
Phommasa (IRD, 2009c) was involved in an even longer period (seven years) of intentionally 
failing to file tax returns. Another example comes from Mr. Lucy‘s (IRD, 2011a) case where 
there were four years in question for personal income tax returns and five years for GST 
returns. These cases are a representation of how tax evasion usually span over a long period 
of time and hence, a characteristic that should be considered separately when assessing the 
seriousness of a particular case.  
An example of a case that consider both the scale and duration of evasion would be 
the James‘ (Court of Appeal, 2010)52 case where he had knowingly failed to file tax returns 
intending to evade the assessment or payment of tax over an eight year period. Judge Tuohy 
from the District Court stated that the taxpayer had used his tax payments to provide a ―very 
comfortable lifestyle‖ for himself and his family and that some of the money was applied 
towards building an ―expensive home‖ (James COA, paragraph [6]). As the taxpayer‘s 
―financial position did improve significantly with the benefit of evaded tax money‖ (James 
COA, paragraph [15]), it would be considered that this is a case where it involves a serious 
‗degree‘ of fraudulent evasion.  
Despite its importance, the ‗degree‘ of evasion should not interfere with the factors 
that have to be considered before agreeing that there are acts of evasion within a particular 
case. However, the acknowledgement on the distinction between the ‗degree‘ of evasion has 
proven to be a determinant for the severity of the penalties imposed onto the taxpayers as the 
courts have a tendency to consider both the time-frame in question and whether the taxpayers 
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have used the tax money for advancements in personal gains. Although these considerations 
do not assist in defining the concept of tax evasion itself, but they act as important issues that 
need to be considered for distinguishing between ‗innocent‘ and ‗fraudulent‘ evasion that was 
involved in the case and how the penalties would be imposed thereafter. 
It is evident that case law takes an extra step than existing literature when determining 
how to interpret the concept of tax evasion. Tax evasion cases generally include two or more 
characteristics identified from Figure 2 before determining the ‗degree‘ of evasion involved, 
or in other words, the seriousness of the case by aligning the facts of the case against certain 
principles (for example, the time period in question or how the tax money has been used by 
taxpayers) to ascertain how penalties should be imposed onto the taxpayers. Therefore, 
although not many case law judgments had defined the concept of tax evasion in a distinct 
sentence (other than applying the relevant sections from the legislation), it can still be agreed 
that case law provides another approach for understanding what tax evasion behaviour may 
incorporate by evaluating the characteristics associated with tax evasion. The factors from 
Figure 2 act as examples for understanding what the concept of tax evasion involves, and this 
would have been difficult to achieve if the concept was to be defined in a single sentence.  
6.4 Response from Tax Practitioner A 
 The response received from tax practitioner A has been both interesting and helpful. 
First, tax practitioner A is ―okay‖ with the definition of tax compliance provided by the 
Inland Revenue Department (IRD) as he believes that the definition is ―clear‖ and it will be 
hard to ―improve on IRD‘s one [definition].‖ It is clear from the response letter that the 
potential problems lie in the difficulties surrounding the concepts of tax planning and tax 
avoidance. They are two very closely related concepts and the blurriness between the two 
cannot be easily separated. Tax mitigation is believed to be a ―redundant term from 
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Challenge used to justify avoidance behaviour‖ and this is consistent with what other studies 
have found (see Chapter 5.3.2.1 Tax mitigation). In addition, tax mitigation can be viewed as 
a behaviour that is adopted to ―cover [acts of] tax avoidance‖.  
In the tax compliance section of the questions, the way in which tax practitioner A 
would define the concepts are very similar to what existing literature has defined them as but 
interestingly, he has never heard of the term over-compliance. Despite this, he believes that 
over-compliance should be placed within the main branch of tax compliance, as opposed to 
non-compliance (that is, what this study has done).  
As for the section on case law, tax practitioner A is happy with how the Judiciary 
implements particular approaches to determine the outcome of a particular case. He believes 
that the decision achieved in preceding cases act as a solid foundation for providing a ―clear‖ 
understanding as to what is tax avoidance or tax evasion. The approaches and principles that 
have been adopted have been able to ―stop‖ certain transactions from breaching the law and 
thus perceived to be effective, however, it is believed that there is still room for 
improvements that can be achieved for providing a clearer picture between what is acceptable 
and what is unacceptable at law.  
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7.0 Discussion and Contributions to 
Knowledge 
7.1 Discussion 
It is evident that the number of existing literature and case law over the years has 
significantly enhanced our understanding and knowledge in the area of behavioural tax 
compliance and non-compliance. However, due to the differences in which individual studies 
have been carried out and the uniqueness of the facts from each case law, inconsistencies 
between the definitions of tax compliance and non-compliance are still a major concern for 
researchers, governments and ultimately, taxpayers. The purpose of this study has been set 
out to examine how definitions for tax compliance, non-compliance, and their sub-categories 
have evolved (or remained fairly constant) over the years and the effect this has cast over the 
possibility of adopting ‗universal‘ definitions for the relevant concepts from the perspective 
of taxpayers. 
Being able to adopt comparable definitions between studies is crucial for future 
studies within this area. As stated earlier, ‗universal‘ definitions for the concepts would mean 
better understanding and less confusion among the various studies conducted. As for case 
law, an explicit definition that goes beyond the statutory definition is presumed to be 
welcomed by those affected. However, this goal has proven to be hard to achieve. A number 
of factors can, and have, influenced how concepts are defined in existing literature and case 
law, and without a doubt, future cases within this area will also continue to encounter a 
number of factors that have the ability to influence how a particular study defines the 
concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that 
although having ‗universal‘ definitions for the concepts may be the desired outcome, but in 
reality, this goal cannot be achieved without producing further problems.  
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At best, definitions may become clearer and be more accommodating for the ‗layers‘ 
and ‗sub-categories‘ of tax compliance and non-compliance, but it will be of no surprise that 
variations of definitions continue to be applied in various studies in the future. A common 
weakness found in existing literature would be the lack of emphasis the author(s) have placed 
on what the concepts actually represent within their particular study. This is particularly 
evident from the number of studies that do not explicitly define the concepts of tax 
compliance and non-compliance (see Chapter 5.3.5 Studies That Do Not Define Tax 
Compliance and Non-Compliance). Therefore, if future researchers could define and explain 
clearly what the concepts mean and cover within their studies, then the level of 
misunderstanding and confusion could be reduced to a certain extent even if definitions 
cannot be made ‗universal‘ (or consistent) across studies.  
From a case law perspective, statutory definitions and precedent cases account for a 
significant weighting of how the concepts are recognized, thus, limiting the possibility of 
adopting unique definitions each time a tax avoidance/tax evasion case is heard. Although the 
existence of precedent cases implicitly set the standard of what tax avoidance/tax evasion 
entails, it is undeniable that there are potential benefits for the court and taxpayers in general. 
The approaches and principles taken by the Judiciary may be perceived as guidelines or 
boundaries as to what may be constituted as tax avoidance/tax evasion behaviours even 
though the facts of each case is unique in its own way. Therefore, creating a balance between 
the reliance on precedent cases and how the Judiciary act upon the issue at hand is important 
to understand the relevant concepts.  
The number of studies conducted around the area of behavioural tax compliance and 
non-compliance has led to a number of different versions of definitions for the relevant 
concepts; therefore, it is an extremely difficult task to attribute ‗universal‘ definitions for each 
of the concepts at issue. Nevertheless, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn that ‗tax 
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compliance‘ involves taxpayers satisfying the applicable rules and regulations by paying the 
correct amount of taxes due at the right time. In addition, there is enough evidence to support 
the argument on the importance to distinguish between taxpayers who observe the ‗letter‘ of 
the law, the ‗spirit‘ of the law, or both, to determine the ‗degree‘ or ‗extent‘ of their 
compliance behaviour. Although it is again a subjective issue in ascertaining what is intended 
to mean by complying with the ‗spirit‘ of the law, it may be reasonably justified that 
taxpayers who are ‗committed‘ to meeting their tax obligations without enforcement 
activities by the tax authorities could fit into this particular category.  
Another interpretation of taxpayers observing the ‗spirit‘ and ‗letter‘ of the law may 
be interpreted to some extent as either ‗voluntary‘ or ‗enforced‘ tax compliance. Both of 
these interpretations intend to incorporate contrasting attitudes towards tax compliance, 
however, it is important to note that they are not substitutes for the understanding of taxpayer 
behaviour, but rather, they should be perceived as different (or alternate) interpretations of 
how varying ‗degrees‘ of tax compliance behaviour can be acknowledged. There is no 
presumed superior method as to which of these two approaches better-suit the understanding 
on the various ‗degrees‘ of tax compliance, as the suitability of the approach taken should be 
reasonably justified within the study by the author(s).  
In the study by Wahl et al. (2010, p. 400), the definition for voluntary tax compliance 
is given as taxpayers contributing ―their fair share to the common good, without hesitation.‖ 
On the other hand, enforced tax compliance is recognized in situations where ―taxpayers pay 
taxes because they are audited and fined, [but] might act strategically as soon as they find a 
way to evade taxes undetected‖ (Wahl et al., 2010, p. 400). It is plausible that there may be 
other forms of taxpayer behaviour within these two extremes, but they are not commonly 
recognized in literature and in practice.  
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In contrast to tax compliance, tax non-compliance is the opposite where it includes the 
main sub-categories of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and over compliance. Within non-
compliance, behaviours such as: under-payment, under-reporting, and non-filing of tax 
obligations by the taxpayers are commonly detected (Slemrod, 2004). Other insignificant 
sub-categories within non-compliance was introduced in Chapter 5, but researchers have 
predominantly focused on the three main forms of non-compliance as the distinction between 
them are considered to be more productive from a research perspective. In addition, although 
there is clear indication of what is tax avoidance and tax evasion in practice, there remain the 
difficulties of being able to distinguish them clearly under different scenarios.  
Furthermore, Goldsmith (1997, p. 11) states that the ―borderline between the two 
concepts [tax avoidance and tax evasion] is very fine and rather than trying to distinguish 
between these two concepts, it is much more helpful and important to start from the basic 
idea that only tax evasion, as opposed to tax avoidance, is reproachable.‖ This reflects the 
impracticality of attempting to distinguish further between the various sub-categories of non-
compliance when the current state may be sufficient, given the limitations associated with 
attempting to further distinguish between the minor sub-categories of tax non-compliance.  
The following figure (Figure 3) is improvised from the studies by Sawyer (1996) and 
Hughes (2009) to demonstrate the legality of how different behaviours between tax 
compliance and non-compliance could fit on a continuum. The left hand side of the 
continuum represents the ‗good‘ side where it accounts for compliant taxpayer behaviours 
and the right hand side represents the ‗bad‘ as it accounts for non-compliant behaviours. The 
white-to-black bar is inserted to represent how taxpayers comply according to whether they 
are complying with both the ‗letter‘ and ‗spirit‘ of the law (white), ‗playing‘ around the 
loopholes of tax law (grey), or whether they are simply ignoring their tax obligations (black).  
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Figure 3: A Continuum Consisting of the Main Categories within the Parameters of Tax 
Compliance and Non-Compliance53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53
 This continuum may not necessarily consist of all the sub-categories of tax compliance and non-compliance; 
however, it is intended to provide an overall summary for the more prominent sub-categories within the two 
main branches. 
54
 Over-compliance may also be perceived to be over-and-above full compliance with both the letter and spirit 
of the law (box A) as taxpayers have, for a number of reasons, met more tax obligations than what is legally 
required from them.  
A Full compliance with both the letter and spirit of the law 
B Compliance with the letter of the law 
C Acceptable tax minimization 
D
54
 Over-compliance 
E Aggressive tax minimization 
F Creative compliance  
G Tax avoidance 
H Tax flight 
I Abusive tax position 
J Innocent tax evasion 
K Tax fraud 
L Fraudulent tax evasion 
Legal                    Illegal 
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In addition to Figure 3, the following figure (Figure 4) is a representation for 
incorporating various sub-categories within tax compliance and non-compliance on a 
spectrum ranging from ‗full compliance‘ to ‗complete non-compliance‘. It is adopted from 
the IRD‘s compliance model (see Figure 1). The following figure looks at the attitudes and 
behaviours of taxpayers when faced with their tax liabilities. Figure 4 shows a range of 
possible taxpayer behaviours where taxpayers could either comply willingly (the top of the 
spectrum at ‗full compliance‘) or they could choose to not declare/pay any taxes at all (the 
bottom of the spectrum at ‗complete non-compliance‘). However, it is important to note that 
this figure does not look at the motive or intent as to why taxpayers choose to comply or not 
comply with their tax obligations. Furthermore, it is also important to consider that there may 
be various methods for placing the various behaviours on the spectrum. 
In addition to the link Figure 4 shares with the IRD‘s compliance model, the 
following figure also takes into account the ‗over-compliant‘ taxpayers who have, for various 
reasons, missed out on claiming their legitimate refunds (Sung, 2009).  The group of ‗over-
compliant‘ taxpayers are placed separately above the spectrum as they are perceived as a 
group that have met over-and-beyond what was expected from them from a compliance 
perspective (see Chapter 5.3.4.).  
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Figure 4: A Behavioural Compliance Spectrum Consisting of the Main 
Categories within the Parameters of Tax Compliance and Non-Compliance
55
 
 
 
FULL COMPLIANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPLETE NON-COMPLIANCE 
                                                          
55
 This spectrum may not necessarily consist of all the sub-categories of tax compliance and non-compliance; 
however, it is intended to provide an overall summary for the more prominent sub-categories within the two 
main branches. In addition, it is important to note that this continuum is based upon the behaviour of taxpayers, 
rather than motive or intent. Note that some taxpayers and tax advisors may perceive the line of ―full 
compliance‖ to fall nearer to the level of ―acceptable tax minimization‖ (or even lower). 
Over Compliance 
Voluntary compliance 
Unintentional non-compliance (lack 
of tax knowledge) 
Enforced compliance 
Acceptable tax minimization 
Aggressive tax minimization 
Creative compliance Tax avoidance 
Tax flight 
Innocent tax evasion (unintentional) 
Abusive tax position 
Tax fraud 
Fraudulent tax evasion (intentional) No taxable income reported 
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7.2 Contributions to Knowledge 
 In general, this study has placed emphasis on researching a fairly new area concerning 
behavioural tax compliance and non-compliance literature, but at the same time, it replicates 
ideas from existing literature on the understanding of the relevant concepts. It is evident that 
existing literature have not been able to settle on a common definition, nor improve on the 
clarity for the concepts of tax compliance, non-compliance and their sub-categories across 
various studies. The inconsistencies in the definitions are particularly evident in case law 
where the views of the Judiciary have the potential to influence the decision reached in 
courts. In addition, external factors (such as: the state of the economy and the government) 
also have an impact on how the concepts are comprehended under different timeframes and 
scenarios. Therefore, the objectives introduced in the beginning form the basis for this 
study‘s contribution to knowledge. 
For this study, the most important contribution to literature is its effort to describe how 
various definitions for the concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance have been applied 
over the years in both existing literature and case law. The number of existing literature 
gathered for this study provides a solid foundation for interested parties as to how the 
relevant concepts have been defined or applied in literature over the years. In addition, the 
tables that have been used to outline the definitions gathered for this study in Chapter 5 
enhanced aspects of clarity and comparability for future studies within this area. As for case 
law, the aim to conduct a preliminary study on how New Zealand Judiciary applies the 
definitions of tax avoidance and tax evasion was also achieved through the examination of 
recent tax avoidance and tax evasion cases. In addition to the influence of preceding cases, 
the analysis of how the approaches and principles that have been applied in recent case law 
enhances our understanding as to what sort of taxpayer actions may amount to tax avoidance 
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or tax evasion. Although the facts of each case is different, this study‘s analysis on recent 
case law acts as a guideline for taxpayers who are in a similar situation in the future, and may 
also act as a ‗warning‘ for taxpayers who may be thinking of ‗dodging‘ around the grey areas 
of tax law.  
As well as looking at the various definitions for the concepts of tax compliance and non-
compliance, this study has also examined the benefits and costs of the current situation with 
the possibility of having ‗universal‘ definitions for each of the key concepts. Regardless of 
the preferred outcome, it is important to acknowledge that it may be impractical in some 
situations to ‗force‘ a pre-determined definition to the concept. Although having a ‗universal‘ 
definition could reduce the issues of confusion and misunderstanding, factors such as the 
type, and nature of study, the time of publication, and the scope of study conducted, can all 
influence the ‗version‘ or ‗comprehensiveness‘ of the definition adopted. As well as the 
factors associated directly with the study itself, external factors such as the government‘s 
rules and policies, and the state of a country‘s economy and well-being may all contribute to 
the impracticability of only having a ‗universal‘ definition for the concepts. Therefore, having 
various factors that could affect the way in which the concepts of tax compliance and non-
compliance are defined and applied in studies, there is solid ground for justifying that the use 
of ‗different‘ or ‗improvised‘ definitions in particular circumstances may be considered more 
sensible and thus, reflective of the study carried out after considering the possible influential 
factors.   
The response from the tax practitioner was useful as it provided information from a 
different perspective. Having a view from a practical field has certainly provided a different 
angle on the issues surrounding tax compliance and non-compliance. The tax practitioner‘s 
view and comments on the concepts and the topic overall not only confirms ideas that have 
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been gathered from existing literature and case law, but it also added another perspective to 
the topic where it could not have been possible to extract from the internet or the libraries. 
Therefore, this study has combined research results from both theory and practice (via case 
law) to produce a wider perspective on the issues and problems surrounding the concepts of 
tax compliance and non-compliance.  
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8.0 Conclusions, Limitations and 
Future Research 
8.1 Conclusions 
 The understanding on the concepts of tax compliance, non-compliance, and 
their sub-categories should remain the focus of research for future studies. This can be 
achieved through a better understanding of the concepts by reducing inconsistencies and 
confusion between different studies. There is still a considerable scope of research to be 
conducted around this area as the external factors associated with how the definitions are 
established may change over time. It is important to bear in mind that a number of existing 
studies describe the concepts, rather than providing an explicit definition, and although it 
facilitates our understanding of the concepts, descriptions or examples should not be 
confused with an actual definition.  
Furthermore, the priority of future studies should be to establish ‗universal‘ (or 
consistent) definitions for the concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance, but 
researchers should be complacent with what has been achieved in literature to date until new 
or improvised methods have been implemented to enhance the approaches taken to define the 
relevant concepts. It is also important to consider the influence external factors may have on 
how the concepts are defined as this will create a clearer picture as to what considerations are 
necessary when coming up with a definition for the concepts of tax compliance and non-
compliance.  
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There is probably not as much room for improvement in case law as there are certain 
procedures that have to be followed by the Judiciary, such as, the application and 
consideration of statutory legislation and decisions from preceding cases of a similar nature. 
Despite this, there should still be an emphasis for the Judiciary to implement certain 
definitions over-and-beyond what has been set out in the legislation to further enhance our 
understanding of what tax avoidance and tax evasion incorporates. The diagram (see 
Appendix C) set out in the Appendix of the Interpretation Statement on tax avoidance issued 
by the IRD (2011f) is a comprehensive overview for establishing whether a particular case is 
tax avoidance. However, it is questionable as to whether the diagram is sufficient for 
capturing this complicated problem of tax avoidance as there are too many uncontrollable 
factors. Nevertheless, the diagram is a useful guide for taxpayers and associated parties to 
determine at an initial stage as to whether certain behaviour is tax avoidance. It would 
therefore be beneficial if a similar diagram could be prepared for tax evasion. However, the 
diagrams are not intended to ‗encourage‘ certain behaviours, but they will be of use for 
associated parties to gain a better understanding of the situation so that they do not face 
unintended consequences. 
Better or more comprehensive definitions for the concepts of tax compliance and non-
compliance also have the potential to reduce the widened tax gaps experienced by 
governments over the years. Not only is the establishment of comprehensive definitions 
important for taxpayers and governments, but the perceived fairness of the tax systems are 
also important.  
This is supported by Book‘s (2003, p. 4) remark where he states that even broad 
categories like intentional and unintentional compliance are insufficient to understand fully 
the dynamics of non-compliance,‖ and so, it is agreeable that taxpayers would be ―more 
inclined to comply with the law if the exchange between the laid tax and the performed 
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government services are found to be equitable‖ (Torgler, 2007, p. 74). In addition, Wenzel 
(2002, p. 630) stresses on the importance of having a ‗fairer‘ tax system because, ―although 
some people may find some unlawful acts of evasion illegitimate according to their concept 
of right and wrong, they may regard respective acts of evasion, even though unlawful, as 
morally justified [if they perceive the tax system to be unfair].‖  
In conclusion, since ‗universal‘ definitions cannot be achieved given the current state 
of literature and case law, the direction of focus for studies should be placed upon the 
approaches taken to define the concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance. As for the 
sub-categories within the main branches of tax compliance and non-compliance, the 
acknowledgement of their existence should be emphasised in hierarchy order in terms of their 
dominant existence as it is both unhelpful and impractical to dwell into the minute details of 
those sub-categories that are not important in literature or case law. 
8.2 Limitations 
Due to the scope of this study, it was necessary to place some pre-determined 
boundaries to ensure that this study could be completed within the timeframe and resources 
available. Both existing literature and case law from New Zealand have been included as 
sources of data information, and throughout the data collection process, a number of 
limitations are evident and unavoidable for this study 
First, in order to concentrate on the behavioural fiscal psychology domain of tax 
compliance and non-compliance, literature that is of an economic or finance-based nature has 
not been considered in great detail. It is likely that some valuable information may have been 
missed out on because of the exclusion of those studies, but because of the lack of skills and 
knowledge within the area, it was considered appropriate to exclude those studies to a 
significant extent to reduce the risk of derailing from the objectives set out for this study. 
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Nevertheless, a few economics or finance-based studies have been cited as those studies did 
not require a high level of mathematical-related background to understand and interpret the 
results from those studies.  
As well as the exclusion of economics and finance-based studies, all non-English texts 
have also been excluded. This was a necessary step to take in order to avoid translation issues 
that may arise if the results from foreign-language studies are included. As well as being able 
to avoid inconsistencies from translating a study, the exclusion of non-English texts has 
allowed for clear boundaries to be in place in order to ensure that the scope of this study is of 
a manageable size, given the time and resource constraints.  
Second, although this research has focused predominantly on the behavioural fiscal 
psychology domain of tax compliance and non-compliance, it was still a challenge to include 
all existing literature into this study. However, this study has attempted to include as many 
references as possible during the data collection process by utilizing various sources of 
information. Therefore, it may be possible that the definitions included and discussed within 
this study may not be a full representation of a conclusive set of all potential definitions in the 
realm of existing literature on behavioural tax compliance and non-compliance. Nevertheless, 
it is believed that this study has captured the essence of the main characteristics for the 
concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance, as well as having examined the more 
commonly known ‗layers‘ and the ‗sub-categories‘ that are present under those two main 
branches.  
In addition, case law outside New Zealand‘s jurisdiction was also excluded because 
different countries operate under different jurisdictions, and this would mean that the focus of 
this study would be too widespread. By limiting the search to only New Zealand case law, 
this has allowed for a closer examination on how the courts handle the various forms of non-
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compliance behaviours. Once again, not all tax avoidance and tax evasion cases have been 
cited, but the cases studied act as a representation as to how the Judiciary perceive those 
behaviours through the adoption of various approaches and principles to determine the form 
(and extent) of non-compliance activity. Furthermore, by focusing primarily on recent cases 
from New Zealand, this means that the laws applicable within the cases are current (to an 
extent) and that the discussions made between the cases would be more comparable. It is 
hoped that by opting for a more detailed analysis on the selected cases would allow for a 
more thorough understanding on the kind of definitions adopted or interpreted in case law 
scenarios.  
Third, the gathering of opinions from taxpayers has not been included. This study has 
not conducted interviews or distributed surveys to taxpayers in general as this study had 
intended to only look at the issues from the perspective of existing literature and case law. 
There are two main reasons for not incorporating opinions from taxpayers. The first reason is 
because of the sensitivity and complexity of the topic studied, where it involves a high level 
of abstraction and technical terms that may be considered to be too difficult for taxpayers to 
comprehend (Hofmann et al., 2008). It is believed that if a taxpayer‘s ability to complete the 
survey/interview would be impaired as a result of the technical aspects and terms associated 
with the topic, then it is highly likely that this will have an impact on the completeness of the 
response, and therefore, the results for this study. In addition, by including the opinions of 
taxpayers into the study, there will be too many behavioural variables (as seen from the study 
conducted by Jackson and Milliron, 1986) that cannot be controlled nor limited, and thus, 
creating difficulties to compare between participants‘ responses. Furthermore, due to the 
sensitive nature of this study, the essential factors for a valid survey or interview would be 
difficult to achieve, as outlined by Jackson and Milliron (1986). This is because some 
taxpayers may not be willing to disclose confidential and sensitive information on their 
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attitudes and behaviours on the area of tax compliance and non-compliance. The three 
essentials are, namely: the ability to obtain a representative sample, to have an adequate 
response rate, and, getting honest responses (Jackson and Milliron, 1986). Due to resource, 
time, and budgetary constraints, it would not be likely to have a nation-wide pool of 
participants, nor would it be likely to receive an adequate response rate, therefore, leading to 
the possibility of biased results (Richardson and Sawyer, 2001).  
Fourth, the definitions for the concepts of tax compliance, non-compliance, and their 
sub-categories have been ordered in chronological order according to publication dates. This 
method of ordering was selected as it provides an easier approach to look back at how the 
definitions for the concepts have evolved (or remained constant) over time. Although the 
ordering method selected may not be considered the best approach to order the various 
definitions, but it is believed that this approach provides a clearer picture for readers to see 
how the concepts have (or have not) changed over the years and across the different domains 
of study. In addition to the possible weakness as a result of how the definitions have been 
ordered, there may also be some disagreement as to the choice of case law that has been 
gathered for this study.  
Due to the widespread number of cases from New Zealand since 2008, it would be 
impossible to cite all tax avoidance/tax evasion related cases given the time and resource 
available for this study. As a result, some readers may disagree on the suitability of the cases 
selected; however, it is believed that this study has captured the essence of the approaches 
and principles taken by the Judiciary between the various tax avoidance/tax evasion cases, 
and how the concepts have been defined under various circumstances. In addition, it is in the 
author‘s view that various landmark tax avoidance/tax evasion cases have been examined and 
the discussions on those cases are considered adequate for the purposes of this study.  
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8.3 Future Research 
 The following list comprises of potential areas for future research in the area of 
behavioural tax compliance and non-compliance. This is not an exhaustive list as the scope of 
research within this area of research is both wide-ranging and diversified. Nevertheless, the 
list is intended to act as a guideline for researchers who may be interested in this area 
concerning behavioural tax compliance and non-compliance. The possible areas of future 
research outlined below are based upon the objectives from this study where it focuses on 
both the implicit and explicit approaches taken to define the concepts of tax compliance, non-
compliance, and their relevant sub-categories. 
First, future studies could easily expand on the scope of research conducted for this 
study in the form of introducing the presence of taxpayers. Their knowledge and 
understanding of the tax law is likely to be at a different level from tax practitioners and the 
government due to the complexity of the topic and, therefore, introducing a different 
perspective as to how the concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance can be defined. 
This approach will further enhance our understanding on the definitions for the concepts of 
tax compliance and non-compliance. This may either create an advantage if it could facilitate 
the process of attributing a ‗universal‘ definition for the concepts or prove to be a 
disadvantage if it further complicates the problem in an unhelpful manner if additional 
‗extractions‘ associated with the relevant concepts are introduced. A ‗universal‘ definition for 
the concepts may be established by aggregating the similarities between the various 
definitions, while assuming that the taxpayers do not have too many ‗unexpected‘ 
understandings on the concepts that will have to be considered as ‗outliers‘.  
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By introducing further players into a study, other sub-categories of tax compliance and 
non-compliance may also be ‗extracted‘ due to other factors that have to be taken into 
consideration, such as the Code of Ethics or specific government rules and policies that 
taxpayers have to abide to. The possibility of having more sub-categories is not intended to 
complicate the problem, but rather, to act as a helpful method for grouping the various forms 
of tax compliance and non-compliance behaviours into distinct categories to reduce 
unnecessary confusions and misunderstandings. This may be achieved by comparing the 
similarities between the more insignificant sub-categories and organize them into general 
groups where they may be better understood and accepted by taxpayers and associated 
parties.  
The inclusion of taxpayers would involve the distribution of surveys and/or 
questionnaires in order to collect their perspectives on how they would perceive or define the 
concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance. Since this would become an experimental 
research, potential researchers would need to control for various variables to limit the scope 
of research to a manageable size and the possibility of experiencing a low response rate due 
to the complicated nature of the topic. 
Second, if time and resource permits, future research could examine case law from a 
wider selection of countries. This study has focused predominantly on the cases that have 
originated from New Zealand, but undoubtedly, there is a great deal of research value if 
future studies could conduct a search on case law from an international perspective. As there 
are numerous tax avoidance and tax evasion related-cases worldwide, it would be necessary 
to set clear boundaries on the scope of research, and one possible approach would be to study 
selected case law that have originated from one of the Commonwealth countries. Another 
possible approach could be to select a few countries and examine how the approaches and 
principles applied by the Judiciary have changed (or not changed) over the years, and 
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whether the changes are consistent with the changes in government laws and regulations. 
Another possibility could be to conduct a comparative analysis by selecting one or two 
countries and examine how the approaches and principles adopted by the Judiciaries from 
those countries differ from New Zealand‘s judiciary. 
Regardless of the countries have been selected for study, certain constraints are 
important to have been considered. For example, limitations may include language 
barriers/inconsistencies between legislations/tax systems and access of relevant information 
when studying case law from a multi-national perspective. By incorporating a number of case 
law from a variety of countries would allow for a more detailed discussion on the approaches 
and principles taken by the Judiciary and how they have applied them under different 
circumstances. However, care must also be taken when comparing results between countries 
as each country has its own independent tax background where it may lead to discrepancies 
as to how the concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance are understood within each 
case law scenario. 
Third, it may be interesting to examine the topic of behavioural tax compliance and non-
compliance from a tax administration perspective. That is, examine methods that could be 
adopted by the government or revenue agencies to educate its taxpayers in order to increase 
the tax compliance rate, and at the same time, combat the problem of tax non-compliance. 
This potential area for future research does not focus on how the concepts of tax compliance 
and non-compliance should be defined, but rather, it examines how the compliance rate can 
be ‗boosted‘ by the government. As not all taxpayers will respond to the same method of 
education, future research could also examine different ‗tactics‘ for different groups of 
taxpayers. The increase in compliance rate will have a flow-on effect of seeing less non-
compliant taxpayers and thus, the government may not have to consistently dwell into the 
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many sub-categories within non-compliance.
56
  As well as the increase in compliance rate 
because of better education, taxpayers would also be considered to be more socially 
responsible as they would have met their fiscal obligations to a higher standard (Devos, 2004).  
Last, there is still much to learn about how behavioural factors, such as age and gender, 
can influence approaches taken to define the concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance. 
In the past, researchers have either focused on how behavioural factors can influence why 
people comply, or, placed emphasis on how the concepts are defined, but never really 
combined the two together within one study. Thus, the integration of the behavioural aspects 
and the approaches taken to define the concepts may not only enable future researchers to 
identify existing flaws in the current definitions, but also help future studies to determine 
better-suited definitions for the concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance. 
In sum, there are a number of potential areas for future research, either expanding the 
scope of research from what this study has achieved (in terms of the analysis on the 
definitions for the concepts of behavioural tax compliance and non-compliance), or limiting 
the scope of research to allow for the study to ‗dig‘ deeper within a defined area (for example: 
focusing on behavioural tax compliance and/or non-compliance). Either method would 
undoubtedly surprise the researcher on the unexplored areas within the topic of behavioural 
tax compliance and non-compliance. 
 
‘ 
 
                                                          
56
 It has sometimes been considered unnecessary for the sub-categories within tax non-compliance to be 
extracted as this has been described ‗unhelpful‘. For example, the Judiciary from Challenge thought it was 
unnecessary to distinguish between tax mitigation and tax avoidance. 
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10.0 Appendices 
10.1 Appendix A- Paragraph 4.12 from Interpretation Statement 0062 (IS0062) 
 
… 
4.12 In determining whether to impose a shortfall penalty for evasion the Commissioner will 
consider a number of criteria including: 
• Whether the taxpayer has been previously prosecuted and/or been subject to shortfall 
penalties for evasion; 
• The reason given by the taxpayer for his/her behaviour; 
• The degree of culpability of the taxpayer; 
• The likelihood of future compliance; 
• The degree of cooperation received from the taxpayer; 
• The effect on promoting voluntary compliance; and 
• The duty to protect the integrity of the tax system. 
… 
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10.2 Appendix B- Excerpts of Section YA 1 from the Income Tax Act 2007 
 
YA 1 DEFINITIONS 
… 
arrangement means an agreement, contract, plan, or understanding, whether enforceable or 
unenforceable, including all steps and transactions by which it is carried into effect 
… 
tax avoidance includes— 
(a) directly or indirectly altering the incidence of any income tax: 
(b) directly or indirectly relieving a person from liability to pay income tax or from a 
potential or prospective liability to future income tax: 
(c) directly or indirectly avoiding, postponing, or reducing any liability to income tax or any 
potential or prospective liability to future income tax 
tax avoidance arrangement means an arrangement, whether entered into by the person 
affected by the arrangement or by another person, that directly or indirectly— 
(a) has tax avoidance as its purpose or effect; or 
(b) has tax avoidance as 1 of its purposes or effects, whether or not any other purpose or 
effect is referable to ordinary business or family dealings, if the tax avoidance purpose or 
effect is not merely incidental 
… 
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10.3- Appendix C- Diagram from Draft Interpretation Statement (IS) on Tax Avoidance 
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10.4 Appendix D- Approval Letter from the Human Ethics Committee 
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10.5 Appendix E- Letters to Tax Practitioners and Response from Tax Practitioner A  
 
 
 
9 January 2012 
 
A Study of Tax Compliance and Tax Non-Compliance in the Context of the 
Current Literature and Case Law: A New Zealand Perspective 
 
Information Sheet for Letter Recipients (Tax Practitioners) 
 
I am a postgraduate student from the College of Business and Economics at the University of 
Canterbury. My research area is predominantly around the area of behavioural tax 
compliance where I am currently exploring how and why the definitions for the concepts of 
tax compliance, non-compliance and their relevant sub-categories (for example: tax 
avoidance, tax evasion and ultimately, over-compliance) differ in the literature. In addition, I 
am currently looking at the feasibility of attributing a ‗universal‘ definition to each of the 
concepts, as well as exploring the issues and problems that may be encountered if the 
definitions are made more consistent, as well as exploring the current issues associated with 
the various forms of definitions for the concepts.  
 
I would like to invite you to participate in my study. If you agree, you will be required to 
respond to a letter containing several questions on the topic of behavioural tax compliance. 
However, you will have the option of answering the questions verbally where I could conduct 
a brief interview in person. The purpose of this is to obtain your views and comments on the 
issues concerned with the study, as well as other potential issues that have not yet been 
focused on. Responding to the questions from the letter should take approximately 30-45 
minutes. Should an interview be conducted, you will have the right to decline any form of 
recording that you are uncomfortable with. If the interview was able to be recorded, you will 
be able to review a copy of the transcript. All participants will be sent a copy of the final 
study via email. 
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Please be assured that participation in this study is voluntary. If you choose to participate, 
you will have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. If you 
withdraw, I will remove any information relating to you as far as is practically achievable. 
I will take extreme care to ensure that the data gathered for this study remains confidential, 
where the data will be securely stored during my year of study. I will also take particular care 
to ensure your anonymity in publications of the findings. After this period, the data will be 
securely stored in password protected facilities and locked storage at the University of 
Canterbury for five years before it is destroyed. Please note that a Master‘s thesis is a public 
document that can be accessed via the UC‘s library database.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the study at any stage, please contact me. This 
study has received ethical approval from the University of Canterbury Educational Research 
Human Ethics Committee, and if you have any complaints, please address them to The Chair, 
Human Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 
(human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz).   
If you agree to participate in this study, please complete and return the attached consent form 
via email as soon as practical. 
 
I am looking forward to hearing back from you and thank you in advance for your 
contributions. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rebecca Wu 
 
Email: rcw46@uclive.ac.nz 
Phone: 0210382780 
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9 January 2012 
 
 
A Study of Tax Compliance and Tax Non-Compliance in the Context of the 
Current Literature and Case Law: A New Zealand Perspective 
 
Consent Form for Letter Recipients (Tax Practitioners) 
 
I have been given a full explanation of this project and have been given an opportunity to ask 
any questions. 
 
I understand what will be required of me if I agree to take part in this project. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any stage without 
penalty. 
 
I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the 
researcher and that any published or reported results will not identify me. In addition, if an 
interview is to be conducted under my approval, I understand that I have the right to decline 
the recording of the interview. 
 
I understand that all data collected for this study will be kept in locked and secure facilities at 
the University of Canterbury and will be destroyed after five years. However, I am aware that 
a Master thesis is a public document that be accessed through the University of Canterbury‘s 
library database. 
 
I understand that I will receive a report on the findings of this study. I have provided my 
email details below for this. 
 
I understand that if I require further information, I can contact the researcher, Rebecca Wu. If  
I have any complaints, I can contact the researcher‘s supervisors, Prof. Adrian Sawyer or Mr. 
Alistair Hodson, or the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. 
 
 
By providing my details below, I agree to participate in this research project. 
 
Name: _________________________________________ 
 
Email address: __________________________________ 
 
Date: __________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Please attach this completed consent form via post with the response letter. 
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College of Business and Economics 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Tel: +64 3 364 2613, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727 
 
16 January 2012  
 
Dear XXX, 
 I am currently studying towards a Master of Commerce degree at the University of 
Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. My thesis is on the topic of behavioural tax 
compliance and non-compliance primarily from the perspective of taxpayers, but also from a 
tax practitioner‘s perspective. The thesis sets out to examine how and why the definitions for 
the concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance differ in existing studies in the literature, 
as well as in case law (from both Australia and New Zealand in order to draw possible 
comparisons between the two jurisdictions). 
As well as looking at the various definitions available within existing studies and case 
law, I will also look at the possibility of allocating a ‗universal‘ definition to each of the 
concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance to enhance the comparability and 
understandability of future studies in this area. Lastly, this study is set out to evaluate the 
potential problems that may exist as a result of higher uniformity in the definitions, as well as 
considering any problems that may arise if definitions cannot be made more consistent 
between future studies of behavioural tax compliance and non-compliance. 
Therefore, the intention of this letter is to collect your views and opinions on this 
matter, where it would be greatly appreciated if you could answer the questions that you feel 
comfortable with (please see the accompanying pages). It is up to your discretion as to 
whether you would prefer to post/email the responses, which may be more convenient (time-
wise), or whether you would prefer an interview to be conducted. I understand the sensitivity 
of the topic where you may not be permitted to disclose confidential information; therefore, I 
will keep your name anonymous, where your identity will remain confidential in the final 
report.  
Should you have any further questions, you are welcome to contact my primary 
supervisor, Prof. Adrian Sawyer, on (03) 3642617. 
I look forward to hearing from you soon and thank you for your time and cooperation. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Rebecca Wu 
P: (+64) 210382780 
E-mail: rcw46@uclive.ac.nz 
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Appendix F- Letter Sent to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
College of Business and Economics 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Tel: +64 3 364 2613, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727 
 
Robert Russell 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
Inland Revenue Department 
PO BOX 39010, 
Wellington Mail Centre, 
Lower Hutt 5045 
 
 
10 January, 2012 
 
Dear Mr Russell,  
 I am currently studying towards a Master of Commerce degree at the 
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. My thesis is on the topic of 
behavioural tax compliance and non-compliance primarily from the perspective of taxpayers, 
but also from the Inland Revenue. The thesis sets out to examine how and why the definitions 
for the concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance differ between both existing studies 
in literature and case law scenarios.  
 
For the purpose of this study, the category of tax compliance underlies the need to 
differentiate between a taxpayer who complies with the ‗letter‘ of the law against a taxpayer 
who complies with the ‗spirit‘ of the law. In contrary, the non-compliance category is more 
complicated as it involves the need for distinction between abusive tax position, tax 
avoidance, tax evasion, creative compliance, and ultimately over-compliance.  
 
As well as looking at the various definitions available within existing studies and case 
law, I will also look at the possibility of allocating a ‗universal‘ definition to each of the 
concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance to enhance the comparability and 
understandability of future studies in this area. Lastly, this study is set out to evaluate the 
potential problems that may exist as a result of higher uniformity in the definitions, as well as 
considering any problems that may arise if definitions cannot be made more consistent 
between future studies of behavioural tax compliance and non-compliance. 
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For both tax compliance and non-compliance, several existing studies have 
emphasized the importance on the need to distinguish between whether a particular behaviour 
is intentional or unintentional. However, due to the complex nature and the ever-changing 
environment in taxation, it is often difficult to draw a clear-cut line between 
intentional/unintentional and legal/illegal behaviours, as demonstrated by taxpayers. As a 
result, the inconsistencies in the definitions (due to the various approaches taken from 
existing literature and case law), a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding exists, and 
therefore, leading to possible non-compliance behaviour without the taxpayers‘ knowledge 
and/or intent. As for case law, the emphasis I have placed on them is to determine how tax 
avoidance behaviour is depicted by the judiciary and whether a ‗pre-set standard‘ is adopted 
to assess whether tax avoidance and tax evasion is present in each of the case law scenarios. 
  
The main purpose of this letter is three-fold. First, it is intended to seek your views 
and opinions on the approaches/principles taken by the judiciary in law scenarios when 
determining whether a particular behaviour is tax avoidance/tax evasion or not. I am aware 
that to a certain extent, the outcomes of judiciary law scenarios are based upon relevant 
legislations and precedent cases; however, the intention of this letter is to further gather your 
views on the suitability of the current approaches and principles being adopted under current 
judiciary law scenarios, and whether appropriate improvements and/or amendments are 
necessary. In addition, if the current approaches and principles are deemed adequate in your 
opinion, what sorts of factors are prompting you to believe that no changes are required in the 
future? Second, from the various definitions that you would have without a doubt have come 
across on the concepts of tax compliance and non-compliance, what would be your view on 
the adequacy or suitability of the definitions that are commonly encountered by taxpayers. In 
addition, whether you have better suggestions or draft proposals on how the concepts of tax 
compliance and non-compliance should be defined. Lastly, as it is no longer a legal 
obligation for wage/salary earners to file annual tax returns, what is your comment on the 
issue of over-compliance for wage/salary taxpayers who may be ‗missing-out‘ on their tax 
refunds if they do not have the required knowledge to file a tax return?  
  
Should you have any questions or queries, you are welcome to contact my primary 
supervisor, Prof. Adrian Sawyer on (03) 3642617. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you soon and thank you for your time and cooperation. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Rebecca Wu 
 
P: 0210382780 
E-mail: rcw46@uclive.ac.nz 
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